University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1973

The Bracero Program : a case study of its development,
termination, and political aftermath.
George C. Kiser
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Kiser, George C., "The Bracero Program : a case study of its development, termination, and political
aftermath." (1973). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1874.
https://doi.org/10.7275/kb05-6859 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1874

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

©

1974

GEORGE CLAUDE KISER

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

THE BRACERO PROGRAM:
A CASE STUDY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT
TERMINATION, AND POLITICAL AFTERMATH

A Dissertation Presented

By

GEORGE C. KISER

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
#

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

December
Major Subject

1973

Political Sc ience

THE BRAGERO PROGRAM:
A CASE STUDY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT
TERMINATION, AND POLITICAL AFTERMATH

A Dissertation

By

GEORGE

KISER

-C.

Approved as to style and content by:

Ir.

Howard

"

O'.
J.

Afia^oa

(

C ha irman

of Committee

Geo^e Suiter

)

“

Dr. Harvey FJ Kline (Member)
Dr.

•

(Member)

VV a/v-y>yJl

Dr

.'

Lewis Hanke (Member)

Dr

.

Glen Gorden (Head of Department)

December

1973

To my wife, Martha, who has

in

2015

https://archive.org/details/braceroprogramcaOOkise

The Bracero Program:

A Case Study of its
Development,

Termination, and Political
Aftermath (December 1973)
George C. Kiser, B. A., Berea
College
M. A., University of
Wisconsin

Directed by:

Dr. Howard J. Wiarda

In response to grower claims
of a serious farm labor

shortage during World War

H,

the United States government

initiated a bracero (Mexican labor)
program providing for
the temporary employment of
Mexican nationals in the United
States.
Once the war ended, new
justifications were found
for continuing the program and it
lasted through 1964.

Although the whole matter of importing
Mexican labor
was rife with political conflict, only
two or three political
scientists have paid any serious attention
to it.

Most of this dissertation is a case study
of the
political underpinnings of these programs
and their ad-

ministration.

Because the final four years of the Mexican

labor system have been least studied, they
receive dis-

proportionate emphasis in the present study.

Particular

attention is devoted to political forces leading
to the

congressional decision to end bracero employment on

American farms.

Among the most important of these was

the reform thrust of the Kennedy administration.

Few studies of the bracero program pay any serious

attention to its earlier historical roots.

This

-2-

dissertation explores the
Mexican labor issue over
a
period of several decades
prior to 1942.
it is found
that Mexican workers were
widely used on southwestern
farms from the early years
of this century.
The issue
was continuously controversial
and many of the political
patterns of the l 9 42-6 bracero
3
era were more or
less

crystallized in those early years.
By failing to consider these historical
foundations, most studies
depict
the bracero program as more
innovative
than does this

dissertation.
Unlike most of the available
literature, this
study presents the bracero
program as one phase of the
broad struggle over Mexican labor
which transcends the
program itself. The conflict existed
long before 1942
and it continues to the present
day.
Nevertheless, the
sparse literature gives the impression
that the death of
the Mexican labor system more or
less solved the controversy.
This dissertation is apparently the
only study to
consider the political aftermath of the
bracero program,
and it considers both the Johnson and
Nixon
eras.

It

finds that the conflict was simply
re-oriented to focus
more on other types of Mexican workers,
particularly so-

called "wetbacks," regular immigrants, Mexicans
living in
Mexico and commuting to jobs in the United States,
and

those authorized to enter as temporary farm workers
under
the general immigration laws which were not affected
by

- 3-

termination of the bracero program.

It is concluded

that termination of the program
was the prelude to
an i ncreasing reliance on Mexican
labor, especially
in the form of wetbacks.
Once the case study has been
presented, the
findings are integrated and interpreted
in the framework of pluralist theory. Particular
attention is

devoted to pluralist propositions relating
group

characteristics to political power at the
legislative
and administrative levels.

It is concluded that these

propositions provide generally useful explanations
of
the development, termination, and political
aftermath

of the bracero program.

No other study has systematically

applied pluralist theory to this subject.

Some major

criticisms of pluralism are also considered, and it is
found that some aspects of the program are more

satisfactorily explained by them.

PREFACE
The broad interest motivating me
to undertake

this study of the politics of Mexican
agricultural

labor in the United States dates from
1958.
the summer of that year,

I

During

was employed as a harvest

worker by one of the largest corporate farms
in the
United States.
Although braceros were not used
in

our camp, some farms in that section of Illinois
hired

substantial numbers of foreign laborers.
My casual interest in Mexican workers dates
from 1964,

the

final year of the bracero program.

In

the fall of that year,

I

in southern Colorado.

Inasmuch as agriculture in that

accepted a teaching position

region had long used substantial numbers of Mexican
workers,

termination of the bracero program generated

substantial publicity in the Colorado press.
My interest in Spanish-speaking workers was also

stimulated by several of my Chicano students at

Southern Colorado State College.

Long after the news-

papers reported that the state had lost its Mexican
workers, some of my students talked about the widespread

v

.

use of "wetbacks” by farmers in
that area.

1

Also,

since the mid-1960's, more and
more of the Chicano
students at Southern Colorado State
have been
raising questions about why academicians
have paid
so little attention to the
Spanish-speaking.
The politics of Mexican labor
is a far more

complex subject area than it might at
first appear.
Richard Craig, one of only two other
political
scientists to devote serious attention to
it, wrote
in 1971:

In many respects, the entire question
of
imported Mexican farm labor was akin to an iceberg
Lying beneath the surface
was a virtual labyrinth of interrelated and
multidimensional processes. One could spend a
lifetime and never thoroughly trace each^ primary
component of the bracero question, let alone
analyze the multitude of secondarily related
ingredients 2
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

As Craig recognizes, we must start somewhere

despite the enormity of the task,

3

and to focus on

certain dimensions means that others must be ignored
1

Scholars, including Chicanos, commonly use the
wetbacks" to refer to Mexicans who have entered
the United States illegally.
For the purpose of consistency, this dissertation follows that practice.
No
negative value- judgment is intended. See Julian
Samora, Los Mojados:
The Wetback Story (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), p. 6.
term

2

.

Richard B. Craig, The Bracero Program:
Interest Groups and Foreign Policy (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1971), p. 12.
3

Ibid.

,

pp.

12-13.

vi

for the time being.

As with his book,

this disser-

tation is written with a clear
recognition that its
coverage is in no sense comprehensive.
Perhaps
hundreds of additional aspects of bracero
politics
might have been usefully studied. For
example, not
included in the present study but fully
deserving
serious research attention are such matters
as the

dynamics of the bracero program in the context
of the
Mexican political system and the literature
produced
by Mexican scholars.

Other important dimensions of

the bracero program which are not studied
in this

dissertation are outlined in the "Epilogue."
I

am indebted to several individuals and

institutions for their contributions to this study.

I

am deeply grateful to Dr. Howard J. Wiarda, chairman
of my dissertation committee, for his consistently

constructive and courteous criticism of the manuscript
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Their useful suggestions have
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draft.
In addition to the usual burdens
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preparation of a dissertation imposes upon the
writer's
spouse, my wife, Martha, played a
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role in my research.
It ranged from helping me
search

the available literature for relevant sources
to
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ideas with me.
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She
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the dissertation.
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CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION.

I

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND
THE CONTEXT

This dissertation is a
politically oriented study
of the bracero program
(also known as the Mexican
labor
system), under which millions
of Mexican workers entered
the United States between
1942 and 1964.
It focuses
especially on the final four years
of the program, on
the reasons for its termination
by Congress, and on the

post-termination struggle over importing
Mexican labor.
Considerable attention is paid to the

impact of domestic

interest group activity on each of
these facets of
bracero politics.

Background of the Bracero Program
The American economy has long
attracted Mexican

workers,

1

and during much of this century
particular

regions and crops have been overwhelmingly
dependent upon
them.
The poor and politically unsophisticated
Mexican
national, rarely seeking more than a living
for his family
and himself, became the center of one of the
most
1

See John H

Tb®—bnited States
pp. 38-71.
,

_

T

.

Burma, Spanish-Speaking Groups in
;
(Durham, N.C.i Duke Univ. Press. 10 ^ 4
’

^

)

.

2

bitterly fought American political
struggles of this
century.
Numerous employers, especially
large-scale
oouthweo tern farmers, gained a
powerful vested interest
in the use of cheap Mexican
labor and increasingly
demanded it as a right.

However, this position was

eventually challenged by a growing
number of domestic
interests, including Mexican-Americans

who found them-

selves in competition with the foreign
migrants,

organized labor, various religious
organizations, civil
rights groups, many liberal publications,
and a growing
number of important politicians.
The problem was obviously a political
one inas-

much as the regulation of immigration is the
national

government's responsibility.

Therefore,

in their long

and bitter struggle with each other, these rival
interest

groups fed the issue into the American political system.
In a broad sense,

the concern of this dissertation is

with these groups and with the responses of the
political

decision-makers

During most of this century, southwestern growers
have been relatively free to use Mexican workers regardless of what the law has said.

By always keeping the

size of the Border Patrol small, Congress has made it

impossible to faithfully enforce the laws which it has

3

passed.

Perhaps the most plausible
explanation for
this paradox has been the
congressional goal of
satisfying, at least minimally,
the demands of both
the friends and foes of
Mexican labor. While

the laws

grew tough, the user of Mexican
nationals continued to
enjoy his inexpensive and often
illegal labor
supply.
The settlement provided something
for everybody.

As one looks at the historical
pattern, the

compelling conclusion is that, with
some exceptions,
when employers wanted Mexican labor
the American government did not often stand in the way.
Before World War I,
by largely ignoring the immigration
laws, the authorities
informally provided a supply of cheap
labor for
south-

western employers.

3

The outbreak of war brought claims

of a labor shortage in that region
and the American

government relied on a special provision of
the immigration laws to admit tens of thousands of
ordinarily
inadmissible Mexican workers. 4

Even while the emergency

program was in effect, vast numbers of Mexicans
entered
2

See Howard F. Cline, The United States and
Mexico (N.Y.: Atheneum Press 1966), p. 16.
3

Ground

.

Art Leibson, "The Wetback Invasion," Common

X

(Autumn,

1949), 12.

Harry Schwartz, Seasonal Farm Labor in the
Uni te d ^States (N.Y.j Columbia University Press, 1945
),

.

;

4
5

illegally.

With the close of the war, the main
justi-

fication for the Mexican labor arrangement
disappeared
and the government announced that it
was being
terminated
However, the claim of a policy change
was
little more than a formality.
Rather than vigorously
.

enforcing the immigration laws, the administrations
of
the 1920's reverted to the government's
pre-war,

hands-

off stance, and unprecedented numbers of
Mexican workers

entered illegally.^

Only with the coming of the Great

Depression and the declining demand for the foreign
laborers did the government begin serious enforcement
of the immigration laws

7
.

Prior to 1942, political decisions to bring in

Mexican laborers were unilaterally reached by the

American government.

Not until that year was a bilateral

agreement governing the short-term employment of Mexican
nationals reached with their government.
5 U.S.,

The resulting

Congressional Record 68 th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1924, LXV, Part 7, 6476.
.

^For example, see U.S., Congressional Record
1st Sess., 1924, LXV, Part 6 6129, 6133
,

68 th Cong.,

,

.

n

Schwartz, op. cit ., p. 6 l Leo Grebler,
Mexican Immigration to the United States (Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1966
p. 25
George Kiser and David Silverman, "Mexican Repatriation
During the Great Depression," The Journal of Mexican
American History (Forthcoming)
)

,

;

.

5

arrangement was popularly known
as "the braoero program"
or "the Mexican labor system." 8
Although it was revised
periodically and sometimes temporarily
suspended for
brief periods, the United States
continued
to use

braceros until December
31. 1964.

Millions of Mexicans

entered under the agreement and
vast numbers of their
fellow-nationals entered the United
States illegally
while the agreement was in effect.

Following common scholarly practice,
Mexican
nationals entering under the series
of bilateral agreements will be called "braceros" to
distinguish

them from

other Mexican workers.

Those entering illegally are

referred to as "wetbacks."

Both should be distinguished

from regular "immigrants" and from
"commuters," who are
Mexicans commuting to jobs in the United
States.
It

should be noted that the death of the bracero
program did
not end reliance on these other types of
Mexican
workers.

In terms of domestic politics and
economics as

well as the foreign policy processes of both
nations,
the bracero program was of major importance.

It was a

O

For details of the original agreement, see
Department of State, Temporary Migration of
Me xican Agricultural Workers Effected bv Exohsnp-P 0 f
Notes August 4, 1 942 (Executive Agreement Series
No. 278) (Washington, D.C., 1943); "Bilateral
Agreement
Concerning the Temporary Migration of Mexican Farm
Workers to the United States," International Labour
Review Vol. XLVI, No. 4 (1942), 469-71
u.cj.,

.

,

6

significant exercise in international
relations between
the United States and one of the
most important Latin
American nations. The agreements were
one strand of the
broader evolving trends in United
States-Mexican
relations.

Many observers in both countries have

interpreted the agreement as a logical
manifestation
of the maturing Good Neighbor Policy 9
which became even
more important when the two nations became
allies in
,

World War II 10
.

Although tens of thousands of Mexican

workers had entered the United States in past
decades,
not until the 1942 agreement was Mexico’s
substantial
interest in her temporarily absent citizens recognized.

Through negotiations she was able to obtain unprecedented

guarantees for them, including agreements covering wages
and living conditions.
The good-neighbor, wartime cooperation summarizes

only one side of the complex United States-Mexican relations pertaining to the bracero program.

For example,

o

For example, see Otey M. Scruggs, "Evolution of
the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement of 1942," Agricultural
History XXXIV (July, i 960 ), 144.
.

10

Otey M. Scruggs, "Texas and the Bracero Program,
1942-1947," Pacific Historical Review XXXII (August,
1963)
257; Dorothy M. Tercero, "Workers from Mexico,"
Bulletin of the Pan American Union Vol. LXXVIII, No. 9
.

»

.

(1944),

503

.

1

.

7

Mexico, claiming intolerable
discrimination against
American^ in Texas, banned
braceros for a time
from that state. She saw
in the agreement more
than a
mere arrangement for
providing workers to American
em-

ployers.

She sought to transform
it into a lever for
pressuring the United States to
end discrimination

against Mexican-Amer loans.

1

Particularly with the

ebbing of the war crisis,
Mexico raised critical
questions about the conditions
of braceros working in
this country and of those
who might come here in the
future
The Mexican political system
had to cope with the
demands of interest groups favoring
and opposing her
series of labor agreements with
the United States.
In

Mexico supporters and opponents
alike recognized the
major impact of the agreements on
their country. As in
the United States, a long and bitter
political struggle
developed.
Opponents ranged from the Mexican Communist
Party to labor unions.
In the national administration,
support for the labor arrangement was
generally hedged
11

° te
M Scruggs, "Texas, Good Neighbor?"
4ge qSout hwes Z
tern Social Science Quarterly XXXXIII
(September, 1962;, H8-25.
*

.

8

by reservations 12
.

Among the politically
powerful elements in Mexico,
there was adequate support
to keep their country
in the
program until the United
States Congress permitted
it to
lapse in December, 1964.
In his careful study.
Richard
Hancock concluded that Mexico
benefitted considerably
from the arrangement.

He reported that for
at least two

years of its duration, money
earned by Mexican nationals
in the United States
was Mexico's third most
important
source of dollars, outdistanced
only by receipts from
tourism and cotton exports 13
Hancock found that
.

numerous small businesses relied
heavily on bracero
14
spending
Inasmuch as the workers tended
to come from
the most depressed areas of
Mexico, the program pumped
money into the Mexican economy at
the most urgent point.
.

12

David G. Pfeiffer, "The Mexican Farm
Labor
Supply. Program- Its Friends and Foes,”
(unpublished
aster s dissertation, Department of
Government
University of Texas at Austin,
1963 ), pp. 90 - 117
.

1 3

•

Richard H. Hancock, The Role of the Bracero
„
in
the Ec °nDm ic and Cultura l Dynamics
of Mexico (StanfWd~
alifornia:
Hispanic American Society of Stanford
University, 1959), p. 129.
14
Ibid
p. 122
.

1

'

Ibid

.

.

.

.

p.

129.

9

m

summary, for Mexico the
labor arrangement was
a very significant economic
and domestic political
isoue.
Furthermore, it was an important
strand of her
relations with a major world
power which had often been
suspect from the Mexican point
of view but which was now
committed to the Good Neighbor
Policy.

Gaps in the Literature and the
Focus
of this Dissertation

Considering the great significance
of the worker
arrangement to one of our most important
Latin American
neighbors and the bitter political
controversy it sparked
in Mexico, one would expect that
our decision to
termi-

nate the bracero program would have
been thoroughly

studied in the nine years that have now
passed.
However,
this is not the case.
In fact, our decision to end the
program has hardly been studied at all.
Aside from its great impact on Mexico, the
development,

termination, and aftermath of the bracero
program

is a fascinating exercise

in the use of interest group

power in American policy-making.

The long and bitter

struggle revolved around some of the most emotion-laden

concepts and ideas in the English language.
The struggle resurrected ancient divisions in

American political life.

It brought many interest groups

10

into the public arena as each
sought to use the
political process to leave its
own imprint on public
policy. Churches, organizations
of Mexican-Americans,
labor unions, newspapers, farm
associations, farmers,
business organizations, politicians,
and others

took part.
House and Senate hearings provided
the arena for
perhaps the clearest interest group
clashes. Congressional
committees played their usual powerful
roles.
Presidents
formulated their own positions and left
their
impact.

The Department of Labor and the
Agriculture Department

were important participants.
It is around the American interest
group struggle

and the response of national political
decision-makers

that this dissertation centers.

After tracing the

historical roots of Mexican labor in the United
States,
it provides a case study of the political
dynamics of the

program

s

final years.

The primary concern is with the

interest group struggle, as opponents and friends of
the

Mexican labor policy sought to pull the federal government decisively to their respective positions.

While

considering the group maneuvering for power but not
limiting explanation to it, an attempt is made to

explain why governmental policy was reversed and the

program terminated.

Why did the political process

11

maintain the policy for 22 years only
to abruptly end
it in 1964?
In a democratic society,
passage or repeal of a

law rarely if ever definitively
settles the issue in
dispute.
The common pattern is that the
old group
struggle continues. However, this writer
knows of no

serious effort to study the continuing
group conflict
once the bracero program had ended.
Yet its old friends
pressured the government to permit large numbers
of

Mexican workers to enter under other legal
provisions
which had not been repealed while reformers
sought
retention of the new status quo.

An overview of this

post- termination group maneuvering is another contri-

bution of this dissertation.
Finally, certain common assumptions of pluralist

theory and some criticisms of it will be used as a

sounding-board for theoretical considerations.
The decision to focus primarily on those aspects

of the bracero program outlined above was made after a

survey of the scholarly literature indicated that they
had been relatively neglected.

Although several theses

and dissertations have been written on the Mexican labor

arrangement, most pay little attention to political

6

12

considerations

Those that are politically
oriented
have given little notice to
forces leading up to termi1?
nation.
Perhaps one reason is that
scholarly interest
the program apparently waned
with its death in 1964
and has only recently shown
signs of revival.

m

To this writer's knowledge,
only a few books have

been published on any aspect
of the bracero program.
In
his book released in
1959. Hancock analysed the braceros'
role in the cultural and economic
dynamics of Mexico.
1

Examples

include Ruth Parker Graves. "A
Historv
T
the Inter-Relationship
between Imported Mexican labor
°
Domestic Migrants, and the Texas
Agricultural E
~

o.

..

oLv

(unpublished Master's dissertation,
at Austin, I960); Grace West, "HealthUniversity of Tex^s
Insurance for the
lo P ment and Implementation
^" 1 3 De
under
under^ublic^Law^R
Public Law ? 8
?(unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation
Claremont Graduate School, 1966 ), Ronald Geenen,
Economic Adjustments to the Termination of
the Bracero
hed Ph,D- dissertation University
,

0f°ArkaAsasri96?)?

^

'

17

Examples include Richard Hancock, "The Role
r
the Ecoi omic and Cultural Dynamics of
S ?S!! o ^.
?
x ico,
(Ih.D. dissertation,
Stanford University,
Robert Dennis Tomasek, "The Political and Economic 1959
Implications of Mexican Labor in the U.S. under the
Non-Quota^System Contract Labor Program, and Wetback
Wi
V ™ en ^'
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
2 ?
of
Michigan, 1965); Nelson Gage Copp, "Wetbacks and
raceros:
Mexican Migrant Laborers and American Immigration Policy, 1930-1960," (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Boston University, 1963 ).
r

iv.c

,

n

)

•

—

8

13

Three years later, Taylor’s
work entitled God’s
Mes sengers to Mexico’s Masse
s.
A Sti.lv of the

S ignificance of the
Braceros was

press.

published by a religious

The following year McBride’s
Vanishing Bracero

appeared.

It is a heavily opinionated,

folksy presen-

tation by a cotton ginner bitterly
opposed to termination
of the Mexican labor program 19
Published in 1964
Galarza s Merchants of I. a
told the story

w

'

.

,

of the

bracero in California between
1942 and 1960 .^

Apparently only one book analyzing the
Mexican
labor program has been released since
its termination in
1964.
That is Richard Craig's work entitled
Th e Bracero Program:

Interest Groups and Foreign Po1iny

published in 1971 21

r

There are important differences

.

between his worthwhile book and this
dissertation.

The

1

T y 1 r — d s Messengers to Mexico's
Masses
S 1 ?
A JLfudy
s tun,, of the Re
A
—
---- ligious Significance
ui
of tme
he -oracerc
BraceTv
!iUj9T0riG
(Eugene,
“TT
Or^PTin
T nc + i -fn
*
Oregoru
Institute
of nTT773rZ""iI
Church Growth,
1962 ).
19
hn G
ride Vanis hing Bracero (San Antoniot
Rtp the author, ;JS?
by
1963 ).
*

.’

•

^

20

r»~

t

'

Ernesto Galarza, Merchants of Labor
Thp
California:

Me xican Bracero Storv ( S anti" Barbara
McNally and Loftin, 1964).
21

.

i

,

Richard Craig, The Bracero Prograrrn
Interest
Groups and For eign Policy (Austin:
University of Texas
Press, 1971).

i

i

14

book pays little attention
to the m uch under-studied

Secondly, Craig credits molding
of the Mexican
labor program and the dec is
lsion to end it to interaction
between four interest groups:
"labor, agricultural
employers, Mexico ... and the
United States ." 23 The
present study pays attention to
other interests as well
as these.
Thirdly,

there are major theoretical
differences

in the two projects.

After promising to use "interest-

group theory and systems analysis,"
Craig’s book makes
no more references to the latter 24
Although much of
his work could be fitted readily into
the interest group
framework, he devotes less than a dozen
pages to
.

explicitly making the connection 25

Very few assumptions

.

of the theory are outlined.

In contrast,

the present

study devotes a chapter to outlining some
important

assumptions of both interest group theory and its
critics.
Another chapter is devoted to relating these theoretical

assumptions to the bracero program.
22

24

md.,
.

2-bid

pp.
.

.

,

xi.

6-7

ot
,

2J
^

37

46,

,

Ibid
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.

55

pp.
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.
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Fourthly, Craig

s

book is not concerned with the

post-termination group struggle while the
present study
devotes a chapter to it.
In summary,

several justifications have been

offered for this dissertation.

First, the bracero

program was of immense importance to both
the United
States and Mexico. Yet, relatively
little has been
published on it. Secondly, political
aspects have been
especially under-studied. Thirdly, interest

in the pro-

gram waned with its demise, resulting in
scholarly

neglect of its final phase.

Fourthly, the single serious

effort to explain the end of the program is
significantly

different from the approach of this dissertation.
I

ifthly,

the present study breaks some new ground in

studying the continuing, post- termination group
struggle.

Sixthly, the attempt to relate interest group

theory to the bracero program is more explicit and
more thorough than the single previous effort.
A Look Ahead

This dissertation is divided into seven chapters

and an epilogue.

Chapter II presents a broad outline of

pluralist theory from which propositions particularly
relevant to bracero politics are isolated.
Most studies of the bracero program pay almost no

16

attention to its pre-l 9 42 roots.

Chapter III outlines

some of the important
developments surrounding the
use of
Mexican labor before World War
n. In later chapters, it
is shown that several
of these early patterns
had an
important impact on the bracero
program.
By taking them
into account, this dissertation
depicts the program as
less innovative than do most
studies.
Chapter IV dis-

cusses historical developments
between 1941 and i960,
several of which are important
for understanding the
later struggle over termination
of the bracero program
and its political aftermath.

Chapter V covers the final four years
of the program with an emphasis on reasons for
its
termination.

Chapter VI is an overview of the continuing
group
struggle in the post- termination period.
Although interest group activity is emphasized
in
Chapters III-VI, the task of explicitly and
systematically
relating pluralist theory to the bracero
program is reserved for Chapter VII.

In that chapter, pluralist theory

provides the theme around which the highlights of
earlier
chapters are integrated and explained. Particularly
Chapters III,

V,

bracero politics.

and VI focus on neglected facets of
The Epilogue turns attention to other

important gaps in the literature which are not covered
in this dissertation.

17

CHAPTER

II

THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction and Justification
Pl uralism,

an intr oducto ry summary

This chapter turns attention to
theoretical considerations of
relevance to the inauguration,
operation, termination,
and political aftermath of
the Mexican labor system.
The main focus is on
pluralist theory, other terms
or
.

concepts commonly used to refer
to roughly the same
theoretical model are group theory,
analytic pluralism,
polyarchy, interest group theory,
interest group
liberalism, and broker rule.
A

primary concern of pluralism is the
location of

political power.

It rejects elitist theory 1 which
lo-

cates power in fairly permanent and
small elites.
It
also denies the validity of the majority
rule model which
claims that in democratic societies the
government translates, or should translate, majority
opinion into public
policy.
The pluralist model depicts widely
dispersed

political power which is mobilized and exercised
through
I

Robert^
D

u

classic presentation of
A
Michels, Political Parties

Books, 1962).

elitist theory is
(New Yorks Collier
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interest groups rather than
through electoral majorities
or prevailing public opinion.
Typically, a public

policy will be most influenced
by the most active and
most interested organized
groups.
There are no permanent
power elites, whether consisting
of individuals
or

interest groups.

Political power is always shifting
from one combination of interests
to another.
Nor is
there anything permanent about
the composition of the
coalitions themselves. Some disintegrate
while new ones
form.
An interest group may leave one and
join another
as either its goals or political
conditions change.
Relevance of the pluralist model

.

Several

considerations suggest the relevance of group
theory for
understanding the politics of the bracero
program.
First
although pluralists acknowledge its relative
inapplica-

bility to many political systems, they claim
that it
especially descriptive of the policy process in

is

the

United States.

2

Secondly, Theodore Lowi, a leading critic of the

group model, has found that the tendency for the
most
2

Several pluralists have applied the model to the
American political system, or particular policy areas
within.it, and concluded that the fit between theory and
facts is close. Examples include David B. Truman,
Th e Governmental Process (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf,
1962); Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1952).
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powerful and most interested
groups to dominate public
policies governing them is
particularly characteristic
of the farm segment of
American society

m

3
.

an im-

portant pluralist study published
in 1951
David Truman
refers generously to the
politically relevant activity
Of agricultural groups 4
,

.

Finally, even a casual reading
of the literature
on the Mexican labor system
makes it obvious that

numerous groups were intensely
interested in the program.
Perhaps the dominant characteristic
of newspaper
accounts of it was their recognition
of the spirited
group competition to dominate bracero
policy.
Despite the apparent relevance of
group theory,
only two previous studies have
attempted to relate it to
bracero politics.
Craig's book was discussed in Chapter
In an analysis of the bracero
program in California,

Galarza considered the "countervailing power"
hypothesis
J
from the group model.
However, neither he nor Craig
outlined the broader model from which their
isolated

propositions were taken.

w
\u
W.W.

That would have made the

heodo e Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York:
^
Norton
and^ Co., 1969), p. 102.
tvt

4

Truman, op. cit .. pp. 8?-93, 468-78.

^Ernesto Galarza, Merchants of Labor (Charlotte:
1964 ) pp. 219 - 28

McNally and Loftin, Publishers

,

,

.

I.
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propositions and the studies
more meaningful.
In order to avoid
presenting a third pluralist
approaoh which fails to
explain what pluralism is.
most
of this chapter is
devoted to a general
discussion of
the main tenets of group
theory.
Toward the
end. a

manageable number of those
most relevant to the bracero
program are summarized and
re-emphasized.
Hopefully,
the earlier discussion of
the larger model from
which
they come will make them
more meaningful.
Pluralisms
T he nature of

An Overview

man and g roups.

Pluralists assume

that the average individual is
selfish and not

necesoarily very rational.^

Consequently

,

they have

been particularly critical of
such optimistic theorists
as Lord Bryce.
For instance, Earl Latham, an
important
pluralist, rejects Bryce’s assertion
that "in
the ideal

democracy, every citizen is intelligent,
patriotic, disinterested.
His sole wish is to discover the
right side
each contested issue and to fix upon
the best man

m

The pluralist conclusion that man tends
to be
13 reached by a radically different
route
from
the one taken by many other theorists
who have reached
the same conclusion.
In the pluralist model, one's goals
and values. do not make him irrational.
Man’s
irrationality lies in his failure to maximize his
opporP
tunities to reach his goals.
,

.

thflTfv

.
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among the competing
candidates." 7
The pluralist claims
that the typical citizen

knows and cares little
about politics.
Those that do
care tend to be dominated
by "irrational
prejudice and
impulse." The citizen's
political involvement is
minimal.
However, his apathy is not
total for he is selfish
and seeks fulfillment
of his personal desires. 8

Despite his selfishness, the
average person, as
a n individual.
is in no position to
defend his political
,

interests.

He

about politics.

is

too uninformed and cares
too little

The way out of the dilemma
lies in group

membership
In order to defend their
interests, people

naturally form various types of
groups.

David Truman

identifies three kinds which are
especially relevant to
pluralist interpretations of politics.
An interest
group is "any group that, on the
basis of one or more
shared attitudes, makes certain
claims upon other groups
in the society for the establishment,
maintenance,
or

enhancement of forms of behavior that
are implied by the
Latham, op. cit .. p. 6.

Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism,
and
^rd ed. New York:
rper and Row, Publisher s,
lWTTTp. 56-64.

g^g? rac y

;

2

^T
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shared attitude.”?

When interest groups

governmental institutions.” they
are called "political
interest groups. 10
Finally, there will be many
interests around which
no interest groups have
formed but which would become
activated should individuals
sharing those interests perceive them to be seriously
threatened.
Truman refers to
them as "potential interest
groups." 11 The prospect of
activating them motivates actual
interest groups to
moderate their political demands.
Therefore, even unorganized interests will have an
impact on public policy. 12
Interest group membership solves the
problems of
individual apathy and ignorance by
decreasing both their
incidence and relevance.

Taking on membership in a political
interest group
is related to an increase in
political concern and
infor-

mation.

Interaction with other members who share
the
same grievance and with politically
sophisticated leaders
tends to intensify both the dissatisfaction
and awareness
of political alternatives as solutions.

Although group membership reduces apathy and
q

Truman, op. cit .. p. 33.
Ibid., pp. 37-39.
12

Ibid

.

*

PP*

11

114-15, 507

Ibid
.

.

.

p.

34

.

. .

23

ignorance

both remain widespread even
among group
members
However, the pluralist sees
this as no barrier
to the group's adequate
defense of the interests of
its

members.

The answer to the apparent
dilemma lies in the
nature of the relationship
between leaders and the rankand-f ile

Aocording to David Truman, interest
groups develop
an "active minority” which
wields predominant influence
on the organization.

He claims this is natural
because

it is virtually impossible
for any considerable body of
people to solve directly all the
problems that may con13
front it."
Because group leaders take command,
the

ignorance and apathy of the rank-and-file
are rendered
less relevant.
While emphasizing the need for leadership
and
recognizing the necessary inequality of power
within the
interest group, pluralists stress the influence
of ordinary members, their apathy and ignorance
notwithstanding.

Leaders are not free to do whatever they please.

To

illustrate that point, Truman quotes, with
approval,
the conclusions of Arthur Ross about the
role of

rank-and-file labor union members:
13 Ibid

.

,

p.

140.
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a
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i

^s?ep?IblI ?o tie Appeals o?
b

r
relation "
ship with the iank°LrfU;
remains ?he mos t
important
the reckoning of the union
officials. 14
Several of the preceding pluralist
assumptions
about the nature of man and
groups may be used to ancicipate later findings in this
dissertation.
They lead to

m

the expectation that the mass
of American citizens would
not be actively involved in the
struggle over the bracero

program.

As we shall see, most of the
activity centered

m

int erest groups supporting and
opposing the Mexican
labor system.
They made most of the news, offered
the

bulk of testimony at congressional
hearings, and sent
most of the letters and telegrams to
congressmen.
The pluralist model leads to the
expectation that

not all interests threatened by the Mexican
labor system
would organize.
In fact, few American farm workers did.
However, we shall see that growers' fear of activating
this potential interest group apparently did
not have
the moderating effect postulated in the
pluralist model.

The model suggests that most of the active

political struggle over the Mexican labor system would
p. 155, quoting Arthur M. Ross,
Trade Union Wage Policy (Berkeleyt
University of
California Press, 1948 ), p. 38.
,

.
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take the form of clashes
between leaders of
pro-bracero

and anti-bracero interest
groups rather than between
rank-and-file members. We shall
see that that expectation is generally borne out.

Prerequi sites of pluralist system.,
The
existence of interest groups
which actively champion
the interests of their
members by no means creates
a
pluralist system. There are
numerous other requirements,
a few of which are discussed
below.

Pluralist systems are characterized
by an openness allowing participation in
the political process by
a great diversity of groups.
No small elite sets policy
and a mass of organized interests
are free to join
the

competition through which public policy

is set.

According to Robert Dahl, a prominent
pluralist, "a central guiding thread of American
constitutional development
has been the evolution of a political
system
in which

all the active and legitimate groups
in the population can
make themselves heard at some crucial
stage in the process of decision." 1 ^
Ihe necessity for the system's openness
to broad

group participation is logically derived from
the
15 Robert

(Chicago

»

A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory
The University of Chicago Press,
1956)
p. 137.
,

9
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pluralist commitment to political
stability.
trations motivating the
formation of

Frus-

new interest groups
may threaten the well-being
of the system if their
activities are not channeled
into the orderly political
process.
Dahl notes that "a group
excluded

from the
normal political arena by
prohibitions against normal
political activity” may violently
pursue its goals. 16

Despite the necessity for the
system to permit
broad group participation, not
all interest groups
actually compete to shape public
policy.
Only
legitimate" ones, or "those whose
activity is accepted
as right and proper by a
preponderant portion of the
active,
may participate.
During
the 1950's,

the

Communist Party, for example, was excluded
because of
its illegitimacy. 17
Even some legitimate groups are politically
inactive.

This minimizes their political influence. 18

Pluralist systems cannot exist without a high
degree of group self-control.

Each group's claims must

be tempered by tolerance for the claims
of others.

Once

a decision has been made by the proper
authorities, all

groups must be willing to abide by it. 19
p.
1

138.

17

Ibid

l8
.

Schumpeter, op. cit .. p. 294.

Ibid.

2?

The pluralist system
cannot survive when all
issues are open to question. 20
Even where national
habits of tolerance for
the demands of others
have developed. the system may
break down if fundamental

principles rather than technical
questions about how to
translate them into policy
come under debate. Compromise is easier on technical
matters than on the most
basic principles.
From these postulated
prerequisites we may derive further expectations
about the politics of the
bracero program. We would
anticipate that a great
variety of political interest
groups had at least some
impact on policy.
However, less legitimate groups
should have had less influence.
Farm organizations,
which were the major supporters
of the bracero program,
had been fully legitimate throughout
the nation* s history.
Their status should have maximized
their influence. Among
the leading critics of the Mexican
labor system was
organized labor. Historically, it had
been less legitimate than farm interests.
In 1951, Truman wrote that
it is only within recent years
that labor organizations
have been able to expect a hearing from
most government
20

Ibid.

9

p.

291.

"

,
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officials. 2l
or many years, critics
of the bracero program
were weakened by the
fact that many of their
most likely
allies failed to meet the
pluralist prerequisite of

political activity.

Although farm workers were
the most
threatened domestic interest,
they were one of the most
unorganized and inactive employee
groups in American
soc iety. 22

The pluralist model leads
to the expectation that
the demands of bracero-users
and their political allies
would be moderate and that they
would be compatible with
the interests of American
farm workers.

Finally, as we shall see in
later chapters, debate
over the bracero program was
almost always limited to
such technical matters as how it
should be administered
and whether it should be reformed
or terminated.
It
never touched on such fundamental
principles as the

desirability of capitalism and democracy.
The, national interest and the
moral implication*

ofjLaw.

There are many different views about
the ulti-

mate purpose of politics.
21

Truman, op. cit

.

Traditional American thought
p.

265.

22

For example, see Harry Schwartz Seasonal
Farm
Labor in t he United States (New York: C
olumbia
University Press, 1945 ), pp. 90-101.
.

*

,

;

29

has been strongly influenced
-Luenced hv
by +-w
theQ proposition that
the
aim of democratic politics
is the realization
of a
national interest transcending
narrow individual and
group interests.

Pluralists have sharply challenged
this idea.
In
only a very narrow sense
could they be said to accept
the
idea of a national interest
at all.
Their pursuit of
political stability and harmony
among organized groups
seems to qualify until it is
realized that these
are

secondary goals whose only
purpose is to enhance group
interests.
For pluralists there is no
national interest
tranocending the outcome of the
group struggle. 2 ^
Interests cannot be objectively
ranked "for when men's
desires and interests are at stake,
one man's opinions
are as good as another's, one man's
interests as
legiti-

mate as any other’s.'"' 4

Consequently, in group theory,

the pursuit of self-interest is
no longer forbidden.

It

accepted as part of human nature, and
it is the only
force to which democratic governments
should be responis

sive.

Of course, it should be kept in mind
that one's

self-interest is to be pursued in accordance
with the
23

Wilfred Binkley and Malcolm Moos, A Grammar
Ame r ican Politics (New York}
Alfred A. Knopf, 1950)
_

.21

7.

John G Llvin gston and Robert G. Thompson,
mu
„
—he
Cons ent of the Governed (3rd ed. New York:
The
Macmillan Co. 1971), p. 105.
*

30

rules of the game.

One who pursues selfish
goals out-

side the rules commits the sin
of denying others the
right to seek their own selfish
goals on equal terms.

Pluralists refuse to consider the
broad moral
implications of public policy. 25 They
are essentially
Social Darwinists. 26 The system is most
responsive to
the demands of the powerful and
that is as it should
be.

27

The refusal of pluralists to evaluate
public

policy in terms of the national interest or to
assess
its moral implications means that the
model cannot

serve as the basis for any critique of the
bracero

program.

If the Mexican labor system displaced
American

farm workers and brought hardships to their families,
the pluralist would see nothing immoral about it.

all,

in a pluralist system,

to victory.

25

After

no group has a moral right

Policy victories are won by the successful

Lowi, op. cit .. p. x.

26

Myron Q. Hale, "The Cosmology of Arthur F.
Bentley," The Bias of Pluralism ed. William E. Connolly
(New York:
Atherton Press, 1969), 36.
,

27
28

Latham, op

.

cit .. p. 36.

I do not agree with pluralists on this point.
chose to use the pluralist model not because I believe
that public policies have no moral implications but
because it contains various assumptions which provide
useful descriptions of how the political process
apparently works.

I
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exerc ise of power

—

.

6 P lur alist

view of gover-nmpnt

The more ex _

treme pluralist statements
suggest that the main function
of government is to ratify
the dominance of stronger
groups over weaker ones. This
view is illustrated by
Latham's famous statement about
the function of

legislatures

j

The legislature referees the
group struggle
lfles the victories of the
successful
coalitions
^J
and records the terms of the
surrenders,
compromises
and .conquests
the form of statutes.
?he
legislative vote on any issue tends to
represent
° f s * ren th
i.e., the balance of
?
power^amnri^+h
g h cont ndin g groups at the moment
vn+inS
wJ
? may ?
of voting.
What
be called public policy is
the equilibrium reached in this
given moment, and it represents astruggle at any
balance which
the contending factions or groups
constantly
y
strive to weight in their favor. 2 9

m

!

.

.

>

Latham does not mean to imply that the
legislature
sits completely above the group struggle.
While
it is

a referee,

it is also a participant.

with its own interests to pursue. 30

It,

too,

is a group

The group struggle

which it referees includes those interests.
A more radical aspect of the pluralist
model of

government is its premise that law enforcement officials,
no less than legislators,

29
3°

serve as representatives of

Latham, op. cit .. pp. 35-36.
Ibid

.

,

p.

37.
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group interests.

The traditional view
that law enforce-

ment involves nothing more
than "personal honesty
on
the part of the executive
and strict adherence to
the
letter of the law" is said
to be seriously misleading 31
Even "if „ e take the President
in 'routine- work of
administration, we still
stiii find him representing
interest
groups ." 32 According to David
Trumans
.

’

Winning a major party nomination
and a president;,!
election rests upon building
and operating an
organization of local and State
represent or are supplemented by elites that
a Variety of
10
n reSt
s -.
-as^oflhelr
Part tacii
u
or overt
1
his reaching the White
E
Hou^e, these party cliques
and interest groups
11 enjoy privileged access
to the president 33
When pluralists say that the
executive branch and
other units of government represent
interest
*

J

™
*

m

^

.

groups,
they do not mean to imply that
all officials of that
unit represent the same interests.
Factions develop
within Congress, legislative committees,
and the executive branch.
This increases the likelihood that
a

particular set of interests will find at least
some
government officials who will be receptive

to their

demands,

ior instance, some congressional
committees

Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Governme nt
^
(Cambridge,
Massachusetts:
The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1967 ), p.
359.
,

32
'Ibid.

33

Truman, op. cit .. pp. 399-400.

,
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tend to be pro-labor
while others are tore
reoeptive to
business interests. 3
One department of
the national
government may be more
reoeptive to farm labor
interests
while another is more
sympathetio to wealthy
growers
-om this brief outline of

the pluralilt view,
government, the following
patterns and hypotheses
as
regards the bracero program
are suggested.
Braoero
legislation will probably
include concessions to
a variety
of interests.
Underlying the congressional
decision to
terminate the program will
likely be important shifts
in
the characteristics of
groups supporting and opposing
the use of Mexican labor.
Once Congress has enacted
bracero legislation, competing
groups will not cease
political activity. They will
shift their demands to
the executive branch to
acquire favorable administration
of the law.
Both sides will enjoy favorable
access to
certain officials within both the
executive and
legislative branches.
T he

Eeo^le.

relation of g overnment officials
to the

As the ordinary person,
government officials

are motivated by self-interest.

and re-election.

Their goal is election

It is achieved by representing
the

interests of groups powerful enough
to defeat them.
34

Latham, op. cit

.

P-

47.
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Traditional American thought
has idealized the
leader willing to sacrifice
his position in defense
of
his principles.
Pluralists reject this type

of leader-

ship.

The leader who does not
worry about his political
future cannot be restrained
by the
35

electorate.

The power of the electorate
to restrain officials
should not be confused with
the power to dictate policy

decisions to them.

According to Schumpeteri

Voters do not decide issues.
... in all normal
with the

candidal
C °n
bW to
\
3^

SK:

fine themselves to accepting'
thto
preference to others or refusing to
accept

it.

Robert Dahl has also paid particular
attention
to the relationship between
the government and the
people in pluralist systems. He claims
that the outcome of an election reveals little
more than "the first
preferences of some citizens among the
candidates

standing for office." 37

For several reasons, the

winning candidates cannot be assumed to have
been given
a mandate to enact specific policies.
First, many of
their votes will have come from persons
indifferent to
the issues.

Secondly, citizens who disagree on the

35 Livingston
•

and Thompson, op. cit .. p. 116.

36 0

ochumpeter, op. cit .. p. 282.

3?

Dahl, op. cit .. p. 125

,

,

.
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issues often support
the same candidate. 38

Thirdly
candidates typically fail
to take a clear
position on
controversial matters. 39
It thus becomes clear' +v> 0 +
crear that the concept
of
"majority rule" has little
relevance to the pluralist
model.
Dahl has written that
most policies are
"determined by the efforts
of relatively

small but

relatively active minorities."
interest

These are political

groups.^ 0

These pluralist postulates
lead, once again.
to the expectation
that bracero policy will
have been
predominantly shaped by a limited
number of particularly
active and interested groups.

gro up correlates of

Because

^

Pluralist model assigns interest
groups the central role
policy making, it is necessary
to briefly consider
why some groups are powerful
and others

m

are not.

As noted earlier in this
chapter, even unorganized
interests will have an impact
on public policy.
However,
the pluralist model assigns
them minimal influence.
To

maximize power, it is essential
for interests to organize.
38

Ibid.

39 Ibid
40

Ibid

.

.

,

p

127.

,

p.

129.
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Truman claims that
"organization is presumptive
evidence of strength in
the short run." 41
The mere
fact of organization means
that the group is characterized by a number of
politically relevant strengths.
Truman notes that a prerequisite
of organization is at
least a minimal level of
cohesion. 42 and that
"cohesion
in turn

...

is a

crucial determinant of the
effectiveness with which the group
may assert its claims." 43
Truman observes that organization
further presupposes some degree of permanence
or at least an
44
expectation of it.
This
ms means that
+s=+ organized
„„„
interests
enjoy the advantage of planning
long-term strategy and
developing useful political skills
in the meantime.
Finally, Truman notes that
organization presupposes acceptance of a division
of labor by the group's
members.
This makes it easier for leaders
to develop
politically necessary knowledge and skills.
.

.

Although organization is an important
correlate
of group power, it is only the
beginning. Even among
organized groups, political influence will
vary.
More

will go to those with large memberships,
adequate
4l

42
^4

Truman, op. cit .. p.

n4

Ibid

4l

Ibid

.

.

,

,

pp.
p.

112-13
113.

^5

,

Ibid

Ibid.

.

,

p.

159.

^

.

.
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finances, and the most
skillful leaders.

Government officials will be
most receptive to
the demands of high-status
groups. 4 ? To be sought
as
an ally by such organizations
is likely to flatter
the
Official's ego. Also, the fact
that officials themselves come from higher class
backgrounds means that
th„.ir
values, manners, and preconceptions"
will predispose them to favor the higher
status interest
groups 48
Groups will have greater political
power if
they are able to form coalitions
with other powerful
49
groups
if their goals are consistent
with widely
50
shared social values,
if they are self-confident,
and if their goals are pursued
vigorously
.

,

For an interest group to wield
substantial

political influence, it must achieve "access
to one or
more key points of decision in the
government."-^ 2
To

have access means that government officials
will at
46

48
50
a

p

•

..

47

Ibid., pp. 269-70, 507.
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,

p.

265.

49
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,
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yl Baskin, American Pluralist Democra cy!
Van Nostrand Reinhold, Co.,’
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1971), p. 93.

51

p.

Ibid

Ibid.

Truman, op. cit ,. p. 264.
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least give the group's
position a hearing.
The most
avorahle access occurs
when officials are
sympathetic
to the position
of the group.
AC ' SSS 13

Ukely

t0 bS greater if

^e group ranks
of the group correlates
of political power
already discussed.
That is to say that
officials are
generally more accessible
to interests which
are
organized, to groups
with large memberships,
to highstatus groups, etc.
well on a

1

A group's access
to officials is
also affected

biases which are buil+
cunt into the structure of
government.
According to Truman:

ments fs not always wha
y
t°i t^dls
these formalities are
rarely
cap some efforts and
favor others
Ua
by sue h°ar rangements^tha

}»
^^teT

tUrab arran S e -

Sa^

to influence key points
of

'

f

y han<Jl -

decCfon^n'do^rs.SS

An example of structural
bias is the malapportionment of the House of
Representatives which lasted
until
the

mid-1960's>

As the nation had

^

increasingly
urban and metropolitan,
farm area representation
had not
decreased proportionately. 55
As we shall see in later

Hid.,
m,

t

•

^

al<
r

322.

p.

olm E

*

^ Ibid

.

.

p.

323.

Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson
(2d

,
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chapters, greatest support
for the hracero
program, came
from rural congressmen.
Failure to reapportion
kept
thexr numbers high and
the „ ouse especiaUy
reoeptlve
the demands of Mexican
labor employers.
Beginning in
1962. a series of Supreme
Court rulings requiring
reapportionment decreased this
56
structural

^

bias.

Truman notes that a similar
bias favoring grower
interests is also found in
the Senate.
Rural areas are
favored by the constitutional
provision that each state
be represented equally
regardless of population.
Truman writes:
This has allowed agricultural
interest frrour^ +ho +
6
hin y Populated States more
points of ""ace e ss ^in” the c
i
Shose

me^r^e To^enS

oiLiCs

I

^op^s

-

;s
has been over the years.
It is obvious? moreover
UP
aS the Araerica " ^rm Bureau
federation, wh?oh
FeIeratfon
which can cover a great m^nv r'nv>cT
+

^™

S Se^^icT

’

tha
any
If ° an a"° hleVe a satis factory
measure ^of cohesion. 5?

As we shall see in later
chapters, greatest

opposition to the bracero program came
from urban based
interest groups whereas sugar beet
interests and the
American Farm Bureau were two of its
most avid supporters.
Ibid.
57

,

pp.

99-104.

Truman, op. cit

.

pp.

322-23.

,

,

,

,

,
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A third

structural bias in Congress
is found in
the committee system.
Because, with rare exceptions. 5 8
proposed legislation must
first be cleared by
committees 59
access to them is crucial.
Refusal of the committee
to
report out" a bill almost
always kills it. Although
bracero legislation might have
been assigned to the labor
committees of each house, it
was assigned to the more
conservative agriculture committees.
Consisting heavily
of farm state, pro-grower
congressmen, the agriculture
committees were much more sympathetic
to the demands of
pro-bracero groups than to reform
interests. 60
.

While the structural bias in
Congress increases
its accessibility to rural
interests, the electoral
college system makes the President
heavily dependent on
61
urban interests.
Consequently, we would expect grower
supported policies such as the bracero
program to have
received more support from Congress than
from
the

President.

While this was not inevitably the case,

58

For some of the exceptions
Patterson, op. cit
pp. 283 - 85
.

59 lbid

.

p.

see Jewell and

.

220.

60™
ror a. perceptive article on the biased
nature of
the House Agriculture Committee, see
Charles 0. Jones
'Representation in Congress:
The Case of the House
Agriculture Committee," American Political Snipn.p
Review LV (June, 1961), 358-67.
,

L

Dahl

op.

c 1t.

,

p.

147.
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the Mexican labor system
lost the effective support
of
the executive branch before
a majority of Congress

turned against it.
Some Problems with the
Pluralist Model
The purpose of this section
is to outline several
of the most common criticisms
of pluralism.
Later in
this dissertation, we shall
find that some of these seem
to provide more adequate
explanations of certain aspects
of the bracero program than
does the pluralist model.
The pluralist system is
essentially corporativist.
That is to say that government
regularly delegates
important legal powers to private groups.
Although

pluralists idealize this decentralization
of policymaking and equate it with grass-roots
democracy, critics
such as Theodore Lowi deplore it.
They charge
that in

the

interest of reducing conflict, government
abdicates

its responsibility and permits powerful
groups to more

or less have their way on matters about
which they feel

strongly.

Although Americans have always feared that

government would expropriate the private domain, Lowi
charges that what has really occurred is "private

expropriation of public authority,"
62 t

Lowi, op. cit .. p. 102.

^

the "parceling

”

42

out to private parties
the power to make
pub i ic policyt „6 3
'the gift of sovereignty
of private satrapies." 6 ^
This domination of
government by special
interests
is nowhere better
illustrated than by the
committee
system in Congress.
Committee members typically
represent constituencies with
particularly intense interests
in bills assigned to
their committee.
Lowi notes, for
instance, that "throughout
the 1950’s
Victor
Anfuso of Brooklyn was the
only member of the House
Committee on Agriculture from
a non- farm constituency. 6 5
Because committees have almost
the power of life-anddeath over legislation,
farm-bloc congressmen really
write the nation's agriculture
laws.
For example, not
until the 1960's did the full
Congress add any significant amendments to bracero
legislation reported out of
the agriculture committees.
.

.

.

Critics of pluralism deplore this
process on the
grounds that it abandons the national
interest. Agricultural legislation affects such
non-agricultural matters
as the nation's foreign policy,
tax levels, and unemployment.
Turning farm legislation over to
farm state

congressmen means that these broader
interests are likely
63

Ibid.

,

p.
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p.

289.
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p.

112

.
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^

SaCriflced

T ^e

most immediate concern
of committee members is to
cleaqp
p ase the P ower f’uI
interest groups
of thexr constituency
because rural congressmen
recruxted by and owe
their elections to’'
the best
organized farm interests 66
‘

.

Policy-making is further
"parceled out to the
most interested parties" 6 ?
by statutes delegatlng
power to non-congressional
bodies.
Lowi acknowledges
that "the practice of
delegation itself can hardly
be
criticized ,” 68 becausp
Because there are certain
tasks which
the legislature cannot
practically undertake. 6 ?

However, the practxce xs
now "pathological" because
it
has come "to be considered
a good thing in itself,"
often giving power to
bureaucrats "without guides,
checks, safeguards ."? 0 From
administrators such as
the Secretary of Agriculture
and the Labor Secretary,
the broad delegation of
power drains to the best
organxzed groups 1 because "the
administrators are
,

accountable primarily to the
groups, only secondarily
to the Pre sident or Congress
as institutions ."? 2
66

'ibid.

,

p.

124.

6?

p.

127

69

p.

12?.

68

'ibid

.

Ibid.
72

Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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126.

Ibid.. p.

fib.
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This drainage of legal power
to private groups
may be illustrated by various
aspects of the bracero
program’s administration. For
instance, as discussed in
later chapters, legislation
provided that braceros could
be imported only in the
event of a domestic farm
labor
shortage.
But for years the Labor
Department tended to

rubber-stamp grower claims of labor
shortages without
making its own independent
determination 73
.

What is wrong with such broad
delegation of legal
decision-making power to private groups?
Lowi charges
that "besides making conflict-of-interest
a principle
of government rather than a criminal
act, participatory
programs shut out the public ." 74 Secondly,
he claims

that broad delegations of legal power
to private groups
cause "the atrophy of institutions of
popular control"

because public officials are no longer in charge.

7^

Critics of pluralism dispute the claim that
there is no public interest transcending narrow
group

goals.

Schattschneider defines it as "general or

common interests shared by all or by substantially
all
73 N.

Ray Gilmore and Gladys W. Gilmore, "The
J^acero in California," Pacific Historical Review
XXXII (August, 1963), 2703
.

74
76

Lowi, op. cit .. p. 86

7
.

^Ibid

Baskin, op. cit .. pp. 175 - 76

.

members of the community."
y

He
rte

nffpr>
oi
fersc as

an example
"the common interest
in national survival." 7 ?
The
Structure of pluralist
systems, however,
minimises the

likelihood that public
policy will be consistent
with
the national interest.
The reason is that
they delegate legal power to the
groups whose members are
most
likely to benefit personally
and directly from the
policies which emerge.
Farmers, for example, could
not
he expected to impartially
develop farm policies maximally consistent with the
national interest. Too many
of their narrow interests
are at stake.
Almost all

non-farm groups are denied
significant influence on
agriculture policy. Yet the less
direct interest that
a group has in agriculture,
the more impartial it
could be.

Contrary to the pluralist model,
some groups
organize around interests which will
not personally
benefit their members. According
to Brian Barry:
People may want policies other
than those calculated
S
th61 °PP° rtunities hence the
possillity of ?ddisinterested
^
action'.
Similarlv
a man may definitely not want
a policy which will'
1^ 1
h
PP0 Unities (perh s because h*
th°inbf?h
+ a°
th at the
policy is unfair and
should get the increase instead ). 78 that others

—

Ml^?

.

f

77

^

— °P le
to

-

78

*

.

.

^

^

Schattschne ider The Semi-Sovere p-n
Holt, Rinehart andTinsto n, 196o),^p.
23
,

i

.

Brian Barry, "The Public Interest," ed.
William
op. cit .. p. 164.

E. Connolly,
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These more detached
groups are excluded
from any
predominant role in policy
making in the pluralist
system precisely because
they are more
impartial. To
recapitulate, the basic
assumption of pluralism
is that
power in a particular
policy area should be
delegated
to those powerful
groups with the most
immediate and
personal interest in the
policy outcome.
This arrangement deprives
public officials of
meaningful power. Yet. one
of their most important
purposes should be to ruard
thP national
+
6 ara the
interest from
infringement by narrow, special
interests.
^

In the

pluralist model, they reinforce
the position of the
privileged by blessing it with
"the symbolism
of

the state.

Critics of pluralism claim
that it exaggerates
the scope of interests to
which the political system
is
responsive. Although pluralists
explicitly reject the
elitist model, their critics
charge them with
re-

establishing a type of elitism under
a different name,
while insisting that power is
widely dispersed.
Critics claim that the pluralist
model exaggerates
the extent to which interests
are in fact organized.

Schattschneider notes that "the range
of organized,
79 Lowi,

op.

cit .. pp. 8?-88.

.
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identifiable, known
ic.
ground
S Ups 13
amazingly narrow,
there
13 n ° thlng rem °
te1 ^ universal
about it. "80 Purther _
already advantaged
interests are much
more
frequently organized
than the less
advantaged.
Fo r
example Schattschneider
claims that "the
business
community is by a wide
margin the most highly
organized
society.
Membership in voluntary
organizations is far more
common for upper status
people.'82
Prosperous farmers are
more likely than low
income ones
to belong to growers'
8
organizations 3 Farm
laborers
are much less likely
than farmers to belong
to organizations. * Based on these
and similar findings.
,

Schattschneider concludes:
the most signif icant P
flaw in the pluraSst aspect"°of
heaven 1S
is
chorus sin^s with
_+

^ that U °°^als
The
^ a t the heavenly
V

upper-dass accent.
people oannot
get into the pressure
system^!

Probably^outlS

Although some pluralists
acknowledge this upper
class bias, they pay little
attention to its implications
for the ov erall distribution
of political power.
They
80
i

schattschneider, op. cit ..
p. 30,
8l
82
83
IbidIMd.. p. 32.
84

Ibid ,. p

Ibid., pp. 33-34.

85

lbid.

(

p. 35.

.

33
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attempt to solve the
problem through the
proposition
that organized interests
will speak for unorganized
ones
and represent them in
the political arena.
Thus. Truman
quotes V. o. Key to the
effect that Mississippi
planters
"speak for their Negroes." 8 *
Critics of pluralism
question the extent to which
the unorganized are
meaningfully represented by the
organized.
For
example,

Connolly suggests that
unorganized blue collar workers
are only marginally
8?
"represented" by
labor unions.

It is not only academic
pluralists who exaggerate
the representativeness of
organized groups.

Government

falls into the same trap, and
this further disadvantages
the unorganized.
Connolly charges, for instance,
that
the national government treats
the American Farm Bureau
Federation as if it speaks for farmers
in general. 88
Yet, the Federation represents
mostly wealthy farmers and
is one of the most conservative
of all farm organizations
in the United States.
By accepting it as the spokesman
for farmers, the government isolates
itself from the

viewpoint of less wealthy farmers.
86

Truman, op, cit .. p. 511,

87 ,

G nn ° lly
The Challenge to Pluralist
ed^nifor
ed.
Williamr S
E. Connolly, op. cit
.. p. 16.
*

ineory,
Theory
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88
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several of the
preceding considerations
lead
CrX *“" t0 the °
0nClUSl0 "
Pluralist m0 del has
Profoundly conservative
implications, 89 that
extent to which the
system fails to he
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P ° Ple
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pl
pluralist
claims of almost
universal rcommitment
+
to that
0
system.?
•

Theoretical Application
The present chapter
has been devoted
to a loose
discussion of the main
tenets of pluralism
and its
critics. Chapters
III-VI turn to a case
study of the
bracero program’s
initiation, operation,
termination, and
political aftermath. The
scope and purpose of
this

dissertation preclude any
attempt to systematically
relate all of the preceding
pluralist tenets to the
Mexican labor system.
Consequently, Chapter VII
discusses the highlights
of these developments

in terms of
some of the most relevant
propositions outlined in the
present chapter. These
propositions are summarised
below.
m ° St fundamental
assumption of the pluralist

^

89

.

I^id-

90.

.

pp.

18-19.

.

bowl, pp. Clt,.
pp. 291 - 92

.
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-del

is that public
policy is shaped by
competing

interest groups.

Consequently. Chapter
VII is heavlly
oriented toward group
political activity.
Particular
attention is paid to the
assumption that public
policy
will represent concessions
to groups with the
greatest
interest in that policy.
The pluralist model
postulates certain group
correlates of political
power.
Eight have been outlined
earlier in this chapter.
They have to do with
memberohip size, organization,
the ability to build
coalitions,

access to government,
prestige, the consistency
of group
goals with broad social
values, self-confidence,
and the

vigorous pursuit of political
goals.
The bulk of
Chapter VII is devoted to
assessing the power of
groups
opposing and supporting the
bracero program in terms
of these power-related
group characteristics.
Grower advantages on these correlates
should be useful
for

explaining initiation and
continuation of the bracero
program.
If the pluralist model
really explains the
demise of the program, then
we should expect

the loss of

grower advantages on these
correlates during the early
1960-s and a simultaneous change
in the group characteristics of reform forces.
These correlates should also
be
useful for explaining the
failure to re-institute
a

51

post- 1964 bracero
program.
The growing advantage
of reform groups
on these
correlates of influence
during the early
196o s tends to
vindicate the pluralist
proposition of countervailing
Power.
The weaker coalition
did grow and gain
political
power.
It eventually succeeded
in reversing a longestablished public policy.
.

Chapter VII considers the
pluralist assumption
that different units of
government will not be
equally
accessible to competing
interest groups.

The relevance
of this proposition is
suggested by previous studies
of
the bracero program which
have found the executive
branch
more sympathetic to
reformers
xormers snH
and Congress more attuned
to grower interests.

Chapter VII also turns attention
to the pluralist
assumption that the administration
of statutory law is
subject to group influence.
If i aw is i mportant
because
of what it does rather than
how it reads, it is essential
that this post-congressional
stage be considered.
The

traditional and widespread use of
wetback labor should
alert us to the fact that
statutory victories for reform
forces may be less important
than whose interests are
accomodated by administrators of the
law.

Chapter VII also returns to the
critics of pluralism.

52

Their position on seven
pluralist propositions is
specifically applied to selected
aspects of the Mexican
1.
labor system. The pluralist
assumptions, summarised
below, maintain that;
No interest groups are
capable of disinterested

action.
2.

The actions of public
officials can be com-

pletely explained in terms of
group dynamics.
3. Powerful interest
groups will voluntarily
moderate their claims.
4.

oenously threatened interests will
organize.

Unorganized interests will be
adequately
represented by those that are organized.
5.

Compromises written into public policy
as
concessions to a variety of groups will
be meaningful.
6.

7*

Ihe pluralist system's responsiveness
to

unorganized interests maintains their
commitment to

it.

j
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CHAPTER

ij

PRE-1942 MEXICAN LABOR
IN THE UNITED STATES
Introduction

Mexico has long furnished
cheap labor for the
American Southwest. However,
popular and scholarly
interest in this labor supply
has been uneven.
Peaks of
interest have coincided
with such dramatic
developments
as crackdowns on illegal
Mexican workers and the
establishment of the bracero
program during World War XI.
Most of the long history
of Mexican labor in the
United
States is more ordinary
and has been less studied.
Studies of post-1941 Mexican
labor in the United
States have generally paid
little attention to its historical antecedents.
One result is that the
government
programs which furnished braceros
to American farmers
from 1942 until l 9 64 have
sometimes been portrayed as
more innov ative than they were.
In fact, rather than
1

A slightly different version
of this chantpr
r offe in S he lpful suggestions
on it at that^staee
r°
£
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and Dr.
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Lab r b e: ore World War II," The
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Journal nf
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II (Spring, 1972), 122-42.
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providing a new source of
labor, they merely
formalized
an old one.

Also,

the basic arguments
of both advocates

and opponents of Mexican
labor were introduced
long ago.
Many of the political
alignments were established
early
this century and have
been remarkably stable.
The purpose of this
chapter is to provide an
historical overview of the
problem during the preera from a predominantly
political perspective.
Gaps in the literature
include not only historical
vacuums, but available studies
have not often directed
attention to the political
dynamics which have shaped
the course of Mexican labor
in the United States.

m

mi

The Nineteenth Century

Because little Mexican labor
entered the United
States during the nineteenth
century, it did not become
an important political issue
here.
Mexico was
essentially a feudalistic society.
Even under the Dfaz
regime with its veneer of
industrialization and modernization, the masses remained very
traditional and
dominated by feudal bonds. As late
as 1900, the Mexican
population remained overwhelmingly rural,
landless, and
locked in debt peonage on the haciendas. 2

Charles C. Cumberland, Mexicot
The Struggle for
Modernity (New York
Oxford University Press,
j

p.

202.

1968),
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Far from wanting to export
labor, a number of
Official surveys concluded
that Mexico was suffering
from a labor shortage. 3
Unlike American farmers,
Mexican landowners mechanized
little and the demand for
farm labor remained high. U
Big farmers complained
that
rural Mexicans were migrating
to the cities and
leaving the farms short-handed. 5
The Mexican Government
made considerable effort to
import agricultural workers,
and a system of Chinese contract
labor was established. 6

Conditions in the United States
during the nineteenth century did not favor
large movements of Mexican
labor.
Industries and farms were heavily
dependent
upon generally ample supplies of
European and Asian
workers, 7 and Mexican workers were simply
not needed in
large numbers.
Also, unpacified Indian
tribes in the

borderlands discouraged population movements.^
Despite the barriers in both Mexico and
the

United States, some Mexican laborers entered
the United
States before the turn of the century. The
post3

5

7

dates
1966 ),

Ibid*. p. 194.

4

Ibid., p. 194.

6

Leo Grebler

,

(Los Angeles:
pp. 19-21.

Ibid

.

.
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195.

Ibid

.

.
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197.

Mexican Immigration to the Unit ed
University of California Press,

Q

Cliffs:

Joan W. Moore, Mexican-Americans (Englewood
Prentice-Hall, 1970 ), pp. 16, 39.
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ClVl1

rapid industrialization
north of the border
heightened the contrast between
the poor southern
neighbor and the increasingly
wealthy United States.
Well before the end of the
nineteenth century, some
southwestern farms had been
transformed into large-scale
enterprises with a demand for
large pools of cheap
seasonal labor which was not
always supplied by
European and Asian immigration. 9
A number of dramatic
developments dating from before the
turn of the century
opened up the arid Southwest to
big, highly productive
farms.
Mechanization was introduced early,
and marked
progress in irrigation dates from
around 1885. Vast
eastern markets were opened through
a combination of
>/ar '

cross-continental railroads and new methods
of preserving
10
fruits and vegetables.
Developing simultaneously with this
gradual

opening of economic opportunities in the
southwestern
United States were improvements in Mexican
transportation.
Dfaz prided himself on railroad construction,
and by

1884 one could travel by train from Mexico
City to
11
Chicago.

^Carey McWilliams Factories in the Field
(Boston:
Little-Brown, 1939 ), pp. b9^5U
10
li
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For most of the nineteenth
century, American immigration laws posed no barrier
at all to the Mexican
immigrant.
Some were passed toward
the century's end,
but they were scarcely
enforced 12 However, nineteenth
century developments brought
only a trickle of Mexicans.
The importance of those
developments was that they were
laying the foundation for a
massive entry of Mexican
laborers during the twentieth
century.
.

Early Twentieth Century
By about 1900,

the growth of agricultural
enter-

prises and railroad construction
in the Southwest was
even more dramatic, and with this
expansion came a
pressing need for low-paid, unskilled
migrant workers 13
The formerly abundant supply of
Asian laborers was
shrinking as a result of the Chinese
Exclusion Act of
1882 and increasing numbers of Mexicans
filled
.

*

the

growing vacuum.

During the first decade of the twentieth

century, some 24,000 Mexicans entered the
United States
as immigrants, while numerous others came
for temporary

Most stuck close to the border, harvesting,
cultivating, and packing agricultural products,
working for

wortv.

12

13

(Chicago:

Grebler, op. cit .. p. 19

.

Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigrati on
University of Chicago Press, i 960 ), p~] 290

.

—
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the railroads and the
mining companies,
unskilled work. 1 ^

or doing other

Sometimes the Mexicans
entered the United States
on their own initiative,
but southwestern farmers,
railroads, and other economic
interests often recruited
dily in Mexico.
Although the pay was
better than in
Mexico, the Mexicans were
often ill-treated.
Wage

promises were not always kept.

Even when paid, the

earnings were frequently too
little to support the families which had come along.
This encouraged job-shifting,
a pattern of yearly
recruitment in Mexico, and an
expansion of the Mexican
population in the American
Southwest. 1
-5

Many of the Mexican laborers
entering in these
years did so illegally, and various
economic interests
encouraged violation of the immigration
laws which
Congress had been pressured to pass
before
1900.

Throughout much of the nineteenth
century, organized labor
had led the fight to protect American
workers
from

foreign competition.
14

1

^

Grebler, op. cit .. p. 19.

^Pauline R. Kibbe, "The American Standard-A11 Americans, Common Ground X
(Autumn, 1949), 21.
Kar y B fard, A Short History of t hp
American
T
Labor movement (New Yorks
Greenwood Press, 1968),
-7
o4.
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congress responded
to these pressures
1885 the Alien Contract
Labn t
Whi ° h banned the
,
tation of altens
under work contracts 17 q
acxs
Six years later
P
Congress prohibited
immigration
mmigration in response
to adver..
lsements promising
work in the United
states
„ ow _
these laws were
little more than
formalities. As
soon as the demand
for substantial
Mexican labor developed
Sarly yearS ° f thS
century, the restriclaws were violated
as agents for big
farmers and
railroads traveled to
Mexico and recruited
cheap labor,
ongress and the immigration
authorities paid little
attention, and their
inaction had the effect,
whether intended or not, of
establishing a policy
through which
cheap Mexican labor was
furnished to southwestern
economic interests.
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Few demands were made
on the government
to enforce
the immigration laws
at the Mexican border.
Although unpopular and wielding little
political power, organized
labor took the main
initiative.
By 1910, substantial
numbers of Mexicans were
working in the United States,
and labor leaders saw
them as a growing threat
to native
r

Bracero in Calif orni a,
a
XXXII (August, 1963)
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In that year,

the convention of the Texas
State

Federation of Labor unanimously
passed a resolution
charging that the immigration
authorities

were indiffer-

ently permitting "wholesale admission"
of Mexicans who
"are displacing
citizen labor at less
.

.

.

than

living wages.

similar resolutions and protests continued
to
come from labor unions, but they had
little effect on
public policy.
One reason was that public opinion
concerning immigration had consistently been
oriented
toward the massive population movement from
Europe and
Asia while the pre-1900 trickle of Mexicans
across the
southern border had been all but ignored.

Once Mexican

entry gained momentum, public opinion was slow to
respond
and the union viewpoint remained very much a minority
one
As noted in Chapter II, pluralists claim that the

prestige of an interest group affects its influence on
public policy.
image.

Farmers enjoyed an excellent public

Although the image of the railroads was less en-

viable, it was widely recognized that they were playing
a vital role
1

Ground

,

in opening up the nation.

Powerful economic

Art Leibson, "The Wetback Invasion," Common
X

20

(Autumn, 1949), 12.

David B. Truman, The Governmental Process
Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 506.

(New York:

6l

interests such as these
encouraged the notion
that the
use Of Mexican labor
was an essential
element of the
American employer's
freedom to xun
run nis
hi- enterprise
ent»
free
of government
interference.
But their
xneir influence
infi
was not
limited to public
opinion.
opinion
These economic
interests
were also well
represented at all levels
of government.
On the other hand,
labor unions had not
succeeded
thr ° Wing ° ff thSir
image and their
political
power remained markedly
limited.
The idea that unions
were foreign inventions
and threatened the
American way
of life was deeply
rooted in United States
history.
From
time to time union
members had experimented
with such
ideologies as socialism,
anarchism, and communism.
Atypical as these members
were, such occasional
calls for
abolition of the wage system
and capitalism left a
bad
public image in the increasingly
capitalistic society.
Although unions such as the
American Federation of Labor
made a sustained effort
to disassociate themselves
from
such anti-capitalist rhetoric,
public opinion was slow to
change .
Consequently, when organized
labor sought to
influence public policy toward
the use of Mexican
laborers,
it was not on an equal
footing with such preferred
interests as the farmers and
railroads.

"

,

^
21

126-49.

already slim chance for limiting
Mexican labor

Beard,

op,,

cit., pp. 52 - 53

,

85

,

107,

116-18,

^

.

62

was diminished even more
during the second decade
of
this century.
Far-reaching, complementary
changes in
Mexico and the United States
brought a dramatic increase
in Mexican entry.
The vast destruction of
Mexico's
Revolution, beginning in
1910, burst many of the
feudal
bonds and tens of thousands
of Mexicans fled the
horror
and insecurity of war for
22
the United States.

Traditional sources of cheap
labor for the United
began to dry up. Japanese
immigration had been

cut off in 1907.

The outbreak of World War

I

drastically

curtailed the European immigration
on which the American
economy had been so dependent.
As foreign labor supplies
shrank, so did the

supply Of native labor available
for low-paying jobs.
The marked curtailment of
immigration opened more industrial jobs to Americans. Many left
the farms for the
better pay, more favorable working
conditions,
and the

security of city jobs, especially those
in the booming,
new defense industries. At the very
time the labor pool
was shrinking, national demands for
farm productivity
was growing by leaps and bounds.

Crop acreage was in-

creased dramatically to meet the growing
food needs of
22

2?

Cumberland, op. cit .. p.
Grebler, op

.

cit .. p. 21

2 45.
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the friendly European
countries involved in
the war. 24

The Bracero Program
of World War I
The obvious source
of additional labor

for the

Southwest was revolution-ravaged
Mexico.
Until the
national governm ent
arrived at a special
war-time policy
regarding Mexican labor,
the employer faced
three options.
irst. he could bring
Mexicans in
legally.

„ owe ver, as

already noted, immigration
laws had grown increasingly

nctive.

In

190?, Congress had banned
the entry of
transients "detrimental to
labor conditions" in this

country.

Exclusionist sentiment had
grown rapidly
during the early years of
the twentieth
century,

reaching a climax with the
outbreak of World War I.
Although the growing distrust
of foreigners had been
directed mostly toward
Europeans

and Asians, it had re-

sulted in new, restrictive
immigration laws which made
the legal entry of Mexican
labor much more difficult.
The
191? Immigration Act had been
the most restrictive in
American history. 26 The head
tax increase from 4.00 to
$
$8.00 had probably been enough
to deter thousands
of

24

May 19.

1

25
26

917. **§7 ill*

TlrneS

‘

Af>ril 3 °’

1917

’

P*

14 and

Gilmore and Gilmore, op. cit.. n.
'

U,S,

»

Statutes at LargP. XXXIX, Part

1,

874-98.

,

64

poverty-stricken Mexicans
fro, legally entering
the
United States to seek
work.
The fact that the
contract
labor law prohibiting
previous contracts had
been renewed made the head
tax relatively more
burdensome
inasmuch as the Mexican
paying it would

still have no
assurance of work in the
United States. Another
barrier to obtaining legal
Mexican labor had been
the
provision of the 1917 act
barring illiterates from
the United States.^

A second alternative
was to evade the
substantial

legal barriers altogether
by using illegal Mexican
immigrants. Although their
docility and willingness
to work
for extremely low wages
made them attractive to
some em
ployers, their economic value
was diminished by the
absence of any contract
binding them to the job.
This
was an especially important
problem for the farmer
be-

cause inadequate labor at peak
seasons could bring the
loss of the entire crop.
Although illegal Mexicans
were employed extensively
during the war, this weakness
encouraged some employers to seek
a legal labor
supply.

The third option was to seek
some flexibility in
the rigid laws then on the
books.
It is not surprising
that would-be users of Mexican
labor were successful in
2?

Ibid.

pp.

875-76.

,
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getting the desired legal
changes
ent had done little
to

After all> the goyern _

.

enforce the immigration
laws at
the Mexican border
even before the outbreak
of
war.

The

wartime atmosphere brought
arguments from top
government
officials, as well as farmers
armers, that food
production was
no less important to
the war effort than
were soldiers
and guns.
Consequently, warnings of
labor shortages
from farmers and other
employers met especially
sympathe tic officials.
The case for Mexican
labor was led by sugar beet
growers and the railroads,
although it was widely

supported by other western
economic interests 28 The
legal loophole was the ninth
proviso in Section 3 of
the 1917 Immigration Act
which specified that the

Commissioner of Immigration could
temporarily admit
otherwise inadmissible aliens.
Interested employers
appealed to the Secretary of Labor,
W.B. Wilson,

to ask
the Commissioner of Immigration
to temporarily open this

loophole for Mexican workers to
ease the labor shortage.
On May 23. 1917, the Secretary
asked the immigration
authorities to ignore the literacy
test,

the head tax,

and the contract labor requirements
of the immigration
laws for necessary Mexican labor.
He explained that the
28

Gilmore and Gilmore, op. cit

.

p.

268.

^
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order was intended to
solve a labor
southwestern states. The
Secretary
delineated and carefully
controlled
gration barriers were to
be lowered
who would engage in
agricultural

shortage in the

promised a rigidly
program.

The immi-

only for Mexicans

work. 2 *

The laborers

were to return to Mexico
immediately upon completion
of
their assigned work in the
United States. 30
A new order from Secretary
Wilson issued in June.

1918, added railroad section
hands and lignite coal
workers to the class of exempt
Mexicans. 31 i„ December,
he rescinded all his
orders to the immigration
authorities,
only to face pressure from
sugar

beet growers and other

employers calling for unrestricted
entry of Mexican labor
Consequently, the orders were
re-issued. 32
Unlike during World War II, the
American government assumed no direct responsibility
for recruitment.
Farmers and other employers traveled
to Mexico and
recruited their own labor.
29

PP

*
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(New York,
ColumbETu.uven.ity Press, 1945).
11 U— 1 1 •
31

32

New York Times. June 20, 1918,
p. 4.
Schwartz, op. cit .. pp. 110-11.
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In Mexico there was
no shortage of laborers
eager
to leave for the United
States.
From the revolution-

ravaged economy, many simply
headed for the border
without contacts of any kind
in the United States.
So
many left that concern began
to be expressed in Mexico
that her own farms would be
under-manned 34
.

stand

Nevertheless, the Mexican government
did not
the way of emigration.
The Revolution

m

had been
fought in large part against the
system of land tenure,
and big farmers did not enjoy the
same prestige as did
American farmers in the United States.
Also, the exodus
of Mexicans helped relieve the
stress on the war-torn
economy, which could not support
the population at even
the level of the Diaz era.
In July, 1918, it was
announced that the Mexican government
was providing
trains for transporting braceros to
the American border. 35
The legal routine for obtaining
Mexican workers,

although not always followed, was complex
and involved
several governmental responsibilities. Because
Mexicans
were to be used only for meeting labor
shortages, em-

ployers were not free to hire them in unlimited
numbers.
The channels established by the Labor
Department
34
35

New York Times

.

June 6, 191 8, p. li.

New York Times

.

July 20, 1918, p. 11.

t
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may be illUStrated
used to obtain far,
labor.

the procedures
generally

Farmers customarily
formed

associations which channeled
Mexican labor to them.
They reported their
labor needs to the
associations
which conveyed them to
the Labor Department.
A major
responsibility of the Department
was to determine
whether a labor shortage in
fact existed and had
prompted the specific requests.

However, there is little

evidence that it took this
responsibility seriously,
and its verification of labor
shortages was apparently
more or less automatic.
The Labor Department
conveyed
the requests, with its
certification, to the immigration
authorities.
They then admitted Mexican
workers
in

numbers limited by the certified
requests. 36
Before an employer could bring
Mexicans in, he
was required to sign an
agreement with the United States

government specifying conditions
under which the braceros
could enter for employment with him.
He was responsible
for feeding, transporting, and
housing the Mexicans,
although these costs could be deducted
from wages. 37
Each Mexican entering under the
arrangement was
identified and photographed at the
border.

He was

66thC °"S-. 3r d
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required to confirm his
understanding that he was
to engage solely in f arm work
and that violation of
the
agreement would be grounds
for his return to Mexico. 3 8
To facilitate the
worker's return to Mexico
at
end
the war
the Labor Department
required
’

that
he invest a portion
of his wages in a
postal savings
account.
The money, with interest,
could be claimed by
the worker only as he
left the country. 8 ? Also>

^

association requesting the
worker formally accepted
ponsibility for his return to
Mexico upon completion
0
Of his work.^
Although it would be an
oversimplification to depict the bracero program as
resulting solely from the
interest group struggle between
its supporters

and
opponents, the underlying interest
group pattern is of
some explanatory value.
As indicated earlier,
powerful,
western economic groups with
substantial political power
were major supporters of the
Mexican labor system,
and

without their demands for the program
it would never have
come into being. Among the most
important of these

groups
were the railroads, coal mines,
sugar beet growers, and
38
39

40
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,

op, cit .. p.
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New York Times. June 20,
1918, p. 4.
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,

op,

cit .. p. 4553.
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cotton and fruit farmer^
warmers. 4 l

n

Congressmen such as

Representative Carl Hayden 42
and other government
officials represented them
well at the highest
level
of government.
While the major groups
and spokesmen
supporting the Mexican labor
program were from

the West,

southern interests sometimes
offered strong support,
as
they would do again during
World War H. The interests
of the South and West
overlapped considerably.
Certain
farm areas of the South
claimed a labor shortage
during
World War [, and farm
labor was imported from the
Bahamas.

Also, inauguration of the
braoero program
for the western states meant
that they were less likely
to compete with the South
for its shrinking supply
of
farm labor.

m

long

Opposition to the Mexican labor
program was not
developing, and it grew throughout
the war.

Steamship companies were among the
earliest critics,
charging discriminatory application
of the immigration
laws.
While they were fined for transporting

illiterates

to this country,

they complained, the American
government

4l

^
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welcomed illiterates from
Mexico. 44
Grass roots opposition
in Mexico apparently
developed from the very
beginning. According to
the

Secretary of Labor, rumors
were widely circulated
in
Mexico to the effect that
Mexicans were harassed at
the border and mistreated
in the United States. 4 5
his address to the opening
session of the Mexican

Congress on September

1.

in

1919. President Carranza ex-

pressed dismay at the mistreatment
of Mexican laborers
in the western United States.
He voiced particular concern about the alleged
mistreatment of Mexicans by
46
American police.
The Mexican government became
directly involved two weeks later
when two railroad
section hands, both Mexican nationals,
were lynched by
a mob in Pueblo, Colorado.
By 1919, organized labor in the
United States had
stepped up its attack on immigration,
including that
from Mexico.
The unions had grown concerned
that return1
ing servicemen would be unable to
find work. * 8
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Pini0n
against

i mrai .

L° the war came a
W xth
growing distrust of
oreigners. and there
was a marked
tendency to see the
emigrant as a threat
to "the American
way of life .
Fear of disloyalty
was widespread,
and it was fed hy
g ration

•

occasional violence
committed by anarchists
and members of other extremist
groups.
grouDS
Tn June,
t
In
1919, the
New Y ork Tim^R
?
suggested
tha+
sted
gg
that immigration
might
threaten American "self ny,OP .
self-preservation.” Although
it
went on to recognize
that the United
nixed btates
States owed much
to
oreign labor, the
paper editorialized
that "no economic or financial
consideration has any
standing in
comparison with the
imperative patriotic need
of
guarding against the
enemies of uxuer
order and the
+h* 0emissaries
of destruction.
,

.

•

Considerable opposition to
foreign labor came
patriotic organizations
concerned with keeping
the nation’s population
"pure.” In testimony
before the
Senate Committee on
Immigration in 1920. a
spokesman
for the Sons of America
charged that the United
States
flooded with immigrants,
many of whom were illiterate
and could not speak English.
This threat to "Americanism."
he warned, "ought not
be further enlarged by
importation
49

New York Times, June

9,

1919, p

,

12

.
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fr 0m abroad or any
other source, whatever
may happen to
•
•
the big cotton and
sugar plantations of
the
Southwest. ”-5°
•

Also opposing the Mexican
labor program were persons who charged that
American employers took
advantage
of the helpless foreign
labor.
In a heated exchange
with
Representative Hayden in
1920. Representative Welty
of
Ohio charged that the
bracero program violated
the constitutional prohibition of
slavery.-^ 1
As the war came to an
end. justifications
for

importing Mexican labor were
undermined. Claims of
labor shortages grew less
convincing. To a heavily
nationalistic public, concern
about jobs for returning
servicemen loomed larger and
larger.
Formal governmental policy adjusted to the
new national mood. On
March 2, 1921. Secretary Wilson
rescinded his orders to
the immigration authorities,
and the special emergency,
Mexican labor program came to an
end.^ 2
The extent and impact of the
bracero program were

considerable.

According to government reports,
72,862
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Mexican laborers entered
under the special
provisions.
The reports further
indicate that the Labor
Secretary's
cla ims of a carefully
controlled program were
exaggerated.
By June 30. 1921.
only 34.922 of the
nationals had been
returned to Mexico while
thousands had deserted
their
employers and disappeared. 53
Nor was this the only
failure to enforce the law.
Evidence indicates that
during the war years, the
overwhelming majority of
Mexican immigrants entered
illegally.
A government
report in 1920 acknowledged
the problem and noted
that
"for many weeks prior to this
report every road leading
from the south into San
Antonio ... had on it
a

stream of these immigrants,
many of them in rags ." 54
It is likely that this
Mexican labor had a
seriously adverse impact on native
workers.
James J.
Davis, Wilson's successor as
Labor Secretary, noted in
1920 that files left by his predecessor
contained "many
reports
that these Mexicans were crowding
American
workmen out of their jobs because they
were willing to
take employment at wages which
would not permit the worker
.

.

.

53 U.S.,

Congressional Re cord. 70th Cong.
Sess., 1929 , LXX, Part 2, 1177.
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Congressional Reco rd. 68 th Cong.
st Sess., 19247 LX V, Part
6476-77
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,
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live on the basis
of American standards." 55
The Decade of the
Twenties

Mexican immigration
during the 1920’s
reached unprecedented levels
Some 500.000 entered
on permanent
visas,
and illegal entry was
probably much greater.
During the decade the
American economy boomed
and continued to offer opportunities
for cheap foreign labor.
On the other hand,
Mexico’s economy failed
.

to live up to

expectations generated during
the years of revolution.
With some exceptions, it
failed to compare favorably
with
the Diaz era.
Cumberland notes that in
1924, as
"com-

pared to the pre-revolutionary
period, the vast majority
of the Mexicans probably
ate less well, had fewer
schools to attend and fewer
job opportunities." 5
'!’

Although the Mexican Constitution
of 1917 put the Mexican
laborer on a level with any
in the world, leaders
such
as Carranza were essentially
conservative and simply
did not carry out the more
radical constitutional provisions. 58 For example,
although land reform was a
major theme of the Revolution,
it went forward at a
snail s pace throughout the
1920's.
#
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Also pushing
Mexicans from their,
*
ry Were the
numerous, deer
rant a conflicts
deep-rooted
which continued
to split
Pl 1
the society.
Some of the
important ones
centered
around
oflabor ’ land
•

•

ZXZT
ofth
f "

m ° St

*

——

erUPted thrOU ^out
the decade.

Mtter

One

involved the
ovement, in which
certain Catholics
awxoxics, including
inoi a
cries +q
engaged in violence
which the government
met with
counter-violence. Many
people werg km#d
time civil war raged. 59

!

-

^

In the United States
tates>

+h„
the question of
Mexican

nUSd aS 3n lmportan t
political issue throughthe 1920 's,
Opposition built during
the bracero era
continued even more
vigorously now that it
did not have
to contend with the
compelling argument of
labor shortin wartime.
g
The vast increase
in Mexican
immigration, both legal
and illegal, brought
new
supporters to the opposition.
Nor did the wartime
suspicion of foreigners
subside. Also, the
severe postwar recession heightened
organized labor's concern
about
foreign labor in the
United States. 60

of) _
i

Grebler, op. cit .. d-5,
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Congressional opposition
to the use of
Mexican

Jr;

Criti0S WaS
0 1924>

^

ntative LaCuardia
of New
Called for ri id
S
enforcement

of the

.

immigration laws at the
Mexiro^
Mexican k
border.
LaGuardia
n
C aimed that
Mexican workers were
underlining American
labor.
The key to their
entry. he charged.
was the
act that employers
could wort them for
less than a
2
dollar a day.
He called for better
funding of the
Border Patrol and
suggested that co-ordination
of the
Labor Department, the
Immigration Service, the
Customs
Service, and the
Prohibition Service would
reduce illegal
immigration. J
.

In the same session
of Congress,
Representative

Raker of California
recalled committee hearings
earlier
that year in which a
spokesman for a sugar
company testified that he had obtained
Mexicans for $2.00 per
worker from labor agents
in Texas.
The congressman
charged that this was a
clear violation of
the pro-

vision of the immigration
law denying entry to
"persons
called contract laborers
who have been
.

6

S

1st Sess !y\
62
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^ d - solicited to migrate
- Promises of employment."**
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During the I92 0- s
the Mexican labor
,
centered around the effort
n
eff ° rt t0 P lace
Mexico under the socalled quota system.
The fervent
,
na +
rvent nationalist
feelings
Of wartime, the
"red-scare- of the war
years, and the
Post-war recession gave
rise to the 1921
quota law .
It restricted
immigration each year to
of the full
number of each nationality
living in the United
States
1910.
The Quota Act of
1924 was more obviously
aimed
at the darker races
inasmuch as it shifted
the base year
to 1890 when relatively
fewer persons of darker
races
lived in the United
6
States. 5 However, both
acts excluded Western Hemisphere
nations from the quota
system,
and Mexican labor was.
therefore, unaffected.
Of course,
Mexican immigrants were
still subject to the
general
immigration laws.
i

.

^

Efforts to restrict Mexican
labor by including
Mexico under the quota
system were strong and
determined.
Representative Box of Texa«?
«
i
«
a
iexas called
for such a bill in
64
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each of^several congressional
sessions during the
1920 s.
Predictably, western farm
interests formed
the backbone of
opposition to the "Box bills."
Although
opposition to Mexican labor
had grown, it did not
lessen the determination
of the employers.

Hearings on one of the yearly
Box bills were
held in 1926 by the House
Committee on Immigration
and Naturalization. Witnesses
appearing to oppose the
bill included various farmers,
representatives
of

Chambers of Commerce, and spokesmen
for sugar beet
corporations. A Chamber representative
claimed that
adequate numbers of Americans were
simply unavailable
for certain types of farm work
and the Mexican was used
"because there is nothing else
available." He went on
to suggest that mere defeat of
the Box bill was
inade-

quate.

He proposed that western
growers be permitted

to import Mexican workers upon
the mere demonstration of

need, unrestricted by all immigration
laws. 67

A spokes-

man for sugar beet industries claimed
that Americans
simply would not do the hardest types

of farm work and

66

Glay L Coc hran, "Hired Farm Labor and the
Federal Government" (mimeographed Ph.D.
dissertation.
University of North Carolina, 1950),
*
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that to expect
otherwise would “drive
the*
agriculture. “68

^

fr ° m

In the committee
hearings of 1926.
only one

prominent witness appeared
in behalf of the
Mu< A
spokesman for the American
Federation of Labor
claimed
that agricultural
surpluses were already
a problem and
at additional labor
merely compounded the
problem.

In response to the claim
*
that+ Americans
were unwilling
to do hard agricultural
work
h* answered
work, he

that inadequate
,
wages were to blame. 69
Many of the opponents
of Mexican labor had
long
based their claims on
a racial argument,
and as the
controversy surfaced in
Congress and elsewhere,
this
theme grew more prevalent.
In 1925. Secretary
of
Labor Davis noted that
he had been “fighting
for
gislation to
.
keep intact the racial
characteristics of our great
republic."™ i„ California,
the
Sa nta Rosa Republican
newspaper, referring to a subdivision of Mexican Indians,
charged that “if the railroads and farms in southern
California could be induced
to pay a d ecent living
wage to white labor, there
would
.

68
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be no need to
import this peon
riffraff "71
.

Despite the widespread
sympathy for reducing
ex lean immigration,
all such hills
failed to make it
through Congress.
There are several
possible reasons.
nganized labor remained
weak whereas the
wealthy
farmers and railroads
had not yet been
discredited by
the Great Depression.
There
re was little
tittle co-ordination
of the opponents
of Mexican
lean labor, perhaps
because their
motivation was so mixed.
Probably another reason
for
failure was the fact
that Mexicans were
entering some of
the least populated
areas of the United
States.
Also
it was widely believed
that the most serious
threat to
Americanism" was persons
with ancestry in the
nations
at war with the United
States during World War
I.

The Depression Years
The economic crisis
at the end of the
1920-s

markedly reduced immigration
from Mexico.
67.000 Mexicans entered

Whereas some

legally in 1927, only
11,915
came in 1930 . 72 The wetback
problem began to take care
of itself as jobs became
unavailable.
Not only did immigration sl ow up. but a large
exodus of Mexicans occurred.
S
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he Great Depression
brought ma ssive
unemployment and a

vast native labor
surplus.

^r "
1

emPl0yment t0

Former urban workers

the, over the crisis.

Job conled to increasing
ethnic tensions, and
American
workers scenes turned
violently upon their
Mexican

dition

ompetitors

From 1931 to 1933.
over 70,000 Mexicans
urned to their own country
while around 100,000
left
during the decade. 74
.

Pressures for deporting
the Mexicans grew
rapidly
as the Depression
worsened.
For the first
time in its

history, the national
government began to rigorously
apply
the immigration laws
at the Mexican border.
They provided for exclusion of
those who might become
"public
charges," and this provided
a lever for keeping
out many
exican workers.
Also, substantial numbers
of Mexicans
were expelled under the
stricter enforcement procedures. 76
Although the enforcement of
immigration laws is
a national responsibility,
many Mexicans left under
pressure from local governments.
As welfare rolls grew.
SOme reUe f
found that they could save
money by
73

W
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paying the Mexicans'
transportation costs hack to
the
border.
Some local officials
simply threatened to
drop Mexicans from the
relief
rolls.

It is commonly assumed
that southwestern farmers
joined the movement to
expel Mexican workers from
the
United States. 78

However, numerous letters
and telegrams in the National Archives
indicate that even during
the depths of the Depression,
many of these farmers continued to claim a serious
shortage of domestic farm
labor.
They opposed all efforts to
reduce the number of
Mexican workers in the United
States. 79
The decision to return
Mexicans was a unilateral
one which created serious
problems for Mexico.

She was
only then beginning to recover
from the Revolution and
from the continuing chaos that
characterized the 1920’s
and, like the United States,
she suffered from
the De-

pression.

About 15 % of the returnees settled
in largely
unsuccessful repatriation colonies
established by the
Mexican government. Most of the other
returnees went
y S B ?gardus,
S ic an-Amer lean "Repatriation and ReadjustMex
s
An Awakening Mirmr-ity
b6rVln Beveri y Hills, Glencoe Press, Y
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back to their native
villages.

Having often lived for
years in the United
States and taken on
American ways.
they were someti.es
rejected by other Mexicans
as
SOSgos who felt superior to their
own people. 80
Both in Mexico and the
United States, it was
suggested that fundamental
principles of justice had
been disregarded in the
“deportations." Many local
American agencies spent little nr
F
or no +time uncovering

™

<

facts about the "Mexicans.”

For example, children
born
in the United States were
often sent to Mexico with
no
regard for their rights as
American citizens. 81

Bogardus suggested that
employers who had profited
from
and exploited Mexican workers
should have assumed some
responsibilities toward them even
when they were no
longer an economic asset.® 2
Politically, one of the most
important effects
of the events of the 1930’s
was the impact they left
on Mexican-United States
relations.
The unilateral
American action left a bitterness
which prompted

Mexico’s tough bargaining when
the United States again
wanted Mexican labor during the
194 o*s.

80
8l

82
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Summary and Conclusions
One useful perspective
for understanding the
use
of Mexican labor in
the United States
before World War II
is the interest
group pattern which
has been discussed.
AS we have seen,
certain economic interests
in the

Southwest came to prefer
Mexican labor because it
was
cheap, docile, and
plentiful. Organizations
such as
big commercial farms,
railroads, coal mines, sheep
ranches, and canning factories
enjoyed substantial political access and power.
On the other hand,
opponents
of importing Mexican labor
wielded much less
influence.

Consequently, southwestern growers
found their interests
especially accomodated by the
governmental system. Some
times the concessions were
legal and above-board while
some took the form of
governmental inaction and indifference to enforcing the
immigration laws.
One pattern that emerges from
this chapter is the

consistent political influence of
the employers of
Mexicans even when casual observation
would suggest
that these interests were having
less and less

impact

on policy-making.

For instance, the decision to
end
the special emergency supply
of Mexican labor

in 1921

gave the impression that employer
interests were
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losing ground.
gram br0Ught a

Yet the p-r*«*
*
great+ struggle
to end the prohollow legal Victory
to

opponents of the use
of Mexican workers
1
ers
Even when
„
£ven
~
the
,
policy turned against
the employers,
their
interests were still
informally accomodated.
The
government continued to
maintain an informal
Mexican
labor program by simply
refusing to apply the
immigration laws vigorously
and systematically.
Far from
reducing the number of
Mexican workers, the end
of the
emergency program marked
the beginning of a
decade
which brought Mexican
workers to the United
States in
vastly increased and
unprecedented numbers.
ft-

»

This chapter includes
useful historical material
for understanding the
series of bracero programs
lasting
from 1942 through 1964.
Most scholars studying
the

programs have looked at them
in an historical vacuum.
Consequently, they have tended
to portray them as
pretty innovative. Yet in
many ways the policy in
the
later period was a replay
of the World W ar I program.
For example, comparing
the program of 1942 with
the
earlier ones reveals that the
legal authorization was
identical, and interest
groups opposing and supporting
the program lined up
similarly.
Most arguments used by
friends and foes of the
programs since 1942 had been
tried

87

out by the same
groups during World
War I. In both
eras, the use of
wetbacks was widespread.
Examples
such as these suggest
that more recent
bracero programs
should be re-evaluated
in light 0 f historical
background such as that
presented in this chapter.
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CHAPTER

IV

THE BRACERO PROGRAM,
1942-60
The present chapter
turns attention to
the
Roosevelt. Truman, and
Eisenhower years of the
bracero
program.
During these administrations,
grower interests

rather thoroughly dominated
Mexican labor policy.
However, it will be seen
that there was also
considerable
opposition to the employment
of braceros.
Among other themes, this
chapter discusses the
broad meaning of farm labor
shortages, reasons for re-

mauguration of the bracero
program, the initial agreement with Mexico, interest
group activity, patterns
of
regional and party support
for the program among
congressmen, the post-World War
II increase in oppo-

sition to the use of Mexican
labor, the Truman
administration's resort to unilateral
recruitment in
19b8, Eisenhower's attempt
to cope with the wetback
problem in 1954, and his unilateral
recruitment
legislation.
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The Concept of a
"Labor Shortage"

Throughout most of this
century. American
growers have been claiming
a shortage of domestic
farm labor. Although
the problem itself is
not political, they have often
sought political solutions
to it.
The pluralist pattern
has been more or less
followed.
Growers have experienced
labor frustrations.
Many have sought solutions
through interest groups
such as the American Farm
Bureau Federation.
These

organizations have often served
as political interest
groups inasmuch as they have
worked through governmental institutions in an
effort to solve the problems perceived by their
members.
Because from
the

pluralist perspective, political
activity cannot be
understood in isolation from the
tensions giving rise
to it,

it is necessary to discuss
briefly the nature

Of the labor problem involved.

Most Mexican workers, both
legal and illegal,
have been used in highly seasonal
crops.
Many of the
farms have been large.
This means that the investment
has been great, and from the
farmers' viewpoint much
is at stake.
In addition to the basic cost
of land

P
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and machinery, new
and substantial
investments are
necessary each season for
planting, cultivating,
and
harvesting the crop.
In farming, more
than in most
enterprises, the labor
needs are unsteady. Once
Planted, the crop may
need little additional
attention
for weeks
But once it does need
that attention, it
mUSt bS Pr ° mpt or the
entire crop may be lost.
As
Schwartz notes*
.
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case of less
° a
e cr °ps, such as
cotton,
there is an

ava!?aMe

af ?he

*

^

k
lng
many fresh fruits and
vegetaMes th»r»
t0 rea ° h mar ^ets «h!ie
prices are^
d
WerS Seek to harvest quickly,
t’
?
aware that
thf the
+h» H
I?
difference
of a day or two in 7
thS diffarenc e between
high^prof
6 proiixs
and small
its^and^m
If"or no orofi+c?
piuj..lts lor +1,^
this
season'qs P-f-Fnv»+
T+
ellort
It
is no wonder,
ix

f^

sSf^-T
1

•

*

+

workers

therefore

^o^ir^aSS^d® nlotsllll.l

No one has disputed the
general claim that an

adequate supply of workers is
needed.

The disagreement

between supporters and opponents
of importing Mexican
labor has often centered around the
question
of just
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w

how large a labor
supply
ppiy must bo
be before it is
adequate.
r ecades many
growers have
dve xaKen
taken bhe
thp position
that
mencan agriculture has
suffered from a critical
shortage of domestic
labor.
This argument was
g
eme of bracero
advocates throughout
.

^

Mexican labor nrofrrpm
pro S rara

the life 0 f the

-

t
+
It

was a continuous
claim,

spanning not only years
of economic prosperity
but
recession and depression
years in which millions
of
Amertcans. including at
least hundreds of
thousands
of migrant farm
workers, were unsuccessfully
looking
for jobs. 2
Critics of the Mexican
labor program inaugurated
ln 1942 t6n<led t0
assume ^at one able and
willing
American for each farm job
was adequate.
Growers, on
the other hand, had
a very strict conception
of the
“ability needed for farm
work.
As in pre-Depression
years, they were often
critical of available farm
work,
charging it with shiftlessness,
dislike for stoop
labor, drunkenness and
plain ineptness.
Throughout
the twentieth century,
southwestern growers have compared American migrants
unfavorably to the extremely
hard worki ng, able, and
uncomplaining Mexican.

Policy Consolations*'^."Nationa! Agriculture Labor
°f
Ecnnomif~*.
XLVIII (December! 1966)

^
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Growers
worker- for- one-

Job-argument

.notber
apparently assume that
as long
i
>.
g as the labor
supply,
matter how large,
contains any element
of uncer-

tainty,

it is inadequate.

workers

In their dealings
with

growers have constantly
sought to increase
the predictability
and dependability
of the labor
Pool. One person for
one job does not
meet the standard. because if for
any reason he is not
fully reliable
at the crucial moment,
the farmer’s huge
initial investment may bring no
return and the cost
of this
year’s crop may simply
be wasted.
,

Perhaps the greatest
threat of uncertainty
is
seen in strikes. From
the grower's
perspective, they
are especially intolerable
in agriculture because
they
can be so much more
damaging than in other
industries
where a work stoppage
does not mean destruction
of the

partially developed product.
a chance of strikes,

Therefore, if there is

the argument may be
easily ex-

tended to assume that even
in a society with tens
of
thousands of migrants
unemployed, the labor supply

is

inadequate and foreign workers
are desperately needed
to save the endangered
crops.
The need to have labor
for planting, cultivating.
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and harvesting
the crops at
the crucial
Liai time is not
the only
motivation of growers
for
r "anting a
large
labor supply.
Themost Pr ° dU ° tiVe
S ° Uth
farms
are Mt
set UP 35 bUSi
for profit-making.
in a hook entitled
Facto ries in the
cwuitams describes
the corporate
farm which hal
increasingly become
the prototype of
American agriculture.
Many farm costs
such as expense
for
machinery, gasoline,
seed, and fertilizer
continue
o increase
and are largely
beyond the control
of
the gr0Wer>
The ““ bi «
^=tor that has been
““t 633117 contr °Had by
farmers has been that
of
labor.
Largely unorganized,
relatively uneducated,
often politically
disenfranchised by their
constant
movement from place to
place, and excluded
from most
important social welfare
legislation of this century
the migrant workers
have been largely
at the mercy of
farmer.
He has set wages
low and found that
from
manipulating this cost
factor, profits could
often
be high,
•

—
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(Boston.
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c°3t factor manageable
Factories in the Fiela
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and l0W in a nu
mber of ways.

First as
^Portant
Political group the h
P, they have
constantly fought the
fusion of farm
workers under the
v
various social
welfare v
benefits that
government h S
to
other workers
rkers.
A major
a
strategy has been
t
een to
res urrect
the s tenant
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the 1920
I920
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to the present +im«
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Secondly, from

Stowers have bitterly
fought
efforts to unionize
v
fan. 1laborers.
4
Thirdly,
^
the y have
sought docile
W ° rkerS - es ec
ially
P
from
m
rom Mexico,
who would accent
cept low wages
without
complaint.

^

-

>,

^

•

The issue of a
farm worker shortage
underlies

the whole Mexican
labor program.

It is the single

without Which the
importation of braeeros
during
11

The Bracero Program
under Roosevelt

Even before the
outbreak of World War
II. farmers were growing
increasingly apprehensive
about the
lab0r SUPPly
Fr0ra
viewpoint, the situation
l!!l
-

Schwartz, o^cit.,
pp
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possibility that
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ESPecially
::; a ;°:
ifornia, unionization
of agricultural
workers
was undertaken.
A number of strikes
culminated
-olence as growers
mounted
their own.

in

a full-scale
offensive of

Although efforts to
organize farm workers
had
Pretty much failed by
the end of the
decade, growers
were increasingly
fearful that the tradition
of lowPard. docile, unorganized
migrant labor might be
coming
Perha P s the greatest
threat was the exam
P le
of industrial
unionization and the
decreasing ability
of industrial
managers to unilaterally
establish wages
and working conditions.
Although the trends of
the
had not yet caught u
P with growers, they were
growing political and
economic voice for the
workingman. Merely as
an example to farm
workers, the
trends could be dangerous.
Perhaps even more serious
was the possibility
that they were an omen
of intentions
umj nis oration had
about workers
-

in

"'ibid

.

PP. 99-100.
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general, and that its
encouragement of unions in industry was a preview of
reform plans it had for

agricultural labor.

Finally, as industry expanded
in
the late 1930’s, workers
began to leave the farms.
There was the possibility
that enough of these would
drift back to farm work with
new ideas about the role
of the workingman to cause
unprecedented trouble and

unpredictability in the agricultural
labor force.
By the late 1930’ s, the tenseness
of growers
was further exacerbated by the
shrinking surplus labor
pool.

By 1940, the unemployment rate
had been reduced

to about 15* from a Depression
high of perhaps twice

that figure.

This trend added to apprehensions
borne

of worker unrest during the 1930’s
led a growing num-

ber of farmers to decide that the labor
supply was
inadequate
These fears were accentuated as United
States

involvement in World War II appeared more and
more
likely.

In September of 1940, Congress passed the

Selective Service Act and in March of 1941, the

National Defense Act became law.

The draft and new

defense industries served as a constant drain on
the farm labor supply.
6

U.S., Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth Census
of the United States:
1940.
Population . III. T~.
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Farmers and "their orpan^a + i
organizations perceived
the
worsening labor picture
as a political
problem well before the attack on
Pearl Harbor and the
United States
declaration of War in
December, 19 * 1 .? One
source of
their impressive impact
on policy during
the war was
their organization.
Oriani.oj
organized into many
associations,
councils, and federations,
the growers spoke
with a
great deal of unity. As
early as May of 1941
f or
,
example, various Farm
Bureau Associations were
warning
congressmen that the labor
supply would be exhausted. 8
Various state and local
officials became part
of the drive to warn
both federal officials
and
the

public that the farmers
needed help. For example,
in
July, 1941, an official
report from the Washington
State Office of Unemployment
Compensation noted that
harvest labor was already
scarce in that state. 9 In
June of the following
year, Governor Culbert Olson
sent
a telegram to the secretaries
of Labor, Agriculture,

States during
LII (December,

La

ur

the
?° T
inte^nT
^
10 ” 31 Labn,lr
ig^n’blTTC ° ng ‘

Seas.. 1941

J u ly

1^1941,

^of^astungton during
pp

1941

.

’

United

lst

t

98

-d

State appealing
for imported Mexioan
bolster farm production. 10

^

Even before the
Roosevelt administration's
dec is ion to
inaugurate a bracero
program, a number of
growers and various
farm organizations
directed requests for Mexican
labor to +ho
4
the immigration
officials.
in the spring of
l 9 4l, a group of
farmers
southern Texas asked
the Immigration
Service to lift
the main restrictions
of the Immigration
Act of 1917
so the movement of
Mexican workers into the
United
States would be facilitated.
In July. a group of
Arizona cotton growers
11
repeated the

^

appeal.

In

September of the same year,
various farm
farm organizations
*
in California asked
the Immigration Service
to import
30.000 Mexican nationals
to meet their labor
shortage. 12
In April of 1942. an
association of important
sugar
refining companies known as
California Field Crops
notified t he Immigration Service
that it wanted 4.000
*

10

ic bard B. Craig, The
Bra earn Program
Intpracf ^
F
P
Uustin ^ u "ive riity of Texas Press,
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Mexicans for the
sugar beet crop. 13

WlU

te reCalled
that Pluralist
theory pos ulates that the
demands of
e

SeneraUy

political interest
groups

° halle

"- d

^

-val

groups which feel
reatened by these
demands. Before the
bracero program WaS inaU
a
d
August. 1942, either
outright
opposition or serious
reservations came from
several
quarters.

^^

-

in 1941, organized
labor tool a stand
against

e

importation of Mexican
nationals,
it claimed that
e domestic labor
supply was adequate.
Also speaking
of Mexican-Americans.

The National
Spanish-Speaking

People's Congress and
the Federation of
SpanishAmerican Voters of
California expressed the
view that
Mexican-Americans were already
unemployed and should
not be further
disadvantaged by foreign
competition.
Scruggs notes that
Mexican-Americans sometimes
feared
that a bracero program
would harm intergroup
relations
the United States, 1 "*
presumably by triggering
latent hostility toward
people of Mexican ancestry.
Before the bracero program
was actually

m

13

14

Ibid

.

Ibid.

p.

142.
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negotiated with Mexico
it appeared that
she might
oppose it. we have
already discussed
the iu-will
lett from the
events of the
Depression years.
Also>
the Mexican
government had long
been concerned
about
discrimination against
persons of Mexican
ancestry
the United States.
According to ScruggS(
opinion in Mexico had
been inflamed by
such events
to the extent
that the government
probably would have
o.md it politically
most inexpedient to
send workers
to the United
States without
guarantees concerning
their treatment.
In fact, the Mexican
Constitution
required such guarantees
although they had been
completely disregarded by
the United States
government
and A merican farmers
prior to 1942. Ar ticle
123 contained the requirement
that contract workers
be
guaranteed return transportation.
A gitated over the
deportations of the Depression,
the Mexican Congress
wrote into the Labor
Law of 1931 the
requirements
that the transportation
costs of workers must
be paid
by employers, that
the employers deposit
funds in
Mexican banks to cover
the expenses of
repatriation,
that the workers be
paid pre-agreed

«

^

wages, and that

written contracts be issued
and approved by Mexican

101

of f ic ials

,

*

^

Probably most American
farmers were opposed
to
e braoero
program as finally
formulated. As indicated by the
applications to the
immigration
authorities, what the
growers wanted was a
lowering
of the immigration
barriers so they could
bring in
their own workers from
Mexico.
In May of 19 h2.
Farm
Bureau representatives
from California.
Arisona. and
Texas suggested that
was the pro
pioper
D er way
wav to cope with
the labor problem.
I„ Jun e of the
previous year.
Texas congressman Kleberg,
an important champion
of
grower interests, wrote
a letter to President
Roosevelt
suggesting that the braoero
program of World War I
should simply be re-opened.
Before the Roosevelt
administration announced
inauguration of the braoero
program in 1942. various
letters from individuals
opposing the importation
of
Mexican labor were inserted
in the Congressional

Grounds for opposition
included "the threat of
radicals
coming into the country,
to make our burdens
worse.”
"the take-over of our
men’s jobs by un-Americans,"
"unnecessa ry government expense."
and the allegation
15
pp.

16
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that surplus labor
could be released
from New Deal
make -work programs 1 ?
"

Despite these several
manifestations of oppo-

^

°"

the iraminSnt

naUOnal debat6

P- gram.
° n the

iss

there was no

-

-ntil after the
Roosevelt administration
had announced its
response!
that time, for
example, Congress
had held no
hearings on the
possibility of importing
Mexican
nationals. Friends
and ioes
foes of the
+ho program
did not
really clash head-on
until alter
after the
tho administration
^
had already set policy.
•

Apparently the Roosevelt
administration did not
give serious
consideration to the
importation of
Mexican workers before
the spring of
19 4 2 .
A11 re _
quests were turned down,
sometimes with the answer
that an adequate supply
of domestic labor was
availScruggs notes that before
early 1942 "government officials felt that
the introduction of
Mexicans
Might pave the way for
the exploitation of

both
foreign and domestic
workers and lead to violent
opposition from American
labor." 1 ®
17
~

2d Sess.,

U.S., Congressional Rpmrvs
1942 ,-LlAXmi, Part
2

Scruggs, op. cit ..
p.
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Another reason for
delay was the
necessity for
consultation and
agreement with the
Mexican government.
During World War
1 and
a aIter
after the rr
*
United
States
unilaterally establish
a braoero program
without doing violence
to her broader
foreign policy
objectives. As Scruggs
notes, those
>

economic imperialism.

^

were days of

But these foreign
policy objectives were to change.
In the 193 0's.
President
Roosevelt formulated
his Good Neighbor
Policy on the
is of mutual
respect and understanding.
A repetition of the World War T
ar 1 Practices would
have been
completely out of character
aracter with the new
United States
foreign policy so
carefully cultivated by
the

Roosevelt administration. 19
As the United States
actively entered the war

and farmers continued
claiming a crucial labor
shortage. the Department
of Immigration
established a socalled "interagency
committee" to study the
farm labor
situation.
Represented on the committee
were several
governmental departments
including Labor. Agriculture.
State. Justice, and the
War Manpower Commission.
The
agency was instructed to
gather facts concerning
the
possible n eed for foreign
labor and to establish
19

Ibid.

,
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tentative standards for
importation should it
become
necessary.
The group met for
weekg
April and early May,
191*2. and established
oriteria
for a possible bracero
program. The standards
took into account three
main sets of interests,

^

^

^

(l

)

the

growers' possible need
for foreign workers.
( 2 )
the
concern of labor that
domestic workers not be
undermined. (3) the interest
of Mexico in protecting
her
citizens. 21
The interagency committee
decided that the
question of labor shortages
should be left up to the

United States Employment
Service. 22 Around the
middle of May. it certified
the need for 10,500
Mexicans for use in California.
Montana, and Idaho.
Claude Wickard, Secretary of
Agriculture, then
took active steps to establish
a bracero program.
On
May 28, 1942, he requested
Attorney General Biddle to
set aside the literacy test,
head tax, and contract
labor requirements of the
Immigration Act of 1917 to
provide a temporary supply of
Mexican labor. The next
day the Attorney General
announced his willingness
to

cooperate.
20
22

Four days later Mexico announced
her

I bid

-
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declaration of war on
the Axis nations,
an, on the
same day Attorney
General Biddle asked
the American
Secretary of State to
he g in discussions
with Mexico
in regard to
inauguration of a bracero
program.
alists note that each
department of the
government will have its
own special interests.
arged with the
agricultural program of
the administration. the Department
of Agriculture had
a set of
rests centering around
such problems as
production
and agriculturali xaDor.
» v +v.„
labor
By
the nature of its
duties,
the interests of the
State Department were
quite different.
Its responsibilities,
of course, lay with
the foreign policy
of the United States.
However,
steps that would increase
farm production would
not
necessarily further the
foreign policy of the
United
States. The War Manpower
Commission also had its own
interest in making sure
that industry and farms
were
well staffed during the
war.
In 1942. some difference
of outlook concerning
foreign labor existed between
the three departments.
On May 22, the chairman
of the War Manpower
Commission had given a copy
of the standards worked
23
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out by the interagency
committee to Secretary
of State
Cordell Hull "as a
suggested guide in
negotiations with
the Government of
Mexico concerning this
matter." However, the State
Department made no immediate
effort to
raise the matter with
the Mexican government.
Foreign
policy considerations
predominated in the Department.
Scruggs notes that many
in the State Department
felt
that a bracero program
might undermine United
States
relations with Mexico,
Should it become necessary,
they insisted that it
safeguard the rights of
Mexican
workers

After Attorney General Biddle's
request, the
State Department agreed to
cooperate and raise
the

question with the Mexican
government. United States
Ambassador Messersmith met with
Mexico's Foreign
Minister Padilla on June
15, 19^2, and stated the Ameri
can case. His main plea was
pitched in terms of the
contribution Mexico could make to
victory over the Axis
powers by supplying farm labor
to the United States. 25
Anticipating the American request,
the Mexican
government had already established
a committee to study
the issue.
Between the middle of June and
the middle
of July, t he committee studied
Ambassador Messersmith's
24
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proposal.

It weighed many
factors,

including a number
related to various interest
groups. 26 Receiving
great
weight was the knowledge
that nothing short of
solid
guarantees for any workers
sent to the United States
would meet the approval
of several important
interest
groups in Mexico such as
organized labor. Also of importance was the demand of
Mexican industry and growers
that their own labor supply
not be depleted.
Their
need for labor had increased
with the war as United
States trade with Mexico
had expanded dramatically.
In early July. Agriculture
Secretary Wickard was

m

Mexico City on other business
but met with the
Mexican Ministers of Agriculture
and Foreign Affairs
to discuss the labor
issue.
As he testified later
before a House committee!

When I arrived there, I found
that there was much
opposition because of previous
can Government had had with a experience the Mexi
large number of
Mexicans left stranded in this
country.
Thev
7
said they had to spend a lot of
moneyto get them
during the Depression. They also
hat
were Promised one kind of wage
or
pnn+ho r an<^ when they
got up here they were left
.,
.

»

.

any^ousingfaf
26

27

the

»*y

^

.

not

havT

Ibid.
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Gon S res s. House, Subcommittee of the
Hearings. Appropriation
f or^the
the Fa
lor
rm Labor Program. C a lendar
Farm
YearlWf
7 ° th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1943, p. 9.
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Wickard also noted that
the Mexicans were
adamantly opposed to the
growers' request that they
be
allowed to recruit their
own workers in Mexico
as
during World War I.
It had “no chance”
of being
accepted.

After several weeks of
negotiations, the Mexican government decided to
provide the United States
With workers on a temporary
basis.
Although many factors contributed to her
decision, three were especially
important.
One was her commitment
to the war
effort.

Secondly, Mexico did not wish
to jeopardize her growing
export market in the United
States. 29 Finally, the
Mexican officials realized that
the booming wartime
industry of the United States
was bound to draw Mexican
workers. Mexico would be in a
better position
to pro-

tect them if a favorable
agreement could be reached.
An executive agreement (EAS
278) between Mexico
and the United States was reached
on July
20, 19h2,

and became effective on August 4. 30
28

29

Ikld-. p. 15.

it should be noted

Scruggs, op. cit .. p. 146.
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u s ..Department of State,
TemDorarv Mi^ra+.i™
£f Mexican Agricultural Worker.. Bffic
tSd by Exchange
N
1942 (Executive Agreement Series 6
S52?
No
No. 278) (Washington, D.C.,
1943).
Also, see
greement Concerning the Temporary Migration "Bilateral
of Mexican
r
Unite d states," International Labour
Revipw° XLVI
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that this agreement
inaugurating the bracero
program
did not take the
form of a treaty,
so the oonsent of
the United States
Senate was not necessary.
Wth only
-nor modifications, EAS 2
7 8 served as the
basis for
the bracero program
until the end of 1947. 31
The legal basis for
American participation
in
the agreement was
identical to that relied
upon for
the World War I
bracero program
the ninth proviso
of the third section
of the 1917 Immigration
1

Act.

To

recapitulate, that provision
permits the Commissioner
of Immigration and
Naturalization to admit
otherwise
inadmissible aliens.
The agreement was a
compromise measure which
reflected the interests of
various

important groups in

both the United States
and Mexico.

The stipulation

that "the Government of
Mexico shall determine in
each
case the number of workers
who may leave the country
without detriment to its
national economy" was apparently a concession to the
employers of Mexico.

3
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The agreement
contained a number of
protections

for the bracero which
helped to satisfy such
groups
as organized labor
in Mexico.
For the Mexican workers
EAS 278 gUaranteSd
transportation to the
United States, subsistence
en route, adequate
housing,
minimum wages, and a minimum
number of working days.
Braceros were to receive
the "prevailing wages"
being
paid in the work areas
if these rates were
higher than
the minimum stated in
the agreement.
Prevailing wages
were to be determined
in public hearings.
Mexicans
were not to be discriminated
against. Finally, at the
insistence of the Mexican
government, it was agreed
that all of these guarantees
would be written into
the contracts each bracero
would receive 32

“-trip

.

Some provisions of EAS
278 were designed to
minimize the opposition of
organized labor in the
United States. This was
consistent with the pluralist
expectation that once groups become
better organized
they will have greater impact
on policy.
Labor had
had little influence on the World
War I program, but
in those y ears it was less
well organized. Also, during
2

tW

i0a aC 0Ur' tS of the r °gra">. see
P
?Pedro
ro ae
de Alba,
Alba Siete
Sie+» articulos
?
sobre el nrnhlpmn
l s braceros (Mg^cb city,
19S4), XgnaciS
g
a mi raC j^ n de b raceros a los
'j
Estados
Tin
} h l „5
Unidos
de Norteam^rica
(Mexico dM-fcy, iojj)
*
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Ill

the interwar years,
the labor movement
had grown more
respectable and legitimate
in American society.

As noted in the
previous chapter,
organised
labor had long feared
the adverse effects
of cheap
foreign labor. Consequently,
the guarantee that
braceros would be paid
the same as domestic
workers
was a concession not
only to Mexico but to
organized
labor as well. Another
important concession to
unions
was the agreement that
Mexican workers were not
to be
used as strike-breakers.
Also, braceros were to
be
used only in case of
a shortage of domestic
labor.
Finally, they were to be
employed only in agriculture.
The Mexican officials
insisted that the Ameri-

can government act as the
formal employer of the
braceros.
This demand was a result
of Mexican distrust
of big growers in the
United States and the ill-will
left over from the earlier
years.
The Farm Security
Administration (FSA) signed the
contracts as employer,
and in turn contracted the
workers to American

growers.
The FSA transported the
braceros from Mexico to employ-

ment centers in the United States.

The FSA was also

in charge of returning them
to Mexico at the expense
of the United States government.

Many American growers were intensely
critical

-

i
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Of the bracero
program.

Much less laho° r
was made
availahi=
le than they
had antic
anticipated
Da tea and wanted.
n
.

United
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Rather than a closely
regulated program,
growers
had sought government
approval for th
emPl0y ” ent ° f
Mexican labor on their
hSlr own
o
t
te
s»hat they got were
rSStriCti °the historically
JP
more or
free flow of labor
across the Mexican
border
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fa™

workers from the
benefits of
minimum wage legislation,
unemployment compensation
and legislation
regulating working
conditions, growers
now found themselves
saddled with all of
these responsibilities and more
toward the Mexican
workers.
Farmer unrest with EAS
278 was immediate.

Ne w York Times

,

N ew York Times

.

August 14, 1942, p.
15.

November 4, 1942,
p. 35
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ays, growers and
farm organizations
were pres
ongress to
t0
a
action, . special
committee was
appointed by
the[ United States
Senate
ate in October,
n., u
1942, f or the
P^ose of bolding bearings
and investigating
the
status of the farm
labor problem*

jr

r::

0nly

^^

tors were appointed
and all
a±L were from
important farm
fates.
Sheriden Downey of
California was the
chairThe other members
were Ernest McFarland
of
Arizona and Charles
McNary of Oregon.
The Downey committee
held hearings in
Phoenix
and Sacramento in
November. Except
for a few govern•

ment officials,
witnesses were overwhelmingly
discontented farmers and
farm organizations.
The hearings
»ere structured to
favor grower interests.
No congressman closely identified
with organized labor
was
appointed to serve on the
committee.
Few persons
opposed to the importation
of Mexican labor
appeared
to testify.
Yet the committee had
invited a great
many farmers and
representatives of farm
organizations
to give testimony.
The biaS of the hearings
is also obvious from

^

S
S eoial Committee to
’
Invest iga te ^Farm °Labor C ond
?
Conditions
the West,
Hearings West*™ F
Labor Condl tions 77th Cong.,
2 d Sess.j 19/12.

m
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the style of
questioning
ng and hv
by the comments
from
Chairman Downey.
For
a
n«
Q
y
r in<5t
lnstance » at one point
in the
hearings, he saidi
U
r° Wn nd talk with
body here who is a
ever YMarine
? 0
an or Sanization
of farmers at length
h becanL^ ?
I would
helping myself very
greatlv
1
y ln
knowledge
the situation. 37 Y greatl
of

in^^

Only two persons
testified in opposition
to the
importation of Mexican labor.
Their

testify

was com-

Pletely omitted from the
published hearings. 3 ®
However,
chairman charged that one
showed "a total lack of
knowledge of what is
happening in the State of
California.
Compared to the many spokesmen
for the use of
Mexican labor, the opponents
gave the impression
of

organizational weakness.

A Mrs. Suchman represented

the Citizen's Welfare
Council.

Although it was a large

group, apparently no advance
arrangement had been made
for her testimony.
Unlike some grower representatives
who stayed for more than a
day at the hearings, she
noted that her group must leave
after a short period of
time.
When asked for their official
position, many
of the farm spokesmen went
into great detail and
37

•IMd., p. 359.

39 Ibid

.
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spoke with great
authority.
3

i
in
n response
restore* to
+
a question

from the committee
chairman. Mrs. Suchman
said.

0131
is an individual
this
^roup ^ut^e r group!
at the civic centfr
recognized
! ?
mostly on relief clients v! cer t alh problems,
0 are J ust b ^°w
the level of plL
loners'?^

hL 1

The ability of the
grower spokesmen to
organize
and present a united
front was impressive.
The
president of the National
Council of Farmer Cooperatives told the committee!
30

3

thS p 0Spect s of food
F
S 1t
W i t the
aderS
in t h?s s t ate a nd “ e
a meetin e of well-informed
leaders o^all^th
PO
C
t
1
n er '
prises in California?
rconsider
it
bestt
group of men ever brought together- £ tS
*5? be
USS an
agricultural

shortages
^"that
t
of.the'far; organ

?

?L\Lr
.

question ?n thif State 8l

At the joint meeting a number
of resolutions
were passed and the spokesman
presented them to the
42
committee.
He could thus claim to be
speaking for
millions of people. Migrant
farm workers and people
on relief were, of course,
not able to present such
impressive credentials.
Grower spokesmen at the Downey
hearings blasted
the federal government for
making it so difficult to
^°Ibid.

,

p. 260.
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import Mexican
labor.
labor shortage

^

Thev

.

T

existed.'*'*

3 Seri ° US

^

They
h Y char eed
that the fail.
ederal government
to cooperate
1
a to
had led
Prop losses.'*-’
,
Thenm>1
+
quality of most
available *
workers was poor.
Growers were
to working
with Mexicans and
W1 „
the R °° SeVelt
^“--tration
would Sttop „•
hindering the war
effort by attaching
tmgs to the use of
foreign workers .'* 6
Most interest
groups appearing
at the Downey
he arings supported
extensive use of
Mexican labor with
7.
only
imal or no
government reguiation<
ure of

•

^

13 m ° re 0F l6SS
tyPiCal ° f gr0UpS
taki hg
that stand from
l
b
9
2
10.
through i 9 64,

St"?”

abl Assooia tion
California Deciduous
0W6rS rLeague
Pacific Fruit ExchangeGrfwe
rowars Association
California^Cannina
p
Pe
g
oh Association
8
California Lim^
?
Cro
" ers Ass ociation
9. Imperial Valiev
Fa™*.'rS Assooiati
°n
Agricultural
r
d
ab ° r C ° mmittee
“• g^fjorni. State GrInge
12. California
Walnut Growers
Association
Farmers feared that
the bracero program
was being
a wedge by the
Roosevelt administration
for
43
44.
Ibid * pp. 244-46.
iMd. pp. 22 31
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introducing revolutionary
changes in the African
far.
labor situation.
If foreign workers
could
benefits such as minimum
wages, paid transportation
and a guaranteed
number of wording days,
would this
precedent not make it
easier to extend the
same provisions to domestic
workers? Indeed it would,
and the
FSA was doing just
that.

^

^

As was the case for many
government departments,
the Department of
Agriculture and its agency.
FSA,
gained considerable powers
as a result of the
wartime
crisis.
The legal basis for their
enlarged powers
over farm labor can be
briefly summarized. The War

Manpower Commission received
broad authority from
President Roosevelt to mobilize
manpower for the
war effort
.

Paul V. McNutt, chairman of
the War Manpower
Commission, found that reassigning
primary responsibility for farm labor to the
Department of Agriculture
would "promote a more effective
mobilization and utilization of the farm labor resources
in the prosecution
the war.
in Directive XVII, the chairman
specified
47
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that, subject only
to the review of
the War Manpower
Commission, -the Secretary
of

Agriculture, through

such persons and
employees

of the Department
of
Agriculture as he may
designate shall have
full operating responsibility
for the recruitment,
placement,
transfer, and utilization
of agricultural
workers."
The directive
specifically stated that
the Department
was being granted
power to recruit, place,
.

.

.

and trans-

fer " domestic farm
workers,

Finally, it noted that

"the importation of
foreign workers for use
in agriculture will be initiated
only after all local
2*
resources are exhausted ." 8
.

•

.

Especially the last quoted
section of the directive seemed to give very
broad authority to the
Department of Agriculture to
make sure that domestic
farm workers were offered
jobs under conditions

simi-

lar to those offered
braceros.

How could "all local

resources" have been exhausted
if braceros were offered
higher wages than domestic
workers? When the Department. at the insistence
of Mexico and with the blessing
of the Roosevelt administration,
delegated responsibility
for the labor program to the
FSA, it became even more

48
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certain that the
farmers' worst
fears of ref °™
Would
realized. 4 ?

^

Even the briefestj
St 00ns deration
of the Farm
Se
„
eounty
Administration's history
makes aDn
the
certainty that it
would challenge
ohall
what large growers
saw aa +h
thexr best interests.
Established as a divi-on of the Department
of Agriculture

in 1937 . the
was concerned with
the alleviation
of rural poverty. particularly
that of small farmers.
i n line
w^h the pluralist
expectation that
governmental departments will be
internally divided
because different
agencxes represent
different interest
groups. FSA was
suspect even within
the Department of
Agriculture.
The Department has
long
en seen as concerned
g been
primarily with the
interests of relatively
prosperous
farmers, whereas Grant
McConnell has called
the FSA
'a poor man's
Department of Agriculture "50
.

From the first. FSA
made clear its reformist
goals.
Programs it inaugurated
were seen by many
people as outright
socialistic.
It loaned money to
the Farm

^^tory
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snail farmers too poor
to qualify f or bank
loans.
Sometimes they were simply
given outright grants
of
money.
The FSA furnished
water facilities for
western
areas bypassed by the
Bureau of Reclamation.
It estabUshed health clinics for the
poor and set up

purchasing and marketing
cooperatives.

It established

some large farms on a
cooperative basis and urged
the
participating farmers to compete
with big growers.
Critics compared these
cooperatives to Soviet collective farms.
Because FSA maintained
considerable
control over the projects,
critics accused it of being

undemocratic
Although the pluralist claim
that government
officials are spokesmen for
interest groups may be exaggerated, certainly there is some
element of truth to
the assumption that the FSA
was looking out especially
for the poor people which the
Department of Agriculture
and other government departments
had often found reason
to bypass.

After FSA was given responsibility
for the farm
labor program, its reformist goals
remained untempered.
In a number of disputes between
braceros and growers,
51

Ibid., pp. 90-92.
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it sided with the
Mexicans. 52

The FSA attempted to
force farmers to give
domestic workers the same
guarantees they gave braceros.
A grower claiming a
labor shortage was not
permitted
to import Mexican
workers until the Farm
Security

Administration had a chance to
provide him with domestic laborers.
In order to qualify for
the American
workers, he signed a contract
drawn up by FSA.
Among
other things, the contract
guaranteed a minimum

wage,
the quality of housing,
and minimum sanitation
conditions.” In short, the FSA
gained

concessions from

farmers which they had never
before had to grant to
domestic workers.
The paradox was that this
nightmare
for growers came as a
by-product of their demands for
foreign labor which in other times
would have served
to undermine rather than
support the interests of American farm workers.
The FSA was harshly criticized by
several

witnesses at the Downey hearings.

Growing numbers of

politicians, especially at the state and
local level,
52
..

o
Security

Scruggs "The Bracero Program under the
Farm
Administration, 1942-1943," pp. 156-57.
,

53 Samuel
kiss, "The Concept and Determination
nf
D
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World
Agricultu ral History XXIV (January,
»
1950),
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men t

grower cause and
accused the federal
govern
of ^sensitivity
to farm interests.
The crucial showdown
came in April.
1943 . when

Congress considered
appropriations for the
hracero
Program. The struggle
of that year centered
around
the so-called
"Dirksen
Se " Riii
BUI. „ hlch provided
appropriations for securing
and transporting
farm labor.
Perhaps most importantly,
that bill and the
law as
finally passed (Public
Law 45 ) ousted the
Farm Security
Administration from supervision
of the program.
I„
their first major
show-down, grower interests
won out
over the Roosevelt
administrations reform
orientation.
In fact, the Dirksen
Bill was written by
officials of
the American Farm
Bureau Federation, the
most conservative of the major farm
organizations. 55
The House vote on Public
Law 45 was not recorded. However, the
record of the debates
indicates
that major supporters
were Dirksen (Illinois),

Cannon (Missouri), O'Connor
(Montana). Sheppard
(Californi a). Dies (Texas),
Lambertson (Kansas),
54
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and Wiggiesworth
(Massachusetts). Speaking
speaking critically
of
nS6n BlU W6re H °
ffman (Miohi Sah).
Brehm
,

(Oh'

T

)

O'Neal (Kentucky).
Debate in the House
centered m ostly around
issues brought out
in the Downey
hearings. Without
a bracero program.
Dirksen thought American
children
-night "go to bed
without their suppers. "56
Cannon
laimed that there is
not a farm anywhere
in the
United States that is
fully manned. "57
Sheppard
criticized "screwballs"
in the Agriculture
Department
and promised that,
if left a i one
California farmers
would get plenty of
work from the Mexicans. 58
Dies
charged that the re*
was run by "socialistic
and
crack-pot bureaucrats. "59
Wiggiesworth accused the
American workers furnished
by the PSA of being
characterized by "drunkenness,
debauchery, and refusal
to
work."
Describing himself as a
farmer. Lambertson
asked that the bill cut
out "social gains" for
domestlC W ° rker s - 1
Alth °«gh Dirksen was now
sponsor of
,

5
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S hould

have allowed the
farmers “to handle
the situa' 100 themS6lVeS
-"
government should never
have
reached any agreement
with Mexico but
should have just
continued to let
i
-u
Mexican labor “filter
across the line
as it has done in
other years
vearq t0
+n 0
+
*
satisfy
the labor
demand on this side
of the Ri 0 Grande.” 62
.

House criticism of
the Dirksen Bin
included
several themes. Hoffman
suggested that the policy
of
the United States
was to “let our boys
fight and die
and let those fellows
come and take their
places at
h °“*"
Brehm Pr ° P0Sed that
^rm jobs be filled by
discharging some Americans
from the military and
moving
others from factory
64
jobs to the farms.
Rogers was
concerned about "undesirable
refugees who are just
waiting for a chance to
get into tViio
gex
this «country under the
guise of being Mexican
farmers 65
+.

.

Marcantonio told Dirksen
that the bill was
66
"distinctly anti-labor.”
Klein refused to support
62 T ,.
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the bill on the
grounds that although
American agri-

culture was ™ore
prosperous than in many
years, the
bill made no provision
for farm workers to
share in
that prosperity by
setting minimum standards
for them 67
A few House members
were outspokenly
supportive
of the PSA.
For example, Burdick
said,
.

is the^only^organization
d

e

we*^

Vr^?^
h^/been

0"

rlC who
foreclostd and dispossessed t0
?{?
haV6
been r.-e.tXliS£8°“'
States, and
payments to the Govsrnnont
6
in many instan^es?^™" "* have been over-paid

SS^iSd "^

Debate in the Senate
centered around basically
the same issues.
Public Law 4 5 was passed
by slightly
better than a 2-1 vote.
There were 39 votes for
the
bill, 18 against, and
39 senators failed to vote.
Among the supporters were
Aiken (Vermont), Barkley
(Kentucky), Connally (Texas),
Eastland (Mississippi),
Ellender (Louisiana), George
(Georgia), Hayden
(Arizona), McClellan (Arkansas),
Russell (Georgia),
Tydings (Maryland), and Vandenberg
(Michigan).
Numbered among the opponents
were Bridges (New Hampshire),
Lodge (Massachusetts), and
Taft (Ohio ). 69
67

69

IMd..

pp.

Ibid .

p.

.

2070-71.
3467.

68

Ibid.. p. 2083.
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Inasmuch as this was
a program benefiting
certain rural interests,
pluralists would expect
its
heaviest support to come
from senators representing
those areas.
Calculations indicate
77 % support
for the Dirksen Bill
f rom the quartile
of voting
senators representing the
most rural states.
73%
from the next most rural
quartile. and 60 % support
from senators representing
the most urban half
of the
states.

Senate support for the
bracero program varied
systematically by region.
Strongest support came from
southern and southwestern
senators. Senators representing more northerly states,
whether located in the
West or East, were less
likely to support the bracero
program.

Of the Republican senators
voting on Public
Law E5. only 29 * voted for
it.
Among the Democratic
senators voting, 98 % supported
the bill.
We have thus found that
the bracero program was
most supported by Democratic
senators from rural states,

particularly those in the South and
Southwest.
?0

Degree of urbanization of the various
states
was calculated from the 1940 census.
See
Bureau
of
the Census, Sixteenth Census o f
the United
States.
~
1940
Population I. ?i
.

.

—
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PerhaPS Partly aS
3 reSUlt

°f

l0Sing the battle
R °° SeVelt
adminiStrati0n s ^ppe
d
U
up
tho°r
P the
bracero Pprogram
n
ogram.
During 1943, a
total Qf
3 o 98
farm workers were

with C

sot.

e3S

’

^

^

in
The following
year, 6 2 ,i 70 entered.
The Truman Years,

On April 12.

m

1

^

945-53

5 . Roosevelt died
and Harry

Truman beoame President.

There were few clues
in
Truman’s record
foretelling
what
nax stand
ft
stanrt he
*
would take
on the bracero prop-mm
a
s am.
As a member of the
Senate
Committee on Military
Affairs in
he was involved
3
a set of hearings
concerned with extending
military
deferments for farm
workers.
Although he said little'
at the hearings,
his comments give
the impression that
he was not a grower
spokesman.
He noted that
despite
the claims of labor
shortages that year that
more had
been planted than ever
before.
He stressed the
need
for an adequate supply
0 f soldiers and
concluded.
"I don't think the
seed planters are in
such a bad
ShaPe
M ° St ° f them
in better shape than
they

m

m

'

71

Hancock, op

.

c it

.

f

p,

17

.
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ever were before.

Senator Truman did
not participate in
debate
on the Dirksen Bin
in the spring of
19 4 3 nor did he
Snate

h0ldlng hearings for
the Special Committee
to
;
Investigate National

Defense.^

The bracero program
reached a golden age
under
Truman’s presidency.
Althoup-h
ixnough the program
had been

justified to meet a
wartime emergency, it
not only
continued during the
Truman years but
unprecedented
numbers of braceros entered
mered. The
Th» bracero
program led
to new controversies
with Mexico. Conflict
between
the supporters and
opponents of imported labor
reached
a new intensity.
ThS endlng ° f the war

bought

the program under

_

new fire.

After all, organized labor
had only reluctantly agreed to instituting
the Mexican labor
system,
only the assurance that
the importation policy
would
end with t he war had brought
its qualified support
to
Comraittee °n Military
Affairs, Hearing^^Iflb
ef rme nt
from Military Servic e of
P !
occ upations
'/bth Cong., 1st Sess.
1 9 4j,
.

,

7

ist se SS

?^ 9 4 3 ^fixe L rp^t R ;r^ 7 r 8th
s

c ° ns

-

5
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the grower cause.

After
iter tho
the o,
surrender of Japan
on
usust 14,
5 . it became obvious
that growers had
no intention of
giving up their
Mexican workers.
It
looked to many like
a breach 01
of lai
faith
r+ „
th
it
began to
look more like the
„ ar was only an
excuse.
When the war ended,
new justifications
were
found for the continued
movement of Mexican
workers
mto the United States.
The Truman
administration went
ahead and negotiated
a new agreement
with Mexico providing for new braceros
to enter and for
the ones
already here to have
their contracts renewed 74
Now
it was claimed that
with the war having
been won,
there could be no
decrease in farm
productivity. The
United States had
obligations to those left
starving
from the war.
In 1946. President
Truman called on
farmerS f ° r rSCOrd
Production. 7 5 Although the
end of
the war brought rising
unemployment, farm interests
used Truman's request
as an excuse to continue
the
bracero program.

m

.

.

In the spring of
1946, some estimated that
unemployment in California would
climb to one million

74
ft'ew
1

York Times, May 8

,

1946, p. 5

New York Times, April
21

,

.

1946, p. 32 .
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before the year was
out.

Yet spokesmen for
the Cali° rnia chamber
of Commerce and
the California
Farm
Bureau Federation
claimed that a shortage
of farm labor
6
was expected.
The growing
unemployment brought union
opposition to continuation
of the bracero
program,
California the CIO noted
that some 500.000
Americans
were unemployed in
that state in April,
it claimed
that if wages were
adequate, this labor
supply was more
than enough to fill
a ll available farm
jobs.
The

m

California Federation of
Labor expressed
reservations
about the bracero
program but took a less

firm position.
Its spokesmen said
that Mexicans should
not be brought
if the domestic labor
supply „ as adequate. 7 ?
The official position
of the Truman admini-

m

stration was that braceros
would be contracted only
if
there was a shortage of
domestic farm labor 78 i
n
1946 the number of Mexicans
contracted fell some
IV 000 below the number
for 1945.^^
.

,

»

^highlight of the Mexican labor
program under
76

79

Ibid,

77

78

Ibid.

Hancock, op.

c

it

.

.

.

Ibid.

p.

17

»
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Truman was its
transference to a
peace
ti
w
peace-time
basis.
a rrilnis C’ation
decided that
nat the government’s
guarantee of the bra0er
° 00ntracts
end now that
the war was over.
oh.7
n
in i1947,
Congress failed to
appropriate any more money
f or the program. 8 ®
Because
Mexico had insisted
all along
.
g that the American
government serve as the
employer
the „con gressional
y
'
decision
was bound to lead
to difficulties
U_L ties
in a series
of
meetings between renresenta +h,
representatives of„ the two
countries
E1 PaS ° fr ° m
November 2® to December
,

.

.

’t

:

.

“

2.

agreement was reached.

m?>

no

Mexico continued to
insist that
the American
government continue in
its wartime role. 8 *
however, she agreed
to permit braceros
already in the
United States to remain
pending
82
a

new agreement

.

Meanwhile, although
unemployment rates in the
United States remained
at substantial levels,
various
farm groups urged the
government to continue
importing
braceros.
For example, the National
Canners Association
passed such a resolution
at its national
convention.
Its incomi ng vice
president warned that without
alien

8°

.

f
M xlCa
Program-- Its friends and
?
P ? arm L abor Supply
Foeb

i~.rw.ta,

Ibid.

3*?ain; ;st;:s8;:* p

P-

32.

Ibid

.

p.

36.

.

,5 .

132

farra workers food
production would fall
in 1948 8 3
In the meantime
unions continued to
insist that
the domestic labor
supply was adequate. 5*
,

Agreement between the
United States and
Mexico
WaS r6aChed ° n Fet
8
17. 1948. 5
The deadlQck
broken by Mexican
concessions. Although
guarantees
were agreed to for
the braceros
raceros, the agreement
was to
the effect that the
United States government
would
no longer be considered
the employer. 86
Mexico had
thus lost one of the
concessions she had always
insisted most strongly
upon.

™

_

Perhaps the most serious
development in United
States relations with
Mexico since Roosevelt
won the
presidency came in 1948.
Early that year. Mexico
raised a series of objections
concerning alleged mistreatment of braceros.
Consequently, several states,
including Texas, were
blacklisted and denied braceros. 87
Durmg 1948, Texas officials
unsuccessfully tried
to

get Mexico to lift the ban. 88
83

84
86
8

Smnd,

N ew York Times

,

January 22, 1948, p. 4i

Pfeiffer, op. cit .. p.
37

Ibid

.

,

p.

88

Ibid.

38.
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X

85
,

u4tumnri49T!'42?

tbaClC InVasion ’"
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Pfeiffer, op. cit .. p. 35
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Farmers and various
farm state politicians
urged
administration to somehow
provide Mexican
labor before harvest
3
time. ? i n mid-October,
the administration took decisive
action which undermined
Mexico s ban on braceros
to Texas and some
other states.
The immigration Service
simply threw open the
border
at El Paso while
thousands of Mexicans
crossed to work
cotton and beet fields.
Grover C. Wilmoth, district immigration
director at El Paso, later
explained
the procedure.
As each Mexican entered,
he was placed
under "technical" arrest,
then "paroled"
'

m

to the

Employment Commission of
Texas.
Then the illegal
entries were put in trucks
and transported to West
Texas and New Mexico fields. 9 ^
Mexico

response was swift and
predictable.
The United States had
encouraged Mexicans to commit
crimes and the illegal migrants
would be brought back
to Mexico for "penal
consequences ." 91 Mexico
s

for-

mally protested that the
American action had violated
the February agreement. 9 ^
89 t

Leibson, op. cit .. p. 13

90
91

92

,

New York Times. October
17

,

1948, p.

33

,

Ibid.

New York Times. October 21,
1948, p. 14

.
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The American
government then sought
to calm
rsy '
lssued a statement

“

th

;;°rr
ad 0rdered
1

9,

border.

to

no "blanket opening"
of the

Immigration

0 f fieials

in

claimed that thpir* _ •p-p*
° ffl0ers at E1
were simply une to stop the
determined Mexican
laborers who
rushed the border in
large numbers 94
.

Finally, the State
Department apologized
to
Mexico and agreed to
send
nd the llle
ilia gal
i
migrants home.
Mexico accepted the
apology as "satisfactory."
The
United States promised
to stop any further
illegal
immigration 95 Mexican
newspapers in the capitol
published the apology,
and it was reported
to be widely
accepted among the
Mexican people 96
.

.

.

Acceptance of the official
American explanation
was less common in
the United States.
With many Americans out of work, union
leaders issued some blunt
criticism. William Green,
president of the American
Federation of Labor, publicly
accused government officials of conspiring with
growers to violate United
St3teS laW S and asked
both be prosecuted.
In a

^t

93
^

5

96

lbid
Ne_w

Ibid

94
.

lbid

.

York Times, October 26

,

1948, p.

35

.

.
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sent to the Attorney
General and others,
he
claimed that evidence
indicated that
American powers
d6libera
the Mexican entry. 97
Prior to about 1948
them
there was a tendency
..
f or
tho mass msdip
ueaia to more or
less sov...„
serve as spokesmen
for
657 int6reStS
Th e
*• abides investigating
migrants' viewpoint
or that of organi
Z ed

^

^

1

-

IT

-

—

labor.

news stories sometimes
read as if they
were publicity releases *•„
eases from corporate
farmers.
However. that paper
and others began
to look critically
at the grower
rationale for foreign
labor,
March
of 1948. the Times
reported that many
destitute farm
workers were unsuccessfully
searching for work in
California, although the
article was tempered by
the
notation that it was
98
between seasons.
On May i,
1949. the Times reported
that although 65 .OOO
fa™
laborers were unemployed
in California, the
state then
had about 5 000 braceros."
1
Organised
w
ganized labor
did much
to emphasize the
same problem
nroblp™ to the
government and to
the public.

m

.

97
98
p.

6.

99

Ibid.

New York Times
New York Times
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March ^28u

May

1,

9

1 Q/ifi
7*40
1

1949. P
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Union opposition to
the bracero
program was
Part of a broader
effort to organise
American farm
workers.
Strikes were caliph
called at+ some
California farms
May of 1948
T
In the fan of
the previous year,
he National Farm
Labor Union had sought
recognition
from the giant
DiGiorgio farms in what
would later
become a celebrated
but losing cause. 101
Some California growers began
counter-organisations for the
purpose of setting
their -house in order

m

so as to

nullify efforts of
leftist unions.
In July,

1948,

"I 02

the National Farm
Labor Union

stepped up its criticism
of Mexican labor.
The
union's president, H. L.
Mitchell, asked the
Truman
administration to curb the
large stream of illegal
immigrants from Mexico whom
he claimed were taking
Americans' jobs by working
for less.
He asked that
American employers hiring
them be penalized.
Mitchell
was also sharply critical
of the bracero program.
He said his union was
"opposed to foreign workers
being brought into the
United States, legally or
illegally, when there are
native Americans unemployed

p.

6

~

w Y ° rlt Tlme
2
-

'

.

101

Ibid

102
.

Ibid.

June 13

,

1948, Section IV,
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by ali
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1Ce t0 AmeriCan
w °rkers most
affected
et tion in
°

;

y

braceros were

the government
generally

'

,

Slower claims of labor
ch
+
shortages
at face value.
MitoH n also
Mitchell
alleged
tho+
g
hat bra ° er0S
exploited in
the „ nated
+
States. Finally,
he accused big
growers
o
s lmply wanting
labQr>
*

i

.

^

iegai

they could exploit 105

iiiegai>

.

^ring Truman -s first
year

in office, 4
9 ,4 4

^

5
braceros entered the
United States.
In
.
3
Only 19.632 were
admitted in
dUrin§
the number c limbed
to 33 288. 10(5
But by'
thS 6nd ° f that
year the T
administration was
cautiously suggesting
that the bracero
program could
be cut back.
However. Robert Goodwin,
director of the
bureau of Employment
Security, noted that
production
goals of the Marshall
Plan would mean that
the program
could not end altogether. 10 ?

m6
m?
.

~

'

.

The res P° nse of
grower interests was
that it
N ew York Times
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should be made easier
,

. ° r lnt
° thS

’

u
nn+
^
n0t harder

.

UnUed StatSS

-

t0 tring Mexican

Senator Cli «°n P.
Anderson (New Mexico)
introduced such a
bill and
omitted any standards
tor minimum wa es.
h ousin g . or
g
ea th.
The State Department
opposed the bill.
Assistant Secretary
of State, Ernest r
Gross, noted that

/

'

’

a

in

passe(j

-

it is highly
probafcle that

our relations with
Mexico would be
adversely
10t
affected.
It is likely that
the growers had
been
emboldened by such
apparently friendly
acts of the
Truman administration
as lowering the
bars for Texas
continuing to call for
braceros while tens of
thousands
of American farm
laborers unsuccessfully
sought work.
and its failure to
curb the vast inn,
nflux of wetbacks.
Although the growers
remained a powerful
political interest, they
were now faced with
an increase in
countervailing power. There
was increasing public
suspicion that American
farm workers who were
willing
and able to work were
not able to find jobs
or were
offered work only under
the most undesirable
conditions.
Welfare agencies began
to note that many
domestic farm
workers fa ced misery or
even starvation in the
winter
108

New York Times, July
13, 1949, p

.
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of 19 4 9
-

jn

-

.

"

November of that
year, the New
ai

«

°<

s

County, California 109

Yor>v

„ ,m

.

In mid-December, iq
I-- 4
*q
9
-

-

1

,

.

+>,the

»

j
Federal
Advisory

Council to the Bureau n-p v i
of E »Ployment
Security voted to
end the importation
on of alien p
farm labor.
Although
r ° le WaS mere1
^
the
.

“-y,

-ted

that its composition
gave its decisions
substantial weight.
Its members came
from the general
Pdblio, veterans,
employers, and union
members.
It
interesting to note
that the foreign
labor ban
introduced by a union
member while the
leader of
the opposition was
an employer.

-

The resolution,
adopted by a vote of
13-5,
noted that "sufficient
numbers of American
citizens
[are]

available for farm work
to meet any
anticipated
requirements for manpower
on the nation's farms
during
the coming year."^®
Despite evidence of growing
opposition to the
braoero pr ogram, the
Truman administration
brought in
109 m
p.

lu

iiew_YortJku!^, November 6

N ew York Times
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143 455 Kexioan
contract workers in
1949. HI
was more than twice
pc m M
33 WerS br ° Ught
in during
the peak
the
ne k year of
the braop^
bracero program
during World
’

War

n

During 1950

pressures to cease
importing
workers from Mexico
n„
grew
0„ ,
Unemployment
among American
,
i arm workers
was nno n-p +uh ®
most used
justifications
or ending the
program.
I„ early 1950,
the New Yor]f
reported that some
100 migrant
und starving
Arizona.
In March of that
year, the
,

to

.

childre^T

m

~

drdmat;ized the plight
of migrants in
California:
in hundreds of
farm labor camps,
shanty towns, and

-mall rural communities,
tens
xens of thousands
of people
are living on the
ragged edge of poverty." 112
In parts of California,
welfare officials
found
that their rolls had
doubled or tripled since
the
previous year.
.

The mass media
increasingly publicized
such
statistics and emphasized
the problems of
American farm
workers more than ever
before.
They began to contrast
thS W6alth ° f many
of the western farmers
with the

111„
Hancock, op, cit
112

~-ow

.

,

p,

17,

Times. March 17,
1950, p.

1.

—

.

I4i

poverty of the laborers
v
XQXlL Times commented:

m
In

m
" arch

>

1950,

.

0

the New

d

denc| in this valley
PaPhetic ev in
udy billboa rds
shadow
boas?iny ^he
he ?°or
p
Gn^
of Kern County
den
Empire
a Billion nfn
on the edge of
n S
Si ine ’
?
don»i
1
owned ranches, multi-minion
individually
beside private^
a
rp
rts from which
ranchers commute to
work and r, + ?
fleets of airpianesfllf d Patro1 the *n holdings

f

1-

^

-

!

m

in contrast to
this picture of
wealth, the
I-es observed that some of
the labor camps
were
"dusters of squalid one
and two-room

plumbingless

shanties and tents
In such newspaper
articles,

the grower's old
image as a struggling
farmer whose only interest
in
foreign labor was to keep
his crops from rotting
and
to keep Americans
well fed began to be
questioned.
Many of the mass media
began to "expose" shocking
facts about certain farmers.
For example, the Times
and various other
publications reported stories
of
wetbacks who were told on
payday that they would be
receiving no pay and were
threatened by the grower with
exposure to the immigration
authorities if they protested.
N ews stories told
of farmers who

actually

113

jjew^/ork Times

114 T ..
Ibid.
.

r

March 18, 1950, p

10

•
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reported their*

il

lp^oi
gal W ° rkerS t0
^

„
„ ay to
Pay
avoid paying them. 11

authorities on

5

-

The government iieet-p
lf Came lnc reasingly
under
attanIr
attach, sometimes
even from its own
officials.

USUSt

°f

195 °’

—

In

threS b ° rder
officials criticized

-

ican poiioy

-

y
that
hey
;;; were ordered not
to enforce the
l aw because
western growers
wanted cheap labor.
They referred to
a powerful
"pressure groun"
g
° f growers who
P
manipulated
e lmmi gration
laws in their finpy,
i

....

mancial interest.
•

•

One
"testified that forpixm
-u
foreign labor
was not needed and
that
it was hurting
-1

American workers.

One Border Patrol
inspector charged that
for the
last five or six
years "higher authority"
had ordered
the border officials
to stop enforcing
the law against
illegal Mexican entrants:

“stand

” 1
various
pressure^groups'go^to^/ish
S
their crops will bedes?rovef t ° n and re P ort that
1
they get the
labor.
This pressure
the
big
ranchers all over the count™
farmers and
h ve mone lr to
go to Washington; Peon?e
?
u
fellows
tne J-itt
lbW who
wh0 haven't
haven, t the money
those from whom these
peopled

^i L
llj
116
'

,

t^So^f

taking^M^'

Leibson, op. cit ..
p. 16.
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The National Farm
Labor Oni™
Union was Particularly
..
j
active in iq^o
t+ a
ced a goal of
10,000 new
members for the year.
In January, i
950 at its

“

.

,

,

1

convention, the union's
executive board called
or an end to the
importation of Mexican
laborers,
claiming that they
were brought in
"for the sole
Purpose of aiding l arge
f arm operators
to beat down
the wages of
117
Americans."

Ernesto Galarza, the
union's educational
dispoke out against the
bracero program:
.

1

t
nt d °® S n0t oreate
displaced peSons becaule e
the
S e m nt says the
imported Mexican nationals
w1if
^
+ ?
" ot
be used where
local labor is available
°
Wh=+
happening is
that we have a new
word
English language, subiect "avan
in the
1°
°r
more
interpretations? We
I
° f the
double talk about
avaHabiUt^

^

.

'

^

He went on to say
that availability could
not
be meaningfully
discussed unless related
to wages.

When Americans were
"unavailable." it was because
wages were inadequate.
At the convention, Galarza
exhibited a contract
signed with a bracero for
picking cotton at a wage
less
than the union had won
in collective bargaining
a month
earlier.
It had never been hard
to demonstrate that
N ew

York_ Times

,

January 14, 1950, p.

7.

.
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wetbacks were undercutting
American labor. Now
Galarza seemed to have
evidence that the
braceros
were doing the same.
He said,
"I now say publicly
for the first time
that Government
officials have
deliberately misled the
National Farm Labor
Union on
the facts
In February of
1950

.

the mid-South meeting

of the National Farm
Labor Union was held.
Delegates
Charged that many cotton
workers had been told by
growers that wages would
be one or two dollars
per
day and if they would
not work for that,
Mexicans

would be brought in.

They claimed that the
20,000
Mexicans used in the mid-S
ou th in 1949 had been
a
tool to help the plantation
owners force down the
cos"t of labor. "^9
The pressure to end the
bracero program reached
something of a peak in
1950
The militance of opponents
was perhaps best illustrated
by the National Farm Labor
Union.
In hearings before a
commission
.

on migrant
labor appointed by Governor
Warren of California,
officials of the union urged
that government pay more

118

~w

-^N

York TimeH

»

January 15, 1950, p. 44.

ew York Times

.

February 26, 1950, p. 45.
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attention to the
unemployment and housing
problems of
a™ W ° rkerS
- form of socialism,
but as the
alternative to possible
communism. 12 ° Union
spo)ces _
""" charged that
thousanda of farm
children ttere
starving. 121
ln

“

-

••

_

ts .

charged before the United
Nations with permitting
slave
labor by its failure
to oversee contracts
between
braceros and farmers 122
.

President Truman's response
was the appointment
of his Commission on
Migratory Labor which evoked
great interest.
It was directed to
make a broad study
of conditions among
migrants, including the
effect of
foreign labor.
Among the members Qf

^

(

1

^

the Right Reverend
Robert E. Lucey, Catholic

)

Archbishop of San Antonios
(2) Maurice
Professor of Law at the University

T.

Van Hecke,

of North Carolina,

(3)

Peter

H.

Odegard, Professor of Political
Science
at the University of
124
California
.
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^

The National Farm
Labor Union announced
that

had inspired President
Truman to create the
commission.
According to the union’s
president, its
effort had enjoyed
strong support from
the following,
1) the National
Association for the
Advancement of
Colored People,
(2) Representative
Helen Gahagan
Douglas. Democrat from
California, ( 3 ) John F
Shelley, Democratic
Representative from California,
(*0 William Green,
President „<•
u.
’
resident
of the
American Federation
of Labor.
.

The commission held
extensive hearings.
The
arguments used by friends
and foes of the Mexican

labor program were more
or less the standard
ones.
The CIO spokesman
suggested that preference
be given
to Puerto Ricans
“in case labor from
other territories
needed.
He called for extending
unionization
rights to imported labor. 12 ^

Clarence Mitchell testified
for the National
Association for the Advancement
of Colored People. He
suggested that foreign labor
was needed but claimed
125
126
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that the increasing
reiiance on it was
in part a
response to the fact
that American
agricultural
workers were fining
unions and speaking
out on
their problems. He
was critical of
the tendency to
assume the existence
of a labor shortage
with no
objective test of it.* 2 ?

Speaking for the
National Catholic Rural
Life Conference, Rev.
William
t
lliam J.
Gibbons called for
the federal
government to return
ieiurn to itsa wartime
role
pervising the work
contracts of imported
labor,
goested that some workers
were being exploited
by employers.
However, he said that
there should
certainly be no blanket
attempt to keep Mexicans
or
any other nationality
out of the United
States. 12 ?
Speaking for the National
Farm Labor Union,
Edwin Mitchell suggested
that government
i

had been'
little concerned with
farm workers, and the
bracero
program was simply another
manifestation of that
general insensitivity
127
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Mitchell contrasted this
neglect of farm workers
with the large subsidies
which Congress had given
to
growers over the years. 1 3°
The bracero program
making the situation even
worse because it was
holding
wages down and causing
living and working conditions

^

to deteriorate.

1

^

The spokesman for the
National Grange claimed
that Mexicans were essential
for growing and harvesting

crops because Americans "just
don't like to get out in
1
the dust." -^
The spokesman for the American
Farm Bureau

Federation claimed that there was
a domestic labor
shortage for certain farm tasks
such as picking cotton.
He propose d that the way to
reduce the wetback problem
130
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»as to make it easier
for braoeros to
enter the
Unitea States.
The pr o g ram then
in effect, he
charged,
was unfair to
growers because it
forced them to give
various benefits to
braceros which were
not "customary
the employment of
domestic labor."
There was too
mU °h r6d
He
objected to the minimum
employment period
guaranteed the braoeros . *33
There
was too much federal
control, and the Farm
Bureau
would prefer more
"local responsibility"
for the
program.

m

The commission issued
its report on April
7
1951, and it was especially
critical of the grower’
viewpoint.
It concluded that
some farm laborers
lived
"virtual peonage." The
commission found that
growers were willing to
give more benefits to
braceros
than to American workers.
It found the worst
exploitation on large farms and
noted that social legislation
exempting farm laborers
from benefits had been
justified
by the assumption that
they worked on small
farms.
The commis sion called
for a phasing out of
foreign
,

w
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labor and observed
that it was not
needed for the
Korean war food
effort
i or-t.
f*^
Pa™ workers were
getting
to work fewer
days each yea r.
The commission
00n .
that any labor
shortage could be
met by
Permitting each American
agricultural laborer
to
work six and one-half
more days per year.
The commission
found that in
negotiating
agreements with Mexico.
fa
interests were favored.
It noted that they
were powerfully
organized and
articulate while farm
laborers had little
organization and generally
little chance to
forcefully
and effectively
express their views.
The commission noted
a strong bias in
the
means of determining
whether a labor shortage
existed.
luded that early
the season, growers
simply
met and generally
established a low, arbitrary
“prevailing wage
Because the wage was low
and because
the season had not
begun, it was possible
that too
few domestic workers
applied. *35

™

m

Although the commission
criticized the deterioration of the bracero
program under President
Truman's
135 N

ew York Times , April 8
,
1951, pp . 1( 35

.
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administration, ha
*4.
ne sairi
said that its
report made ”an impressive contribution.
The increasing
criticism of the Mexican
labor
program did not deter
the grower campaign
to keep it
going.
The new Justification
was the labor
shortage
caused by the Korean
rean War
Tn
t
War.
I
n January
of 1951. a meeting of farm group
leaders concluded that
300,000-

hOO.OOO Mexicans would
be needed during
the year.
At its meeting, the
National Cotton Council
decided
that at least 500.000
foreign workers would
be
needed *^7
.

Unlike labor during
much of World War II,
the
National Farm Labor Union
was not prone to
compromise
during the Korean War.
It fought on many
fronts.
The
Truman administration
had negotiated an
agreement with
Mexico permitting the
legalization of wetbacks, a
group of the union’s members
followed a group of buses
transporting such Mexicans to
the border to be legalized.
Galarza, the union’s vice
president, protested
to the Mexican consul
that the legalization was
a
"fraud." a nd he demanded
an end to the practice. The
136
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-can

consul then discussed
the problem with
United
States immigration
officials and announced
that the
Mexicans would be
deported.
Galarza charged that
the American
government was being used
by the growers,
This is proof positive
,,
the ^aci * or active
collaboration that goes* on
tween ranchers and
the Immigration DeoartmoM+
and
ther Federal
branc he s to c ire umven l^+hp
?
re<
ui
rements that
l
labor shall be imnlr?ed
ly Way ° nly 0,1
specific certifications
of needfl3§

^

In the summer of

l

95 l. members of the
National

Farm Labor Union made
citizens' arrests of
Mexicans
whom they believed to
have entered the country
illegally.
They turned them over
to immigration
authorities and
demanded that they be
deported. To their surprise,
the union members found
that the strategy worked. 139

The legislative highlight
of

95 l was return
of the bracero program
to a wartime basis.
It will
be recalled that the
United States government
guaranteed the braceros' contracts
during World War II but
this practice ended in
194? on the grounds that the
l

emergency had ended and consequently
the role of
government should be reduced.
This remained the case
until 1951 and American
involvement in the Korean War
138

New York Times. March
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The pressure for
re turn
,

.

basis came from
Mexico.

g +to the emergency
wartime
,

lZf0

The new law returning
the bracero program
to
a wartime Tooting
(Public Law 78 ) took
the form of
an amendment to the
Agricultural Act of
1949.
it „as
introduced by Senator
Ellender (Louisiana),
a longtime spokesman for
grower interests. The
House version
was introduced by
Representative W. R. Poage
(Texas)
By voice vote, the
Senate approved the
new law on
7. 1951.
On June 2 7 . it
passed the House on a
roll call vote of
240-139. 141 Although
the critics
of the bracero
program were more vocal
than ever before, it still enjoyed
a very comfortable
margin of
support in Congress.
.

^

Perhaps the most notable
aspect of the House
vote in 1951 was that
the bracero program
was supported
more by Republicans than
by Democrats. Among
representatives present and voting,
7 k% of the Republicans
voted for the bill whereas
only 5 k% of the Democrats
supported it. Although there
was no roll call vote in

^

1^0
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.
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the House on the
1943 bill,•

“

thS Senate

U

it shm.i
* v
should
be recalled that

re ° eived far more
support from Demo-

=rats than from Republicans.

Thus from

l 9 h 3 to l 951
the braoero program
appears to have changed
from a
Democratic one to a
Republican one. We can
only speculate as to the reasons
for the change. Perhaps
it has
something to do with the
fact that the l 9 h debate
3
was not so much in terms
of wealthy
,

farmers versus

poor migrants.
program in
However, by

l

9h 3

Much of the opposition
to the braoero
was stated in rather
right-wing

terms.

95 i discussion was more in
terms of the
poverty of farm workers,
exploitation of migrants,
and the need to unionize
agricultural labor.
l

Public Law ?8 increased the
role of the American government in the bracero
program.
Once again
the government itself,
through the Department of Labor,
accepted the responsibility for
recruiting and importing Mexican workers.
Braceros were transported from
Mexico at the expense of the
American government. At
reception centers in the United States,
they were hired
by American growers whose labor
shortages had been
certified by the Labor Secretary.
Finally, Public
Law 78 provided that the United
States government would
be responsible for seeing that
contracts entered into

^
155

between growers and
braoeros were fulfilled. ^2
President Truman signed
the new law but
exssed his reservations.
P
He was particularly
concerned that it had
made no provision
for coping
with the wetback
problem .
Mexico also was concerned
that the United States
had not done more to
rediif'o
educe illegalt
immigration.
Her
argument had long been
that the only solution
was for
the American
government to penalize
those who used
this labor.
Mexico's concern, of
course, was that
r citizens enter
legally as braoeros so
they would
enjoy the many guarantees
which she had negotiated.
In 1952. Congress
acted to deal with the
problem
by passing Public Law
28 3
It imposed penalties
on
those bringing illegal
aliens into the United
States
and on those harboring
or concealing them.
Unlike
previous legislation, the
offense was defined as
a
felony rather than a
misdemeanor.
The new law also
increased the authority of
immigration officials to
search private property and
make arrests.
.

In the Se nate.

142
1^3

the bill was passed by
voice

Ibid.

New York Times. July
13

,
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v °te.

It passed
overwhelmingly in the
House with a
vote of 162-10.
Howevpy*
SVer +u
the vote is
misleading if
tt is interpreted
to mean th=+
that n
’

Congress had solidly
turned against the use of
USe
illegal Mexican labor.
The
one-sidedness of thp V n + 0 ^
an P rot) ably be
explained
y two factors. First,
before signing Public
Law 78
President Truman had
received promises from
congressional leaders that
they would take
action against
illegal entry. Secondly,
Mexico had stepped up
her
protests against United
States failure to cope
with
the problem, and
there was increasing
fear among
growers that if Congress
did not act. Mexico
might
decide to end the
bracero program altogether.

m

In

enate debate, there was
strong support for the
law
even from grower
144
spokesmen
.

The Eisenhower Years

When Eisenhower became
president in 1953
chances for ending the
bracero program were not
good
Inaugurated during wartime,
it had been given a new
lease on life by a second
war.
Despite his periodic
criticisms of the program.
President Truman had made
,

1

(1952),

44

IlU'?^

633101151 Q Uarterlv Almanac
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effort

"to

srui
a

i +
it.

On the contrarv
Q
ary » +>,
the
number of
Mexicans entering
the United States
both
rac* and illegally
had reached
unprecedented heights,
unng World War II, the
largest number of
braceros
° e " ter
Single
62,170.
During
Truman * s last two
years in n-r-roffice, about 200,000
were
brought in each year. l4 5
,

^_
,

iwr

.

^

^

Of course, by
1953 the critics of the
bracero
Program had expanded and
had grown more vocal,
sometimes militant.
However, any chance
they had of
ending the program was
harmed by Eisenhower's
election.
Although it was not well
known at the time, his
proiness orientation was
soon apparent. Richard
Nixon, his vice president,
was similarly oriented.
Ezra Taft Benson, secretary
of agriculture, had
long
been a spokesman for
the grower cause and
would later
become a leader of the
ultra-conservative John Birch
Soc ie ty
In 1953. Congress
predictably extended the

bracero program until December
31. 1955.
Eisenhower signed the law on
August 8.

President

Once again.
the braCer ° pr ram ha
°e
* received overwhelming
support

145

Hancock, op, cit .. p. 17

.

,

158

m

Congress.

It passed the Senate
on a voice vote
and was approved in
the House by a vote
of 259-87. 148

The Committee on
Agriculture and Forestry
of
the United States
Senate had held hearings
on the

proposed legislation on
March 23 and 24 ,
1953.
Eisenhower's Undersecretary
of Labor. Lloyd Mashburn. had called for
an extension of the
bracero
program. He had claimed
that the supply

of domestic

agricultural labor was
inadequate and would remain
so
in 1954 .
Another official calling
for extension had
been Arthur J. Holmaas.
representing the Production
and Marketing Administration
of the Department
of

Agriculture. 147

Also calling for extension
of the
Mexican labor program had
been representatives of the
following organizations:
(1) Texas Citrus and
Vegetable Growers and Shippers, 148
(2) National
Grange,
(3) National Cotton Council
of America, 1 -’
11

1

(i
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W

ln,

perial Valley Farmers

AssociatW 51

(5)

tional Farm Labor
Users Committee 152
(6) Araerioan
Farm Bureau Federation. 153

Raising serious
questions about the
wisdom
bracero program had
been representatives
of
these organisations,
(l ) the CI0 for
Arizona
ew Mexico,
2
(
)
National Consumers
League for
Labor Standards ^^5 /o\ A
3 ' American Federation
,
of
Labor.

^

1

Many in the Eisenhower
administration and
Congress felt that Mexico
had long been too
demanding
negotiations with the United
States. Louisiana's
Senator Ellender was
especially outspoken about
what
he considered to be
Mexico's unwillingness
to meet
the United States
15
halfway.
?
The Eisenhower administration seemed to be taking
a cautious, wait-and-

m

see attitude.

Lloyd Mashburn noted that
Mexico would
likely be hard to negotiate
with.
He claimed that
MeXlC ° had the attitude
that the United States
needed
151
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labor and would come
with her hand out.
ln Maroh>
1953. Ellender charged
that Mexico was
demanding
-re f0 r the braceros than
they could get paid
at
home.
He suggested that
the State Department
simply
tell Mexican officials
that they would have
to cooperate better with the
United States. 158
In spite of the
administration's display of

strength and unilateral
action later that year,
it
did do one thing which
Mexican representatives
had
long been demanding.
Shortly after Eisenhower
became
President, he began to
crack down on illegal
Mexican
migrants.
Truman had already begun
the action, but
it reached unprecedented
levels under Eisenhower.
The Mexican government
cooperated and for awhile
furnished military escorts
for American trains transporting the migrants back to
Mexico. 159
In April of 1953,

it was estimated that
about

one illegal Mexican entered
the United States every
thirty seconds.
The 1952 law (Public Law
283) was

proving most ineffective, because
it provided penalties
only for bringing illegal
aliens into the United States,
harboring, or concealing them.

159 New.,

The big loophole was

York Times. January 27,
1953, p. 32.

161

that no penalty
had been provided
fQr
Although Public Law
283 had increased
the
authority of
Migration officialg>
service at the Mexican
border remained
hopelessly
under-staffed.
•_
There
wo-o about
here were
500 officers to
patrol a border some
1600 miles in length. 160
Although the law might
not be adequate
to
keeP the iUegal
“Ricans out, they could
be prosecuted in federal
court for violation
of

^

the

immigration laws.

Almost immediately
after taking
of face, the Eisenhower
administration initiated
an
unprecedented number of
such prosecutions.
Even
wealthy growers were
caught up in court,
and it began to look as if the
pluralist claim that even
the
courts represent the
interests
resxs of the most
powerfully
organized did not apply
to this case.

During the first six
months of 1953, some
80,000 illegal Mexicans
were arrested. 1 ^ 1
During
a two day session in
United States District
Court in
El Paso, 350 were
tried.
Of these, 2 50 were
first
Offenders and received
suspended sentences.
The

Ne w York Times
Ne w York Times
,

,

,

April 16, 1963, p

July

9,

.

1953, p. 3.
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other 100 received
short prison sentences. 162
Mexico, two prominent
cotton farmers „ er e
caught
smuggling eight
illegal migrants
and were sent to
jail for thirty d
l6
3
ays
An Arizona grower
was
indicted by a federal
grand jury on grounds
that he
had used a short-wave
wave radio to warn
illegal aliens
working in his fields
that Migration
officials
were approaching.
The indictment
specified that he
had conspired to
violate the immigration
.

laws.^

The response of
growers, farm
organizations.
and politicians from
the Southwest was
immediate
and determined.
The New Yn-rV
10rk
reported that the
efforts of growers from
the Southwest and
their
spokesmen in Congress to
persuade the Justice
Depart-

—

ment to "soft-pedal”
enforcement of the law
had
reached an "unprecedented
pitch l6 5 Farmers
olaimed
that application of the
law would endanger their
crops
Some charged that it
would undermine the
whole economy of the
United States. The
president of
the Imperi al County
Labor Users Association
and the
.

.

York Times
3

.
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the problem farmers
were iac
facing
mg as a result of
losing their illegal
helpers. l6 ?
P

Snme
Sorae growers
asked

•

+u
the

government to release
their Mexican workers
who
had been arrested
so they could
get back to work 168
Farmers were joined by
others who had
lost their

laborers.

A group of women's
organisations in El

Paso announced that
they were in favor
of legalist
illegal Mexicans as
a means
f*
m
+
eans nof
maintaining
an ample
supply Of domestic
169
servants
•

•

•

.

Powerful politicians
began lining up to
support
the demands of
farmers that the law
not be enforced.
Representatives Robert Wilson
and John Phillips of
California charged that
the immigration
officers had
been over-zealous. 170
The L os Angeles -pi...
announced
that Vice President
Nixon would meet with
officials in
the Justice Department
and discuss the possibility
of
"tempering " their actions
so that the farmers
of

167
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California would have
adequate labor. 171
Several
congressmen suggested
that the problem
could be
solved simply by
legalizing the illegal
migrants.

A-nong those making
this proposal were
Representatives

John Phillips, Robert
Wilson, and James Utt.
all from
alifornxa. Joining them
was Representative
Clark
Fisher of Texas. 172

Along with the opposition
came some support for
the immigration offic
ers
Business Week reported
that
businessmen were opposed
to illegal aliens
because
they did not buy as
much as domestic workers. 17 3
-

Also speaking out in favor
of enforcing the
immigration laws were
representatives of organized
labor.

The National Farm Labor
Union called for legis
lation which would make the
employment of illegal
migrants a felony.
Industrial labor unions also
17i*
called for enforcement of the
law.

Although Business Week observed
that there was
a shortage of domestic
farm labor, it emphasized
some
of the problems caused by
illegal aliens.
It claimed
171

172

173

174
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"Wetbacks in Middle of Border War,"
loc
Ibid.

31.
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was high.

The magazine
also
notea sene of the
hardships faced by
wetbacks.
Por
example , it observed
that many of them
died while
trying to evade the
Border Patrol. 17 ^
Three factors we
have been discussing
apparently coalesced to
produce one of the
most erratic
policy changes of any
administration concerning
Mexican workers.
First. Mexico was
allegedly difficult to negotiate
with. Secondly, vast
numbers of
Mexicans were illegally
entering the United
States.
politics, President
Eisenhower attempted
to
enforce the laws.
Thirdly, he ran into
vigorous
opposition from well
organised and politically
powerful interests.

After Eisenhower's
law-and-order approach to
the wetback problem,
it was suddenly
announced in
early October. 1953. that
the United States
might
terminate the bracero
program when it expired
and
rely entirely on illegal
Mexicans who would simply
be
legalized.
The administration
was especially unhappy
with the practice of
Mexicans consuls ordering
braceros t o quit work until
disputes with employers
175 Ibid.

166

were settled. 176
In what appeared
to some to
t0 ho
be another
effort

to weaken Mexico’s
s h=.v.obargaining position,
•

•

it was

-

an
nounced that officials
lals nr
of -m,
the British West
Indies
Visited California
and had offered
oilered a more
favorable
agreement than the
United States
arrangement with
exico.
The British West
Indies government
had
agreed that the West
Indlans
pay their own transrtation
P
one „ ay .
However. the suspicion
California growers were
not really intending
to give
UP their largely
unbroken historical
supply of Mexican labor had been
aroused by the fact
that the
West indies government
was interested only
in yearlong employment for
its people. 177
Southwestern
growers had been saying
for decades that they
needed
large supplies of sea
sonal workers, because
they
could not afford to
hire yearlong labor.
.

.

.

^^

Although the Eisenhower
administration was
not optimistic about
reaching an acceptable
agreement
With Mexico, negotiations
proceeded during December,
1953 ‘
Th6 a S re ®nent then
in effect was due
to expire

1

76
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New York Times . November
29, 1953, p.
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on the last day of
the year.
In the spirit of
the recommendations
of the
President’s Commission
on Migratory Labor,
the AFLCIO requested that
its representatives
be allowed to

participate in the
negotiations with Mexico.
According to union
spokesmen. Secretary
of Labor Martin
Durkin agreed to give
the proposal ’’serious
consideration.
However. Durkin resigned
before negotiations
held
r re P rese ntatives
were excluded from

’,^°

the talks.

By late December,
there was little sign
of
progress in the negotiations
in Mexico City.
The
United States was calling
for a completely new
agreement which would give
Mexico less authority over
the

program.

Especially deplorable to the
Eisenhower administration was the practice
of Mexican consuls
advising braceros to stop
work until their disagreements With growers were
settled. Seeing this
as al-

most an infringement of
national sovereignty, the administration considered it to
be the single most
important conflict with Mexico
since the program
began in 1942.
1

78

New York Times. December
17, 1953,
179 New
York Times. December 22,

p.

14.

1953, p. 22.
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end6d Wlth minor m
°difications. However
once deadlock ensued,
Mexico-s position
became less
c ear.
This was partly due

^

^

ations „ hich Her
representatives Had to
wei gh . On
the one Hand. Mexico
needed the bracero
program beoause it provided
work for tens of
thousands of
people which her economy
could not absorb.
Yet she
had been presented
with very harsh demands
by the
Eisenhower administration.
The United States
had
said in effect that
Mexico must provide
workers on
our terms or we would
take action which
would violate
both her Constitution
and her Labor Law of
1931

.

While the United States
was demanding that
Mexico agree to weaken
her authority over the
braceros
certain forces in Mexico
were demanding a complete
end
to the program.
Various left-wing interests
and Mexican industries seeking
cheap labor felt that
the place
for the braceros was at
home.

Responding to these various
and conflicting
pressures, the Mexican reuresen+a+iv.o
representatives announced that
pending a new agreement farm
workers would still be
all0W6d t0 g0 t0 the United
States. 180 The American
180

i

New York Times. December
27, 1953

,

p.

10.
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10n W3S 1633 COncil
^ory.

of January

,

During the second

19 *. the United
States

hat she had no
interest in Mexico's
continuing to
permit braoeros to
enter the United
States while negations were stalled. It
was announced
that the
ustice and Labor
Departments were prepared
to meet
the labor needs
of American
Ampri^ow farmers
*
without Mexican
cooperation if necessary.
To emphasize that
getting
ex ic an l abor was
no insurmountable
profe
States officials cited
*.
lted ,q«
1952 .*
statistics
on the large
number of wetbacks. t®I
It became clear
that Eisenhower lacked
Roose-

restraint in dealing
with Mexico. Whereas
the Good Neighbor
Policy had renounced
unilateral
action. Eisenhower's
administration was threatening,
even while negotiations
were proceeding,
that the

United States would act
unilaterally.
It was a sharp
break from the Roosevelt
tradition.
It was more akin
to Truman's action in
opening the border.
The Departments of
Justice, State, and Labor
set up a program for
unilateral recruitment

to begin

°n

JanUary 18 and *>
1

8l

-"til agreement was reached

New York Times, January
12, 1954

,

p.

17.
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with Mexico.

Certain guarantees
would still be
bP glVen
1 ®2
•

the braceros.

Mexico's response was
prompt and determined,
he officially
closed her border to
farm workers
seeking to enter the
United States.
The American
State Department
announced that unilateral
recruitment
would be carried out
despite Mexico's
opposition. *®3
The Mexican attempt
to close the border
did
not work. She stationed
armed guards along a
section
of her border with
California where the
recruiting was
occurring. Mexican border
guards, soldiers, and
immigration officials cooperated
in an effort to stop
flow of illegal immigration.
However, the United
States continued recruiting
Mexicans who swarmed
18
across the line.
**”

Although resentment of the
American policy was
widespread in Mexico, the
Mexican government attempted
to keep open the
possibility of agreement.
President
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines commented
that the breakdown of
negotiations was "not a problem
but only an incident."
Some Mexic an newspapers
expressed the suspicion
that

l82
a

Q

New York Times, January
16, 1954, p. 15.
New York Times, January
17, 1954 p
62.
,

184

jjew

York Times. January 23,
1954, p.

3,
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Eisenhower was be i ng
influenced by growers
interested
only
cheap labor and not
in the rights of
Mexican
aborers
Fears were articulated
that the guarantees
U1 t Up 0Ver the
years were all to be
185

m

.

lost.

Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles announced
that the United States
axes was disposed^ to
re-open talks
an atmosphere of
-mutual respect- and
"goodwill."
Some Mexican newspapers
responded favorably. 186
Caught in the middle of
the controversy were
Mexicans wanting to do
farm work in the United
States
Armed Mexican soldiers
and police would pursue
them
as they attempted to
cross

m

the border.

caught and turned back.

Some were

Others entered, legally by

United States standards
while violating Mexican
law.
Others entered in violation
of the laws of both countries, inasmuch as they
did not go through the
American
security check and health
inspection.
However. United
States officials legalized
even some of these.

Officials escorted them back
to the border for the
ritual purpose of stepping
eighteen inches into Mexico
so they could then be legally
admitted to the United
•j

Or

New York Times. January
24, 1954, p. 10.
186

Ibid.
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States

Mexican guards
SQmetimes out the
iegaUzation
y seizing farm workers.
Fights broke Qut
and sometim
he w°u ld .

v

;8
and jailed. 107

be iromigrants
were beatei;

Mexico did not long
continue her efforts
to
stop the movement of
people into the United
States
It appeared to be
futile, and the image
of Mexican
policemen beating impoverished
men who simply wanted
jobs could have had
its political costs
in Mexico.

During the first week
in February of
1954,
the Eisenhower policy
of unilateral recruitment
ran
into trouble at home.
The Bureau of the Budget
ruled that funds
appropriated by Congress for
Mexican
labor could not be used
in the absence of an
agreement
with Mexico. The Bureau
ordered the program
188
ended.

Legislation was then introduced
in Congress
to nullify the ruling
of the Budget Bureau by
legalizing
unilateral recruitment. Among
those supporting the
resolution were the American
Farm Bureau, the National
Council of Farmer Cooperatives,
and the National Cotton
Council. Opposition was
concentrated in organized labor.
l 87

188

jbid.

New York Times. February
6, 1954 . p. 20.
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In the House,

opposition was led by
Harold
Cooley (North Carolina).
He claimed that
passage of
the law would furnish
a "bUckjackfor the Eisenower administration
to use against
Mexico.
In the
Senate. Hubert Humphrey
(Minnesota) was particularly
critical of the proposed
legislation.
He said the

bill was "in
n violating
~
violation of our
good-neighbor policy."
He charged that it
had onlv
y one purpose bringing
into the United States
cheap labor." 1 ® 9
,

The bill was passed
in the House by voice
vote
on March 4, 1954.
One day earlier, it
had been
approved by the Senate on
a roll call vote. 190
Of 43 Republican senators
voting. 42 supported the
bill.
Seventeen Democrats voted
for it while 21

opposed it. 191

once again an important
provision for
providing Mexican labor drew
predominant support from
the Republicans.
On March k

t

it was announced by the
State

Department that a new agreement
had been reached with
Mexico.
The United States had won
the important concessions it had demanded. While
Mexican officials
189 „
(1954).

12 r°i;r

190

eSS10na l Quar terlv Almanac

Ibid., p. 128.

191

ibid.. p

.

.

X

°

could protest the
treatment
nt or
°f k
bracet-os in the
United
st
t
States, they could
no longer call
axi worK
work stoppages.
ston
Although the new arreenw>n+
'
'"t incorporated the
m „ st lm _
t demands of
the administration,
Eisenhower
nnid he wan pleased
that Congress had
provided for
unilateral recruitment.
He called the
th„ new law
Rood
„
precautionary" legislation. 192
<

During the final
years of the Eisenhower
administrate. opposition to
the hracero program
increased
substantially,
However. the number
Qf
contract workers imported
each year dwarfed
even the
Truman era. From
1956 through 1959, well
over
'•OO.OOO entered each
99
year.’
Once the Eisenhower
administration had let up
on its drive against
illegal
aliens, it became the
most important ally
0 f the

growers.

However, it was not
completely unified.
During the late 1950-s.
Labor Secretary James P.
hell used his administrative
discretion to bring
ab ° Ut 80me Uberal
ref °™ 3 ° f
Mexican labor program.
192

Ibid

.

.

129.

p.

^

mm i tee on Equipment, Supplies.'
and^Manpiwe r“of ' th
the
,
Comml
ttee on
Agriculture Extension I? SI
* ICFin „ arni Labor
Program.
«6th Cong., 2(T Sess
i960.
,
194
•

—

.

Inter- American Studies

.

VII (October, 196577
5^5!

"
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For instance. he
adopted a new wage
formula for
braceros „ hioh was
designe(J tQ
their
impact on domestic
farm workers
iters.
he
He began
setting
minimum labor standards
for American farm
workers
recruited by the
Department of Ubor.W
MitcheU
also began using
his position to
help p U blioi 2e the
case for farm labor
reform. 196 He v*
became a kind of
spiritual godfather to
the s
growing
ing reform movement
during the late l
95 0's and early i 960
's.
.

.

Summary
By 1942. United
States involvement in
World
War II had substantially
reduced the labor force
available to growers.
Under Dreq^n^
-r
pressure from
southwestern
farmers. Congress
passed legislation
providing for the
second formal bracero
program in American history.
The Roosevelt
administration sought to
liberalize the Mexican labor
system and to use it as
a lever
to reform the conditions
of domestic farm

labor.
ever. grower interests
enjoyed special access to
Congress, and they successfully

How-

pressured it to roll

195,

Craig, op. cit..
pp. 152-53

196
PP-

153-55.

+

176

ba= fc the reforms
already enacted and
to head off
anticipated ones.

Although the bracero
program had
h»* v
been justified
as a wartime necessi+v
lty ’
dld not ®nd with
the war.
ew excuses related
to post-war recovery
were found,
"der the Truman
administration, the number
of Mexican workers imported
far exceeded the
peak war
i

years.

Truman left office, the
wetback problem had
also grown to major
proportions.
Once World War II
ended, opposition to
the
bracero program grew.
It was led primarily
by
organized labor. The mass
media also began to look
"ore critically at
grower claims.

With United States
involvement in the Korean
War, reform forces
lost any hope of ending
the bracero
program soon. The annual
importation of Mexican
workers again reached
unprecedented numbers.
During President Eisenhower-s
second administration, opposition to the
Mexican labor system grew
substantially. However, Congress
remained firmly
support of the program and
so did the administration.
The only partial exception
was Secretary Mitchell.
Although he did not oppose
the program per

m

se, he be-

gan to speak out against its
worst abuses and to identify them as factors undermining
domestic farm workers.

17?

CHAPTER

y

final years op the
bracero program
Introduc tion
The body of
scholarly
ii+a>-o + ^e
y llterat
on the politics
nff Mexican
labor in the United
c*
nited States
.

is weakened by
important historical
ga ps.
Xn Chapter XXI.
Mention
urned to the much
neglected. pre- 19 4 2
era in order
o provide some
historical background
Lor understanding
he bracero programs
of later years.

jo
.

.

.

The present chapter
turns to the second
neglected
period, the era spanning
the four years
between President Kennedy's
inauguration and termination
of the
Mexican labor system in
December, 196*. Although
these
years are absolutely
essential to any overall
understanding of the Mexican
labor program, scholars
of
PUbli ° LaW 78 have aid
li«le attention
P
1
to them.

ProgramJ^nte'f^^-l^^^ard

B.

Craig, The Bracero
reIpn
University of Texas pge^s ?u,f?
TA^tlKT
1
1 5°-97
PP
attention is also devoted ’
Brief
Ellis W. Hawlev "The Po?^? the Kennedy era in
1CS
f
Issue, 1950-19 6s " ao-t-i
Labor
i+
i° Hieto^,
AgnculturaX
X L (July,
1966), 170-75.’
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Likewise , books on the
Kennedy presidency
fail to 00n .
vey the substantial
concern of his
administration with
Mexican labor problems 2
.

The activity of
pressure groups reached
a new
intensity during the early
1960-8.
Their strategies
successes and failures
took on a new significance
during the Kennedy era,
because for the first
time
since 1942 , the seemingly
invulnerable

grower coalition
lost the battle to its
historically weaker group
opponents.
Still another new pattern
was that never
before had Congress been
confronted by a president
so critical of bracero
legislation. Also

new, in degree, was the zeal with
which much of the press
joined
other reform interests.

Additional interest in the Kennedy
era is added
by the fact that as late
as 1961. the rapid decline
of
the bracero program was
generally unantic
ipa ted

.

How-

ever, this failure to
anticipate the future is
r
^ ment ^ one<*
n ^?^’
’
^-^^Snd_|Dais
reenwich, Connecticut!
(Greenwi?h^'c^”^?/
Fawcett Publications, 1965).
3

F r

Ponfn?

a

le

*** 5 ex P‘ Rehnbe rg, "Discussions
Labor for
Seasonal Work in the
i
states— Issues
Involved and Interest Groups in

The Use o ? Fo"

TL
g

i*

° f Farl" Econoi,lica

-

XLni

(December,

,
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'-”»* *"
».« .ir..*
through two decades
of both war and „»
peace.
it had
flourished more than
ever
r dUring
during +»,
the se °ond Eisenhower
administration.
1

,

.

.

This chapter, then,
turns to the neglected
but
interesting and important
years from 1961 to
l 9 6h
The purpose is
two-fold.
First, the broad
goal is
to outline some
of the bracero
program’s more important
political developments
during this era.
Secondly, a
more specific purpose
is to deal with
the question
of why Public Law
?8 was eventually
terminated.

Kennedy's Reform Inheritance

Certainly the Kennedy
administration played an
important role in the reform
and termination of the
bracero program. However,
even before it assumed
power
there were scattered
indications that reform
trends
might already be developing.
Failure to recognize
them would exaggerate
the impact of the Kennedy
government, important though
it was.
The years 1959 and i960
were marked by consid _

enable media attention to
the problems of farm
workers
and their families,
it was only to be expected
that

o

5

.
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liberal periodicals
such as the
continue Publicising
the hardships Qf
f
was J0 ined by
Various other maga2ines
_

New^^

_

"

would

^
and

“interchurch M Q ,.,n

E

hS businessoriented Fortune

~

.

oegan to write of
migrant hardships
and to place part
f the b lame on
4
farmers.
Various
anous important newspapers, including the
Newark Times, featured
similar
articles and editorialised
for farm labor reform.
During I 960 , two
television networks
broadcast powerful and controversial
documentaries on the pli
ght of
American farm workers.^
,

m

™

0

Fa
Labor Urgent,"
lnterchurch Me^o^°?. l1 £
Plight," F^tune, Noveibe?,
Workers'
igfo
the Low,” New Rennhi i/%
Lowest of
”her 2 1959,
Edward P, ETrgal^ore
p
S
ottln
Peo Ple,
Reporter.
March S. iqw r
Mig
a Problem fo^S?Aoois."
Sa?na fF Ven ng Pr"' f-’ rs p °^
May 28, i960, p. jg.
"Baule f Consciences,"
September 21, 1959, ’p.28.
Time,
,

i,

.
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X
still Tobacc Roadf" Ne^
April 24 , i 960 p. jlj-;

rk Tlmo M
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F r 5 ° 0 000
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isti an Century
May 3. 196 l p° s48 qf Stv
"
Harvest of Shame,"
Commonweal *M.y 19, ’1961,
p^oL*
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^
^

Pollsters apparently
l.ii.p
i°n a sentiment
about farm l abor
during
were scattered
indications that public
opinion
growing more favorable
toward reform.
: n Ma rch.
*'•
reported that public
opinion
*
m ° re COnc
^out farm labor probems for at least
a year.? Letters
reprinted in

-

^

™

the

^^^S^i^aOecord

and the Times took
on an increasingly reformist tone
during the late l
95 0’s and early
1960’s.
Public reaction to the
television documentaries
was reported to be
favorable.** Luring
19 6o. seven
states had passed laws
or taken other action
to improve
conditions of domestic
farm workers. 9

Forces struggling to
reform the bracero
program
had always been weakened
by the fact that
American
farm workers, the
people most threatened by
imported
labor, were unorganized.
Before Eisenhower left
office
there were signs that
even this might be changing.
During 1959 and i960, the
American Federation of Labor
and the Congress of
Industrial Organizations
had made
substantial attempts to unionize
southwestern farm
York Times. March 20,
196l, f
p. 28.
8
Keisker, loc cit
jjew

•

.

9„

A

.

American Outcasts," loc. cit.

’
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workers. 10

During the final
year of +ho Eisenhower
w*
administrati™ certain
*
tration,
senators began
uegan di*m
displaying a new
determination to reform
the k
bracero Program,
i 96 0 .
,
+u e
first time in the
history of Public
Law 78
the reformers were
able to hold its
traditional twoY ar renewal to a period
of six months.
This unprecedented success came
from a new determination
on the
part of such senators
as George McGovern
(D-S.D ) 11
who simply threatened
to filibuster an
end to the
program if its supporters
continued to insist on
a
two-year renewal period. 12
.

•

m

.

Another trend favoring
the Kennedy administration's reform efforts
was mechanisation.
By 196l
it was already
reducing the demand for
farm labor
and weakening the case
for the bracero program.

,

The chance for reform
was increased by another

important factor which is
easily overlooked.
Although
the reform group in
Congress had been consistently
outVOtgd °" t he braCero
ro
Sram, its numbers had always
P
10 T
Ibid
,

.

.

.

n
r
e
0
Will r e PP®sent their
respective parties and°states!Ilen
A

Reporter

.

Fe°r.l^y

ybb,
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n5 f
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^

Wrath, Vintage 1961,"
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°ne- third of the
members
a majority could
be

taSk COnfr ° nting
the nSW
administration
was to econvert
this substantial
minority to a new
congressional majority.

Importance of Kennedy's
Election
b3S1C Clai "
th
the ,
Kennedy

°f

tMs

° ha P ter t- that
although

administration inherited
certain conditions
conducive to reform
of the bracero
program, the new
government itself was
a major cause Qf
reforms
e Ultimate decision
to terminate the
Mexican labor
system.
It did make a
difference whether Nixon
or
Kennedy won the 19
60 presidential election
because
their records on farm
labor were signifioantly
different,
Had Nixon won and used
the vast power of the
presidency
to hinder reform,
the bracero program
might have lasted
beyond 1964

^

^

,

Apparently neither Nixon nor
Kennedy mentioned
the Mexican labor
system during
the i960 election.

It

is thus necessary
to look at the earlier
record.
As a congressman, Nixon

was never faced with
a

roll call vote specifically
on extension of the
Mexican

184

labor program.

1

^

Howpvor.
W6Ver> as

floated earlier,
1XOn had lon been
S
considered a ssnolce
P°^esman for the
e
southwestern farm cause.
nis record ranged
His
from
osi ion to farm
labor unionisation 14
to his votes
against anti-wetback
1?
bills.

^

n °° ntrast - as
^ congressman,
John Kennedy had
aligned himself more
with +u
the ontics of
southwestern
growers.
On a roll call
vote i„ 1V51.
1951
h
he had
voted
to end the bracero
16
mu
program
^
program.
The following
year
ennedy had voted
against a proposal
to cut appropri° nS f ° r the Ira,
” igrati0

/

.

^

,

" a " d Naturalization
Service

”

3
the roll call
??* reo °rded by
method ^n^hf^h'th
r
each member votes
is Called aad
'’aye" or "Lv
?H
aay - Alternatives
elude the ’‘voice" ann
in;
votes
problems for the research"
Thaaa Present
the votes of
individual congressman
eSSmen cannot be
determined from the
official recordf

T

,

^

t

-

3
E ] ars la the House ora
Workers in the^ietd
f j^
^^,
°f
Dame Press, 19 7 J),

TOe

pp.^f^/^sity
.

U

2d Sess.. if52,^rfrivii?" a
d Congp a rri[-8iff

1st Sess.

’

Con e-.

^
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(Which is responsible
for wetback
apprehension)
n
195^, he had voted against
Eisenhower’s unilateral
recruitment bill. 18
.

The distribution
of Kennedy’s
electoral support probably increased
the likelihood
that his
administration would seek
either liberal reform
or
termination of Public
Law 78
The bulk of his
electoral votes came
from the heavily
industrially and
urbanized eastern centers, 19
located in «+
+
states
which
used no braceros.
It i s unlike
iiKeiy
lv that
+h a + a
conservative
approach to the braoann
racero program would
have helped
.

m

Kennedy to hold his
coalition together.
In the i960 election.
Kennedy won about
85 ^

of the Mexican-American
vote.

In many parts of
the

Southwest, "Viva Kennedy”
organizations worked for
his
eleCti ° n
The «exican-American
vote made possible
-

^
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^

victorias in
such a close
election

2,

—

29 eleoto ^l votes
of these
t
+
two
states loomed large
in
the margin
g
of victory 22

m

~™;; :~;r r
°f

OS lor farm
jobs,

they tended to
PPose the Mexican
labor p
program
eiam 2 3 Con
Consequently.
any ing less than
a reform approach
would have enangered Kennedy's
important Mexican-American
support.
Flnally Kennedy '
s mare in Of
Victory among
V0t6rS
de ° iSiVe in
^ates, including
Illinois With 27
electoral votes.
Blacks suffered
rom one of the
highest unemployment
rates i„ the nation
were frequently in
competition with Mexican
labor. 2 '*
Had Kennedy lost
the states of Texas.
New
eXiC °’
IUin0iS
»ave lost the election.
*

.
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(un P“ blia hed
dissertation,
pp. 176-77.

Master's
unlve rsity If
Universi?v
of Texas at Austin,
1963),
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This realization
may well have
reinforced his prior
critical, inclinations
toward the tracers
program.
Kennedy's reformist
outlook on Public
Law 78
prang logically from
his promise of
a New Frontier
icated to creating
opportunities for
disadvantaged
»er lcans . By the
tine of his
inauguratiQn>
evidence indicated
that the importation
of Mexican
workers was having
an adverse effect
on America's
farm labor force,
particularly in the
Southwest
where Kennedy was
heavily indebted to
Chicano

/

^

^

The Reform Offensive
of 1961

When John

F.

Kennedy was inaugurated
on
anuary 20, 1961, Public
Law 78 was due to
expire the
following December. The
new administration
was not
long in mounting a
reform offensive.
However, it began with an attack on
rural poverty rather
than a
direct assault on the
bracero program. During
Kennedy's
first month in office,
several high level
officials
including Secretary of
Labor Arthur Goldberg
and
Agriculture Secretary Orville
Freeman highlighted the
extent of this poverty
and pledged the
administration's

.

188

efforts to eradicate

it.^

The preliminary focus
on domestic poverty
was
not unrelated to the
forthcoming assault on
Public
Law 78. Within a
month, the administration
would be
blaming many of the
hardships of American
farm workers
on the widespread use
of Mexican labor.
This was to
be a continuing
theme of the Kennedy
government and
one of its most
effective weapons in the
campaign to
reform the bracero
program.
The 1961 struggle over
Mexican labor legislation
centered around the so-called
Gathings bill. Early
that year. Representative
E. c. Gathings
(D-Ark.)
introduced H.R. 2010 which
provided for a four-year

extension of Public Law 78
without amendment. 26
In earlier years, the
Gathings bill could have
been expected to sail smoothly
through the House.
By
1961 the situation had changed.

Bracero interests

which rallied around H.R.
2010 found themselves opposed
by the united forces of the
Kennedy administration.

^

administration was not long in making
known

25
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xts unalterable
opposition to the
Gathings bill.
y racero program the

^

3 ref0

™ ed

cultural workers.

——

The

administration would
support

protect domestic agriHowever. Kennedy
did not wish

to
see the bracero
program terminated
in 1961. 2 7
The administration
preferred
preierred reform over
..
immea late termination
for spv
P
r.
a
i
several reasons. One
was its
recognition that conversion
nversion to adomestic
labor would
take time.
Another was the
realization that an
abrupt
end to the program
would involve unacceptable
risks in
.

.

United States relations
with Mexico. To
abolish
Mexico's third most
important source of
foreign exchange
on short notice
would have been too
much out of character with Kennedy's
Alliance for Progress,
still
another consideration
was the fact that the
President was counting
heavily 0 n a Mexican
endorsement
of the Alliance as
a means of making
it more acceptable
to other Latin
American countries. 28

Perhaps another reason
for Kennedy's willingto settle for less
than termination was
his assessment of th e limited power
of his administration
to

27

IMd., pp. 163-64.

28

1962, p. 7 f

enned y ln Mexico," New
Republic. July

2,
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accomplish such radical
change
ange.
Hp u
h
He
had
won the presienoy by the smallest
percentage of the
popular vote
American history. Nor
had the Democrats
fared
particularly well in
congressional races. 2 ?

m

On March 6.

7>

and 17 . 1961 , the Subcommittee on Equipment.
Supplies, and Manpower
of the
House Committee on
Agriculture held hearings
on
8.

9.

H.R. 2010. 30

The subcommittee was
chaired by Representative Gathings. the
author of this non-reform
bill
to which bracero
users threw their
enthusiastic
support.
The hearings attracted
a variety of oral
and
written testimony. Supporting
H.R. 2010 were numerous
farmers, both individual
and corporate. Most came
from the West and many
were users of braceros.
A great
deal of testimony was
offered by growers' associations,
many of which were western
based.
The services of

growers' associations vary
considerably, but many are
primarily concerned with furnishing
large supplies of
labor on short notice. Many
of the braceros had always
^Friedheim, op, cit .. p. 221.
30
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been supplied through
these organizations,
Among
associations of growers
presenting evidence to
the
Gath mgs subcommittee
on behalf of H.R.
2010 were
the following
1

1

2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11

ey Cotton Ass °ciation
Verctahl
Growers Association of
America
°a
Wefterr rGrowers
Western
Association

California Toma to

Ventura^itru^ ^Q

% r owe r s^A s s oc

f

^ ^e e

ti0n

National Pickle Growers A^^nr*
B 6t Growers
Association
Imperial
mperial Valley
Valle Farmers
p
Association
i

The American Farm
Bureau Federation had long

championed a non-reform bracero
program, and its
spokesman presented a
well-prepared statement at the
Cathings hearings. He was
joined by a representative
from the Arkansas Farm
Bureau Federation. A

few local

units of the Chamber of
Commerce sent spokesmen to
oppose reform.
Also testifying for H.R.
2010 were spokesmen
for a variety of business
interests whose own success
was heavily dependent on
grower prosperity.
These
included an association of canners.
a Chicago processor
of Michigan pickles harvested
by braceros, the Great
Western Sugar Company, a cotton
ginner, the Southern
Pacific Railroad, and the Security
State Bank of
Littlefield, Texas
.

t
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Reform-oriented cresc-nr'a
Pressure groups were
better
represented at the
1961 hearings than
ever before.
err numbers had
increased and their
testimony was
noticeably better
prepared.
-r

Several spokesmen
from labor
organizations presented testimony
highly critical of
the Gathings
bill.
Among these were
representatives of,
1.
The American Federa + i™
r
^
2.

(AFL-CIO)
3

4

.

.

g

*

Food

’

and Allied Workers

:ed Meat Cutters
an <* Butcher Workmen
(AFL?CIO)
Joint-U.S. -Mexico Trade
Union Committee

Also testifying against
the Gathings bill
were representatives
of several
01
several religious
voi;
organizations,
including the following
•

Social Justice

2
3

4
5
6

Method is t^Church°

* Ural Lif ® C °"^ence

Racial and ethnic groups
most affected by the
bracero program were barely
represented at the 1961
hearings.
The only such testimony
consisted of a
short letter from the
American GI Forum
of the

United States, a
Mexican-American organization.
The
letter called for termination
of the bracero program.
Also presenting testimony
critical
of the
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blU

the Nati ° nal C °
nSUmers League and

the Consumers L e
ague of New Jersey
.

interests had long
maintained

t0

^^^

^

braoero
?g

6eP f °° d PriC6S d ° Wn
"° consum er groups
’
a p p e ared
su PP° rt the
non-reform bill.

Other organizations
presenting liberal
testimony
critical of the braoero
program were.

j:

£

ThS Socialist Party
°f

thfUnited^tales

Finally, spokesmen from
the Unite d States
Department of Labor testified
against the Gathings
bill and called for
reform of the braoero
program
to protect American
farm workers.
Pa tterns of group dist r
ibution

at.

the

lorti

Heatings.

On balance, the
distribution of groups
represented at the hearings
favored the reform cause.

Since earlier hearings,
a greater number and
variety of groups had
joined the reform cause.
The
Status quo forces had
gained few new converts.
Perhaps
symbolic of troubles to
come, one of the important
farm organizations, the
National Grange, dropped its
traditional support for Public
Law 78 and joined the
critics at the Gathings
hearings.
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63

dayS ° f the MeXiCan
lab0r

its futu
ture was not
particularly threatened
by the
that its strongest
advocates came from
a single
region or two of
the United States.
After all< few

^t

vocal organizations
from any region
attacked the
program in a systematic
and effective manner.
However. the narrow
regional base of its
most ardent
supporters had become
more of a liability
by 196l
because the program
was under fire by
an entire
administration and a host
of politically adept
and ably
manced organizations
whose members were
far more
dispersed around the
nation. Since union
members,
teachers. Catholics,
and Methodists are
scattered
throughout the nation,
no congressman is
immune to
their retaliation at
the polls.
On the other hand,
the vast majority of
congressmen are not dependent
on
the votes of bracero-users.
cotton ginners. and
southwestern bankers.
.

Finally, most individuals
and organizations
supporting the Gathings bill
had a direct economic
interest in opposing reform
of the Mexican labor
system.
The reformers generally
projected a more self
less image inasmuch as
most of them would neither
gain
lose money regardless
of what happened
to the

bracero program.
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——

note on the terms nr
debate
QeDa
~
a
te
As
already
ndicated, the arguments
for and *samst
against the use of
Mexican labor have
been characterised
nzed >,by substantial
continuit, over the
y ears. However. as
major histori= anges have
occurred, one side
or the other has
«en found it advantageous
to insist that
the terms
s debate
change to reflect
new developments.
When
fort has succeeded,
debate has re-focused
to
center around a new
predominant question.
Although
answers to that
question have generally
favored one
s^e at the expense of
the other, even
many interests
disadvantaged by the new
concern have agreed
that it
an appropriate
question which
wii-Lun must be
answered by
both sides.
A_

.

..

.

>

.

During World War

I.

employers seeking Mexican

workers gained decisive
advantages when they
succeeded
xn structuring debate
around the national
security
aspect of farm labor.
Obviously these terms
were
outmoded with the end
of the war. With the
onset of
the Great Depression,
opponents of Mexican labor
succeeded in structuring
national debate around the
issue of massive domestic
unemployment.
This strengthened their case and
played a major role in
bringing
about the repatriation
of large numbers of
Mexicans.
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With the outbreak of
World War II. the
advantage moved to potential
employers of Mexicans
as they
once more to shift
the terms of debate
to
the national security
role of farm labor.
As peace
returned, reform forces
gained ground as they
turned
attention to growing
unemployment.
Then with the
outbreak of the Korean
War. they lost control
over
the terms of debate.
Once again the
preoccupation wa s
insuring an adequate
farm labor supply
in

the

interest of national
security.

During the post-Korean
Eisenhower era. the
structure of debate changed
from the wartime necessity
for Mexican labor to a
generally conservative,
proagriculture orientation. Both
President Eisenhower
and Congress were content
to assume that farmers
needed Mexican labor, war
or no war.
The burden of
proof was thrown to the critics
of Public Law 78.
With the arrival of the New
Frontier, the terms
Of debate shifted to favor
the reform forces.
The
pro-business concerns of government
gave way to a
growing concern with liberal
reforms. Critics of
Public Law 78 shrewdly took
advantage of this development and successfully insisted
that the bracero
program be debated in terms of
an assumed commitment
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to reform.

The outstanding
characteristic of the
1961-64 era was th«+
vil3.X th6
r'Q
SUDDOrtp
PP rters
of-P
•

sporting Mexi-

labor were forced
mor e onto the
defensive than

year 1961 mar.cs the
last major shift in
of debate prior to
expiration of Public
Law
7
Both the case for
and against Mexican
labor were
Presented in great detail
at the Gathings
hearings
that year.
Because later hearings
and congressional
debate added little
new infnrmc+^
information or style,
arguments presented at
u
the
ne Gathin^
uathmgs hearings
will be
summarized in considerable
detail.
The case against
the bracero program
deserves special attention
because
it was these arguments
which eventually
prevailed and
helped bring an end to
the entrenched Mexican
labor
system.
•

T he reform case at
the 10A,

At the
196! hearings, critics
of the bracero program
made
much of the claim that
they were in tune with
the new
national mood of social
and economic reform while
their opponents were
clinging to an
outmoded position

Kennedy's campaign and early
presidency set
the stage for a greater
national awareness of the
problems of poverty. As
noted earlier, critics of

198
the bracero program
had long charged
that it was a

-jor

cause of rural poverty.

With the coming of
ew Frontier, their
argument gained new
attention.
Reform of Public Law
78 to protect American
farm
workers, they argued,
would be an important
antipoverty, New Frontier
program.
Growers had always claimed
that they used
Mexican labor only because
an adequate supply of
able and willing
Americans was unavailable.
At the
1961 hearings, reformers
charged that farmers were
deliberately making the
conditions of work so difficult and unattractive
that Americans could not
afford
to do it.
This was allegedly achieved
by setting
low wages 3 * and by the
failure to offer dome£Jtic
workers the many job benefits
which braceros were
guaranteed.

Throughout the history of the
bracero program,
participating growers had worked
hard to create and
maintain a good public image.
They had always denied
responsibility for rural poverty,
attributing it
instead to generally depressed
farm conditions which
made it impossible to pay
higher wages. An important
strategy o f the reformers at
the 1961 hearings was to
31

Ibid .. PP« 57-58, 72 .

9
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undermine this image.

Th

y
drgea that many
of the
bracero-users were weal+hv
wealthy corporate
farms.
The
accusation was that
much °of
f the P° v erty
against which
America’s conscience
was rebelling
reh^n
was deliberately
generated by wealthy
y growers so +
h
they
could become
even richer.
r.

.

.

•

«

Critics charged that
in addition to
causing
many Americans to
remain unemployed,
the braoero program was undermining
domestic farm workers
who had
lobs.
They statistically
demonstrated a tendency
f or
wages to remain lower
n areas using
substantial
numbers of braceros.*
They also presented
showing that as the
number of braeeros
used in various
states increased,
wages for domestic
farm workers
tended to stagnate ^3
.

These claims helped
to undermine the
traditional
grower argument that the
braoero program was no
threat
to the American
farm worker. Although
the critics had
long disputed that
assumption, their rebuttal
during
the 1 h 0
and l 95 0’s had come
mostly in the form of
emotional and unsubstantial
statements. At the 1961
hearings, they offered
detailed studies, some
of which
32

ibid., pp, 56,

5^

33
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,

102
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,

,

200

had been conducted
by the Departm ent
of Labor.
This
crucial gam for the
critics, because much
of
the support for
Public Law 7 8 had
been based on the
assumption that the
imported labor had no
adverse
effect on American
farm workers.
At the 1961 hearings,
critics of the bracero
program made a major effort
to capitalize on
the New

Frontier concern for the
disadvantaged.
They stressed
the allegedly terrible
conditions under which
American
farm workers lived,
and they blamed these
hardships
directly on Public ^aw
Law 78
/a.
aa ov,
spokesman for the
National Consumers League
testified.
i

^

U

11
1 importation of
the^OO^OOO o? so Mexica^br
br
eros
*as a direct
and a deleterious
??

cond?r

Sti °

0

"^htTorke "

°f

^

anfth^b Sn^diminiT^
°f ue
n Y?^
worktime

Applicants
wa
6 es decrease,
decreases
decreases, job
inh security
goes
out the
window/ 34
By 1961 two trends were
expanding the surplus
of agricultural workers
and making the alleged need
for
braceros less convincing.
Spokesmen for interest
groups critical of Public Law
7 8 forcefully pressed
both points. They called
attention to the fact that
unemployment was at its highest
level since the days
of the Great Depression. 35
Secondly, they pointed out
^^Ibid.

,

p.

96

.

^

5 ppid.

P-

55.
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that fan, mechanization
had made great
process and
that it was creating
mo re and more rural
unemployment.
As increasing
numbers of fa™ workers
lost their jobs
to machines, how
could growers claim
that Americans
simply could not be
found to fill the
shrinking
of remaining jobs?

^

The claim centering
around mechanization was
a more powerful
justification for reform
than was the

old argument that
reliance on Mexican labor
should be
P ased out because of general
unemployment. Champions
of the bracero system
had been able to counter
the

earlier argument by pointing
out that many of the
unemployed were not farm
workers and were unwilling
to
begin such a drastically
different form of work.
It
was much harder for them
to answer the claims
centering
around mechanization, because
the unemployed in
question
were a gricultural workers
who, on the face of it,
were

willing to do farm work.
The paradox of the reformers
at the 1961 hearings
was that much of their best
ammunition came from developments which they most deplored.
If national rates
of unemployment had not
been climbing and if farm

mechanization had not been throwing
people out of work,
their case would have been
considerably

less convincing.
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Also attuned to the
New Frontier style
of
politics was the
reformers' attention
to the morality
o
the hracero pro
g ram.
At the 196l hearings,
o aimed that
the use of foreign
workers to undermine
merican labor was
inconsistent with "the
moral
conscience of this Nation. "36
To continue PubUo
haw 78 without
reform would
u be
oe ",
a h1n+
blot upon our
national conscience " 37 and
i
a violation
of the
Christian concept of
justice .*’ 38
.

.

A third theme of
critics at the 1961
hearings

was also meshed with
priorities which the New
Frontier
was already popularising.
It was charged that
at the
very time President
Kennedy and the American
people
were alarmed about the
declining prestige of the
United
States, the bracero
program was harming the
nation's
international reputation.
An American spokesman
for
ung Christians, an
international organization,
told
of bringing some young
Latin American leaders
to the

United States for a
good-will visit. They were
critical of the treatment of
braceros. especially "their
severe limitations of
movement, their life in
labor
camps, sep aration from
their families, and their
nZ

PP. 58,

38

-Ib

id .

,

p.

125.

72.

37

Ibid., P. 75.
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inability to change
jobs ."39
ics at the 19 ol
hearings charged further

that the conditions
of American farmworkers,
underlined hy the use of
foreign labor, were also
giving
the United States
a bad image abroad.
It was pointed
out that at least one
million domestic migrants
did
not "enjoy the human
rights and privileges
which the
General Assembly of the
United Nations has agreed
should be a common standard
of achievement for
all
people and nations.

Although gearing their
testimony to New
Frontier priorities enabled
reformers to take the
offensive, it sometimes caused
problems.
For instance,
the Kennedy administration
was strongly committed to
extension of foreign aid, and
supporters of Public
Law 78 claimed that the
bracero system was a crucial
foreign aid program. At the
1961 hearings, spokesmen
for interest groups critical
of the Mexican labor
system made clear that they
were not opposed
to the

principle of foreign aid.

However, bringing many

poor Mexicans to the United
States for a few weeks of
work each year at very low wages
could not be a
'

^Ibid

.

»

P-

113

^°
*

Ibid .

.

p.

125.
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permanent solution to
the problems of
Mexico's
extensive poverty.
Secondly, it was
noted that other
countries
were aided from
general revenues rather
than by
throwing the entire
burden of foreign aid
on already
poverty-stricken families
amines. Who+
What sense did it
make to
help poor Mexicans
bv
eivirogiving them the jobs
5
of the
poorest workers in the
United States?
Since 1942 a powerful
justification for the
labor program was the
argument that
.

it fur-

shed a substantial
income to poverty-stricken
exicans.
Its friends had long
told of thankful
braceros returning home
laden with farm machinery,
automobiles, cooking utensils,
new clothing, gifts,
and substantial sums
of money.
They had claimed that
bracero earnings had enabled
many people to build
homes and buy farms and
successful businesses. By
the late 1950's, a
common assumption among
supporters
of Public Law 78 was
that the law had been
an important
cause of the expansion
of Mexico's thriving new

middle class.
Before 1961, critics of the
bracero program
had countered these claims
more with statements of disbelief than with statistical
data.
However, in the
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hearings that year, they
were ready with survey
results
gathered from interviews
with braceros leaving
the
United States upon
completion of their
contracts.
The
study found that the
workers had failed to
earn enough
to maintain their
families and repay their
indebtedness for the trip to
the United States . 41
Friends of Public Law
78 had long claimed
that
the large number of
braceros wishing to return
to the

nited States year after
year demonstrated the
program's popularity with
them.
Indeed the survey found
that some 93^ of the
men expected to seek a new
contract the following year.
However, the researcher
concluded that the high
return rate was due mostly
to the braceros'
indebtedness resulting from
their
work already performed in
the United States 42
.

A second broad strategy
of the reformers was
designed to convince segments

of the coalition

supporting the bracero program
that their own interests,
aside from New Frontier
priorities, were not being
served by Public Law 78
.

Supporters of the Mexican labor
program had
always argued that it was necessary
for "American
4l

pp.

356-57.

42

Ibid.

»
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farmers."
th»

—

L7 T

reia
of

t

•

Critics charged that
it Was ln
fact serving
#'
gr ° WerS ***
that
7
SmaU farmSrS US6d b
"hiie
"ere hired by large
corporate

h

^

^^

—

-t

arged that hraceros
were used on iess
than 50.000.^
* ° ritlCS
Want6d t0 kn ° W w^
small farmers should
support thrs program
which did not benefit
them
Continuing the theme
that Public Law
7 8 was a
torm of governmental
favortism to a very
limited num*r of growers, reform
forces emphasized
that only a
small geographical
region received any
substantial
number of braceros.
Most went to the
Southwest, but
even within that
region, the primary
beneficiaries
were the five states
of Arkansas. Texas,
New Mexico.
Arizona, and California.^
Reform interests asked
why farm interests
in the other forty-five
states
should favor this labor
bonus for such a narrow
region.
Critics of Public Law
78 went on to claim
that
growers not participating
in the bracero
program were
actually being harmed by
it.
While only a few farmers
W6re aSSUr ed Cheap and
^reign labor, the others
c

43

ibid., p. 296.

44
Ibid

.

,

p.
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had to sell their
products in the same
market.
Those
Paying less Tor l a hor
could afford to sell
their profor less, thereby
undermining the competitive
position of farmers not
participating in the
bracero
Program.
it was also claimed
that
of a cheap Mexican
labor supply encouraged
employers
of braceros to
overproduce which in turn
lowered the
value of* that product
-p
oauc
for* all farmers
p
x ior
producing it.
Critics of Public Law
7 8 alleged that the
program put an unjustified
burden on taxpayers.
At
the Ga things hearings,
a reformer charged
that the
use of Mexican labor
placed "an unnatural and
unnecessary strain on taxpayers
in agricultural
areas through the social
effects of extreme poverty 46
It was also charged
that the program was
harmful to
local businesses.
Braceros would spend less
money
in the local area than
would have domestic workers
holding the same jobs.^

^

45
47

Ibid-, p.
Ibid.

338.
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^-ag^^iberaL reform
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much on the defensive

«•

n , th ,

,„„„„„

>”»*
The
ne P
profrr*m
r °gram was on
trial

and its partisans
suffered from the
disadvantage of
avmg the terms of
debate structured
primarily by
the critics of
Public Law 78
.

Two closely related
themes appear in the
defensive case built by
supporters of Mexican
labor
F lr st. the bracero
program was not out
of character

with emerging
national commitments
to social reform.
Secondly, it was in
fact a liberal. New
Frontier
type of program the
termination of which
would underoine the most
important priorities of
the Kennedy
administration.
Much of the concern
of the grower coalition
was directed toward
answering the charge
that Public
Law 78 was undermining
American farm workers.
Farm
spokesmen charged that
the administration
of the law.
actual conditions of
domestir
m workers,
uomesxic farm
and the
intent of growers using
braceros had all been
misconstrued.
,

It was claimed that
the average yearly wage
for

farm workers was misleading
because they included
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economic aUy
as housewives and
retired persons 48
.

Supporters of Public
Law 78 did not
claim that
omestic farm workers
enjoyed high earnings.
Howthey did argue that
impressive earnings
were
possible for able and
devoted people.
Numerous
P es were cited, including
one migrant family
which was able to save
$ 3 . 20 0 in a period of
five
weeks.
True enough, not all
employees would earn
a good living,
because many American
farm laborers
were lazy and did
"not want to work" 5°
or were
severely handicapped,
physically, mentally, or
P ych la trie ally, or by
reason of age .''^ 1 None
of
these problems were
caused by the fa™er.
and it
would be unjust to saddle
him with the responsibility
for solving them.
There were sound economic
reasons why even
able Americans doing
farm work on a permanent
basis
did not earn more.
The fact that their
earnings were
not higher was not due
to the caprice or
insensitivity
of growers.
It was caused by a
combination of declining
farm price s and the leveling
of worker productivity. 52
48
J

IMd., PP. 4-5.

°Ibid., p. 81
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Supporters of P ublio
Law ?g argued

tWltleS

f° r

impressive pace .

-re

increasing at an
Liberal reforms did

^^^^

written into bracero
legislation, because
farm wages
ad already risen
substantially in all
bracero-using
states, some farm
workers were already
covered b y
ocial Security, the
Interstate Commerce
Commission
was protecting
interstate migrants,
several states
were guaranteeing
safe intrastate
transportation of
farm workers,
twenty-eight states had
already established migrant labor
commissions, eight states
had
passed laws repairing
crew leaders to
register, and
more state departments
of education were
working to
improve the education
of migrant children 53
There was no attempt
to deny that some
migrants
lived under deplorable
conditions. Growers and
their
Political allies called for
some reforms, particularly
relatively non-controversial
ones in such areas as
education and health.
However, legislation
dealing
with such matters should
come from state and
.

local

governments.

They
ney were closer to 4-v
the people and less
likely to abuse power
and threaten the democratic
way of lif e than was the
national government.
53

Ibid.. P- 37.
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Liberal critics of
the bracero
program and
users of Mexican
labor had always
disagreed about
which level of
government should
nouid assume
ass„ m „ responsibility
for regulating the
conditions
unaixions Of *
farm workers.

“‘*"1"

r.o,r,„„, ly

«
,

«•

7W „

or , obllo

7e

, up<rtlionr

ro e of the
national government
while farm interests

Lad generally
favored regulation
from the state and
local level.
Whatever the motivation,
each had
Ught to place
governmental responsibility
at whichever level its own
political influence was
likely to
be greater.
Coming from more
agricultural states
bracero-users could generally
expect their local and
state governments to
be more sympathetic
to their
cause.
At the national level,
the political
influence
Of southwestern
farmers was more diluted
because it
had to compete with
the great urban and
industrial
political interests of the
eastern states.

Supporters of Public Law
78 charged that the
reforms proposed by its
critics made unrealistic
assumptions about the bracero
program and its impact
on American workers.
It was simply not
correct that
the Mexican labor
program was undermining
domestic
workers. After all. the
law flatly and explicitly

t

6

,
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prohibited that.

P ub l io Law ?8
required

^^

Labor Secretary,
before certifying
braceros for far.
use. must have
determined that Americans
who were
qualified, and willing
to work were
unavailable
at the time and
place needed.
He must also have
concluded "that "there
wrmia be no
re would
adverse effect on
domestic farm laborers
orers and that
that the grower had
made
reasonable efforts to
hire Americans
at "wages and

standard hours of work
comparable to those offered
to
foreign workers."
Therefore, "to the extent
that

domestic workers are or
may be available, these
provisions assure they will
receive priority.

According to supporters
of Public Law ?8,
there was no question
that this provision of
the law
had been enforced.
In fact, it was claimed
that,
6

6

^

™ent

De
has
benf over 'bac Awards
kwards^to
to administer this
Jroviqinn
*5® extent that they
are often r
required^fT
®Pluired to employ

jus

•

domestic workers
aS b ® en rec^ uired
employ*
!?
people wh0
who are just
a disturbance, who didn’t
o any work, who were
ineff ic ient. 55
It was charged that a
second unrealistic

assumption of the reformers was
the claim that unemployment in the United States
demonstrated that
Mexican farm labor was not
needed. When workers
5h

Ibid,

p.

1

.

55 Ibid.

,

213

""

needed

W6re

'

ar trme and place.

needed at a particu-

General unemployment
might be
highest during the
.inter months while
the greatest
demand for farm workers
.as in the summer
and fall.
Those without work
.ere often in the East
.hile crops
needed planting and
harvesting in the South.est.

Transportation over such
distances .as impractical,
because most farmers
needed seasonal .orkers
for
only a fe. .eeks at a
56
time .Many of the unemployed
were industrial .orkers
with no experience in
agriculture.
Sometimes they had no desire
to move inasmuch
as they o»ned their
homes, had children in

school,
or were otherwise
committed to the local area.
Supporters of Public La. 78
vehemently denied
the accusation that
growers had failed to make a

conscientious effort to recruit
Americans for availfarm jobs.
They claimed that farmers
much
preferred able domestic workers
to braceros because
of the substantial expense
involved in providing the
numerous benefits guaranteed
by law to the
Mexicans.

Positions had been announced
through news releases,
radio spot announcements, and
handbills.
Information
stations had been established
and farm placement
56

Ibid,

p.

10.
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^^

b6en l0Cated

-

facilities to reach

a maximum number
of potential employees.

Transportation had often been
furnished to and from
the Sob. 5?
It was pointed
out that many
unemployed Americans
had
refused the Jobs. Of
those who went to
work, few remained beyond several
days and almost none
lasted the
Since few Americans
wanted these
jobs, the

growers had no alternative
to relying on
Mexican labor.
The preceding case
for the bracero
program was
mostly a defensive one.
Although Public Law 78
was on
trial, its supporters
also took the defensive.
They
claimed that they were
the ones who were for
humanitarian legislation while
the critics of the
bracero
program had made proposals
which would only intensify
human misery.

Critics of Public Law 78
had testified to the
terrible conditions under
which American migrants
lived and worked. Yet they
had repeatedly advocated
reducing the extent of the
bracero program and moving
American citizens into these
jobs. 58 Growers did not
believe that the government
should encourage Americans to move into seasonal
work, because it was hard,
it often d isrupted
families, and it made it almost
57

Ibid.

,

pp. 33-35.

58

Ibid.

,

p.

8.
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impossible for children +
" t0
rt

° btaln a
.

education,

he use of Mexican
labor reduced the
number of
Americans exposed to
these hardships. 59

Another reform quality
claimed for the bracero
Program was that it had
significantly reduced the
wetback problem.
If there were

^

no program>

still have to harvest
their crops and the
problem of
illegal entry would
return. Since
poverty-stricken
Mexicans were going to
enter in any event,
it was
much better to have
them coming under the
bracero
program with all of the
protections which it
guaranteed.
Congress was reminded of
the terrible problem
of illegal
immigration before the Mexican
labor program was
0
established.

Supporters of Public Law
78 claimed that it
possible the kind of good
relations with Mexico

which the United States
was seeking.
The bracero
program had led to increased
understanding between
the two countries.

There was great poverty
in Mexico,
and to end the program
would hurt her and her
citizens
61
"critically."
I n fact, Public Law
78 was serving
59 Ibid
°1

. .

Ibid .

.

p.

16 .

p.

14.

60

Ibid.

»
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18,

21,

83.
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the same .unction
as the proposed
Peace Corps.

-re

We

teaching Mexico -about
the United States
through
e eye witness
account of its own
citizens." 62
President Kennedy had
expressed the goal of
keeping Latin America
from going communist.
Continuation of the bracero
program was well suited
to that
New Frontier priority,
because it was helping
to
avoid "the economic
chaos which is the
feeding ground
for communism. ,,b 3

Summarized above are two
main clusters of
arguments presented in
defense of the bracero
program
at the 196! hearings
before the Gathings
subcommittee.
First. Public Law 78
was not standing in the
way of
New Frontier goals.
Secondly, it was in fact
a

liberal reform program which
could be most useful to
the Kennedy administration.
A third set of justifications represented a reply
to the reform effort
to
up the bracero coalition.
Supporters of Public
Law 78 denied that any
members of their coalition
were violating their
self-interests.
It was claimed that
termination of the Mexican

labor system would harm small
farmers more than large

62-

Ibid

.

t

P.

27.

63

Ibid.

pp. 4 2-45.
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ones.

If the Mexican labor
supply were cut off.
there
would be a labor shortage
which probably could be
met

only through mechanization.

The wealthy farmer
could

solve the problem
through purchasing expensive
machinery but the small farmer
could not. The latter
would
not have the money, and
even if he did it would
not
be economically sound
to mechanize a small
farm. 64
Evidence was presented to
contradict the claim of the
reformers that few small
farmers were participants
in
the bracero program. 6 ^
It was charged that
the termination of Public

Law 78 would harm even
farmers who grew only crops
in which no braceros were
used.
If Mexicans could
no longer work in the United
States, the demand for
the available supply of
domestic labor would be
much greater. 66 An employer
of Puerto Rican farm
labor in New Jersey testifiedi
th Mexican nationals should
be barred of entrv
if
% 6
“Wition
with CaUforn^'
Sew Mexfco
Puerto Rican agrtcuituraf iabSr
P

New Jersey°counties^ 7
64
66

IMd..

p.

Ibid*

P»

»

6.

26.

65

e in th6SS

Ibid

.

p.

.

^ Ibid.

,

^Tis^lfthat

4l.

pp.

26-27.

218

Supporters of the
bracero program
charged
that its termination
would seriously
serious! v harm
„
numerous
merican businesses.
This oonolusion
„as based on
e assumption
that growers would
lose a great deal
,

.

^

in

UnaMe

IIT
a
event,

"

° btai "

l-or.

the many businesses
furnishing them

With supplies would
also suffer
UIler

*

^

ThP Picture
+
The
presented

a vastly interdependent
eoonomy i„ which
farmPlay a vital role.
It was dangerous
to tamper
with their labor supply,
because

”

anything depressing
farm income would
have a deleterious
effect on millions
of other people,
leading to serious
economic problems
far beyond the farm
economy itself,

Advocates of the bracero
program claimed that
ft was helping to
prevent the very sort
of depressed
areas which so concerned
President Kennedy,
f r ederal aid t0
de '
p ro &
.r
ram is cut off or
P

materially chane-ad
at segments of our agricultural
»mi/r
but bankrupt overnight?^ ” 6 n0t iUSt de P re ssed,

Las

1

'

Supporters of Public Law
78 claimed that its
termination would harm almost
all American consumers.
Without a Mexican labor
supply, the labor shortage
68

IMd.,

p.
P.

23.

69

Ibid.. p. 21.
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;r

t

r

wages unreasonabiy

«*•

*—3

coot on to consumers.

With
ith so
s
many points of view
and with
Wlth +h
the "any pressure
„
rn
mo
groups pushing for
reform, it is not
surprising that
+
„ ennedy
administration drafted
its own liberal
bill (H.R, 6032),
T+ wao
WaS ln broduced by
Representative
Mp
Merwm Coad (D-Iowa)
t+o aim
> Its
was to prevent
braoeros
rom adversely
affecting domestic
farm workers.
The
bill would have
banned the Mexican
workers from yearlong and skilled
Jobs,
it provided that
in order to
qualify for braceros,
growers must have
previously
offered American workers
wages as high or
higher than
those paid Mexicans.
Finally, it specified
that domestic laborers must
be offered various
other perquisites
which braceros were
re guaranteed
_
finarantooH such
u
as free housing
70
and transportation.'
.

,

.

•

.

“

•

.

.

•

Several administration
spokesmen had called for
reform before the Gathings
subcommittee. After the
hearings had ended, they
continued to call on the
House
Agricultur e Committee to
reject the Gathings bill
and

70
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report out a reform
measure.

For example> Qn
16 Lab ° r SeCret3ry
GOldberg iSSUed ^
statement
mg that the Kennedy
administration was flatly
opposed to extension
of Public Law
7 8 without amendments to protect
American farm workers
from unfair
competition. 71
’

ZT

The Kennedy
administration had no
realistic

hope of getting a
reform bill reported
by the House
Agriculture Committee,
of thirty-three
members, only
two came from the
northeastern states. The
committee
membership came predominantly
from the southern
and
western states. Bracero
supporters had always
dominated the committee.

Despite the discouraging
composition of the
House Agriculture
Committee
ixxee, the
+h* Pressures
r™
directed
at it by the Kennedy
administration were not
without
purpose.
They helped to publicise
further the position
of the executive branch.
Also, they helped

to set the
stage for the more
favorable showdown before
the full
House in which grower
strength was more diluted.
They
encouraged reform groups to
push their case harder
now
that they were clearly
allied with the executive
branch.
71

—” York

Times. April 26,
1961, p

.

b6.

.
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0n

196!. the Agrio ul t U
r e Committee

y a vote Of 25-3
approved the Gathings
bill and ex .
tension of the Mexican
labor program without
reform. 7 *
e only raem bers
opposing the Gathings
measure were
Representatives Goad.
Lester R. Johnson
(D _ wisc )(
and Daniel K. Inouye
(D-Hawaii ) 73
.

The accompanying
report of the Agriculture
Committee did little
more than summarise
some of the

mam

arguments presented
in the testimony
of grower
spokesmen before the
Gathings subcommittee.
For
instance, it concluded
that Mexicans were
needed because not enough
Americans were willing
to do stoop
labor and that ending
the program would
be disastrous
for small farmers.
Keeping it would provide
muchneeded jobs for poor
p
Mexicans
uexicans
The program played
an
important role in supplying
crucial dollars to Mexico's
economy.
It helped to reduce
the wetback problem.
The
committee report flatly
rejected all of the administration's reform proposals.
To require employers
of
braceros to pay a certain
wage to Americans would
be
"a backdoor approach
to regulating the
employment of
domestic workers." There
was no need to guarantee
.

72

cgWR, XIX (April 28,
1961), 714.
73 CgWR,
XIX (April 21, 1961),
677.
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»*
aoeros.

„ jw

^

Amerxcan workers
alrea(Jy

W3S

SUPeri ° r ” t0

^

bI

th. Mexicans,
b
because
"domestic workers are
free to 1*
6mPl ° y ment they don’t
like anda seek
employment elsewhere 7I*
The administration
attack was
as Promptly
nr „ m+ , renewed.
nv>
Pri 23> GOldberg
blasted ^e committee
action.
.

.

.

a

h a<1
tjafth^ pow: r and t
aut^Itfof ?h !! inistration
r d de P ress ed
nomic conditions of
ecoUnited |? a I
tas Tarm workers,
Evidence accumulated hv +h
proves beyond doubt tha+^w Department of Labor
of Mexican labor has ban the ”? ss importation
3
havin g’ an adverse effect on the
W
i?1
W
°
r
and employment opDortnft + 1! a
g condi tions
)
S °'e
f United
farm workers? At a lZ »
States

a^

a major problem
in
be no justification the

:

l

?

e,lt is
Unul? s25i°?f
there Can
for cnn+tnf
SU h a

^

program unless action is
?
taken
a en
protect
interests of United
the
^
united States farm
workers 75
The administration
carried its fight for
liberalization of the bracero
program to the floor
of
the House.
Some of the most
important reforms contained in the unreported
Goad bill were offered
as amendments to the Bathings
bill.
They were all defeated.
.

some in vo ice votes,
others by standing votes. 6
74

CSWR. XIX (April 28,
1961), 71 *.
5
York Times , April Zb,

~

76

-

CgWR, XIX (May 12
,
1961

1961, p . Z b.
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794.
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Only one or two
Republicans supported
the liberal
amendments while the
main opposition came
from a
oalition of Republicans
and conservative
Democrats,
especially southerners. 77
House debate on the
Gathings bill and
extension
of the bracero
program was lively.
Supporters of the
Program claimed that
this effective
eiiective foreign aid
bill
was helping to keep
Mexico out of the
communist bloc. 78
The Mexican labor
system was essential
because Americans simply could
not be found for the
hardest kinds
of farm work. 77
Because farmers had to
have labor
termination of the bracero
program would bring a return of the wetback
problem at its worst. 80
Reforms
were not needed,
because Public Law
7 8 gave Secretary
Goldberg all the authority
he needed to protect
domestic workers from
adverse effect.®*
•

In House debate,

the following
representatives

supported continuation of
1
the
a p 0 ro
nn program
xne hr
brace
without
77

New York Times, May
ll, 1961, p

7 Sr,

.

36

q,

a?th c °^->
79 I
8l

bid

8°
.

Ibid

.

Ibid., p. 7710.

.

p.

7709.

)
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substantial reform.

S

A
S *ith (R-Calif.)
C
Charles
Teague (R-Calif
ld
ley (D - N -C.)
Har?
S°°
Harlan
Hagen (D-Calif.)
eS
ubser (R-Calif.)
?
Wi?^
William Avery
(R-Kan.
Hoeven (R-Iowa)*
Edwin Durno (R-Ore.)
c. Ga things
(D-ArV
Clem Miller
(D-Calif!)
R. Poage
VJ.
(D-Tex.)
James Utt (R-Calif. )82

1

2

3

k
6
7
8
9

10

)

)

11

12

r°m

None of these
anti-reform congressmen
came
indUStr -l -st.
With one exception,
all

^

Cam e

the

-ftM

using areas.

and most from
hracero-

Reform congressmen
participating in House
debate included the
following.
1

2
3

Thomas Lane (D-Mas=?
Marguerite Church
(R-m.
Jeffery Cohelan
(D-Calif #)
W1
ad (D -^wa)
a?£ h S°
Alfred
Santangelo (D-N.Y.)
1
Ba ley (D ’ W Va.)
Edfth Green f(D-Ore.)
Edith
Charles Joelson (D-N.Y.)
John McCormack (D-Mass.)
James O’Hara (D-Mich.)
James Roosevelt
(D-Calif.)
William Ryan (D-N.Y.)
)

)

6
7
8
9

10
11

12

^

-

In contrast to
the vocal1 anti
antl -reform congressmen,

these reformers came
more fv™
from +u
the eastern United
States
82
I

For the debate, see
Ibid., pp . 770 6-28.
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and were more likelvy t0 vbe Democrats.
Fo r the first
time, the outspoken
refnrm
D
re formers
included the Speaker
u
of the House
(McCormack).
i-.

The main obiectinn +«
" t0 the vbracer
° Program was
,
it ,
verse effect on
American workers.
workers
it was noted
+ ..
.
.... h.r.
,

X

My Mexican- Americans

ignoring «»,

n

- M~U

-g„„ lMy

the Gath mgs
subcommittee

^

pirUio

oritici.eo , or

^
•

r„„,
Congressmen were reminded

that -through the
device of extension,
an emergency
program is being
stretched out into a
permanent
Policy.- Supporters
of the Gathings
bill were accused
Of insulting Mexicans
byy "claiming
aiming +ho+
that +v
they are willing to perform labor
.,
that
xnat lg below the
dignity Qf
American men and women." 83

During House debate,
no traditional
opponent
of the bracero
program observed that he
was in the
process of reconsidering
his position.
However, there
cases of traditional
supporters of Public Law
78
noting that they were
thinking of switching
sides.
it was obv ious from
their explanations that
points
83

Ibid.

pp. 7707-09.
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raised by
a
J the rpfnv-m
reiormers
were threaten
nreaxenmg to undermine
+ho
racero coalition.
Representative B. F
sisk
if.) ha,
consistently supports,
Public Law ?8 .
,

.

6

W ° Uld

-ver

,„ so ag ain.

„ e was

particularly troubled
by evidence
aence indicating
indie +•
that
6
racer o program was
a
undermining
"dermining American
farm
8i*
workers.

Representative Marguerite
Church (R-Ili.),
another traditional
supporter
pporter of ti,,
the bracero
program,
at she had supported
it only because
she had
>een told that Mexican
labor was needed.
She implied
that she was beginning
to doubt that
foreign workers
were needed. She caIIoh
or steps to protect
domestic
migrants from bracero
85
competition
.

On May 11, the
Gathings bill was put
to a rollcall vote in the House.
It passed easily
with a vote
° f 231 ' 157>

Ocntinuing the pattern
of the 1950’s, the
program once again received
disproportionate support
from the Republicans.
The Democrats split
evenly.
WitH 115 V ° ting for the
and the same number
voting
agalnSt
0nl y 42 Republicans
voted against it

U

-

84.

'iMd.,

P-

7707.

85

Ibid.. p

.

77 o8.

22 7

while 116 supported
86
it.
Thus the Kennedy
administration's reform
pro
posals fared badly
e u
y i n th
the
H0Use
M °*t supportive
of
non-reformed hracero
program were members
of the
conservative Gathings
subcommittee and the
House Agriure Committee.
Although the
administration did
better on the vote
in the full
h
fUl1 House
Gathings
M1
bill, was passed by
a wide margin.
-

-

>

Reform forces were
tn galn some
able t0
ground in
the Senate.
This WaS
wa<? not
“"expected. Scholars
of
Congress have noteri
noted +vic+that v
because senators
represent
entire states, they
must be relatively
relativelv more
responsive
to urban interests
mi--.
~
rests.
The composition
of many House
districts is more
exclusively rural.
•

,

Senator Eugene McCarthy
(D-Minn.) introduced
the administration
bill (S 1945) in the

Senate.
It
was cosponsored by
Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.).
Stephen Young (D-Ohio).
and Paul Douglas
(D-Ill.).8?
The McCarthy bill was
essentially the same as
the Goad measure which
had died in the House.
The
McCarthy p roposal required
denial of braceros to
®6

CQWR, XIX (May 12,
1961), 79 h f 832-33.
££WR» XIX (June 16,
1961), 988.

,
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farmers who had not
offered American
j mc
workers comparable
oonrtif
tions
It limited the
Mexicans to temPorary employment.
It banned them
from operating
power-driven machinery,
it also required
y
that no
employer could receive
braceros unless he
..offers and
Pays to such workers
wages equivalent to
the average
the State
employment
“ located, or
the national farm
wage average, whichever is "the lesser.
•

,

"

r: "r

*

-

McCarthy spent
considerable energy in
explaining
the motivation for
his bill to the
“

Senate.
It was
meant to implement
the Kennedy
administration's desire
to protect American
workers from braceros.
Although
Law ?8 had always
granted power to the
secretary
of labor to prevent
"adverse effect." it
had failed
to spell out clear
guidelines for achieving
that goal.
the Labor Department
had implemented
guidelines

to protect American
farm workers from their
Mexican
competitors, it had sometimes
been

faced with lawsuits
based on the assumption
that it was exceeding
its
aUth0rity
McCar thy said the purpose
of his bill „ a s
'

88

i=!+
1st

U
Congress ional Record
Sess., *?Ai
1961— W II, Part

f

7T5599.

87th Cong.
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to provide "the
Department of Labor
ctuor with more
m
and

clearer standards
designed
lgned t0 Prevent
the program
*v ‘”‘ *dv
•"”* ”p°" «•

”

*~

"a

workers.

„f

,,oy

The bill reported
by the Senate
Agr culture
.

and Forestry Committee
contained some reforms.
It
required employers to
furnish the same
conditions of
work for Americans
as for braceros.
Mexicans were to
be employed only
in seasonal work.
They were not to
be allowed to
maintain or operate
machinery. Empi oyers
were required to
both offer and actually
pay the
prevailing wage in the
area to bnth
a
both American
workers
and braceros.
The Senate Agriculture
and Forestry Committee
refused to accept all
of the

administration-proposed

reforms,

it rejected the
proposal that Americans be
offered the same guarantees

of housing, subsistence

insurance, transportation,
and work guarantees as
braceros. Because the
farmer could be relatively
sure
the Mexicans would
complete the season, he
could afford
to offer them extra
benefits.
On the other hand,
the

American w orker was free to
leave at any time and
89

Ijbid., pp.

8596-97.

*

th

farmer

'

S

initUl inV

~—
•

t I.
tation,

could be lost.
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as for transpor-

Supplemental views,
reiected
ejected hv
by the committee,
were offered by
McCarthy,
n
m
Y Maurinp
Maurine B.
Neuberger
(D-0re.)
Pr ° Xmire (D - WiS
°^> ^ilip A. „ art (D . Mich-)
an, Stephen M. Young
»

^

*

(D-Ohio).

They said the

braced

f

program should not be
renewed unless the
l a „ were revised
require farmers to
provide identical
benefits, including housing and
transportation, to domestic
workers
They proposed a
guarantee of more generous
wages to
Americans than the
committee was willing
to accept. 90
In their supplemental
views, the five
committee
members added:

^

Public Law 78 was enacted
a +<
time of
labor shortage during -t-ho vin 19 <>i »+ a

f

*™

-b.r-

In a letter dated August
8. 1961, Secretary

Goldberg told Senator McCarthy
that the "prevailing
wage" requ irement reported
by the Senate Agriculture
90

GQWPf XIX (August 4

,

1961), 1358.
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Committee had "no
practical value " 0
Goldberg noted
that that provision
had always been
part Qf
agreement with Mexico.
Because the
"prevailing
«age" tended to
be set unilaterally
*
by farmers, it
„
was important
to tie wages
waaes *to *„
the state or
national
average.
Goldberg told
Earthy that his wage
proth
keystone
•

.

: :r:9 ;

-

-

.

s

;

add6d that M0Carth ^’
s wage formula
sho
Id be added
ould
as an amendment
on the floor of
the Senate. ^

r

The bill reported
by the Senate
Agriculture
ommittee was the
Gathings measure
2010 ) with

amendments.

McCarthy followed
Coldberg-s advice and
added a wage proposal
as an amendment,
ft specified
at farmers were to
pay no less than
90 * of the
national or state average
farm wage, whichever
was
lower, before they
would be eligible
to contract
braceros.
It was accepted in
a roll call vote
by
^2-bO. Critics of the
amendment charged that
it was
a devious means of
setting minimum wages
for domestic
workers and would
ouia ffreativ
greatly decrease the
value of the
bracero program to
^
farmers. 9
•

9

9

^IMd.,

p.

18786

.

93

•

Ibid., p. 18787

.

C£WR, XIX (September
15, 1961), 1574.
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In Senate debate,

the

lowing

-Foil

meters opposed
significant
ant ref
reforms xn the
bracero program and
supported the Gathings
billt

1

2
3

4
5
6

Allen Ellender
(D-La
yer-ett Jordan
(D-N.C.)
John T ° wer R-Tex
llliam Fulbright
(D-Ark
ard H ° llarid
(°-Fla.
Clint
A
linton Anderson
(D-N.M.
)

(

.

)

Reformers speaking
out in Senate
debate were
"ore numerous and
included the following,
Eugene McCarthy
(D-Minn.)
2
n Long (D-Hawaii)
3
Claxr Engle (D-C
a lif.)
4

5
6
7
8
9

10
11

12
13

S

lUi

f

s (D-N.J.)
°!? ?
C?f?f ° rd
Gas e (R-N.J.)
Philip Hart (D-Mich.)
aurine Neuberger
(D-Ore.)
William Proxmire
(D-Wisc
e h K ati
"s (R-N.y.)
?
Pau? Douglas
n
Paul
(D-IH.)
Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.
Wayne Morse (D-Ore.)
John Carroll (D-Colo.) 9 ^
)

The bill (h.r.
2010) as amended passed
the
Senate on September
11 . 1961 . by a roll
call vote of
76-9.
The heavy vote for
the bill should not
be interpreted to mean that the
traditional bracero program
had
grown imme nsely popular.
The important fact
is that

1st Seasf^mi—
Part 16. 20755 - 75 ?

’

’

8 7th Cong..
18769 ’ 91 and

)

)

)
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the bill was verv
much a «compromise
y munh
measure with

something for everybodv

growers, there was
continuation of the
program
P ogram even though
unemployment
rates were high.
For critics of it.
there were reforms designed to
protect domestic workers.
The
bUl was passed by a large
ooaution Qf nberais
conservatives. The nine
opponents were also a
mixture
of both.
Liberals such as Albert
Gore (D-Tenn.
and Kenneth Keating
(R-n y
joined such conservatives
as Richard Russell
(D-Ga
and Herman Talmadge
(D-Ga.
in opposing H.R.
2010.
)

•

)

Party support in the
Senate took a different
pattern from that in the
House.
It will be recalled
that in the latter,
disproportionate support came
from
Republican members. In the
Senate, the bulk of the
opposition to H.R. 2010 as
amended came from Republicans.
Three^Democrats and six
Republicans voted against
the
bill.
Perhaps one reason this
pattern deviates from
heavier Republican support
observed earlier is that
the issues were now
less clear inasmuch
as the bill

»as such a mixed bundle
of liberal and conservative
compromises.
96,

'CfiWR.

XIX (September 15, 1961

),

1574, 1603.
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On September
15, i 96l
committee members
met to
th, «»».«

«d

Sen,,, v . r, l0

.

House-Senate cont ere
nce

>"

„ „

differences i„

The com ~
eliminate the
important McCarthy
amendment. Of the
seven Senate
enate conferees,
conf
only
George Aiken (R-vt
SUPP ° rted Mention
of the amendment
The
ThS
° PP0Sip
g
retention were all
southerners and/or
Republicans.

mittee voted

tn

•

)

•

^

C ° nferenCe

°° mmittee finished
with the
was more conservative
than it had come
from
the Senate.
On September
21, 196,
o
aCCepted
the conference ren
SPOrt h
by a rol l «11
vote of 4l- 31 . 98
On this more
conservative version
of „.R. 2010
.
Hepublian support was up
and Democratic
support down.
Of the
enate Democrats,
25 voted for the
bill while 24
opposed it. Republicans
split l6- 7 with the
majority
supporting H.R. 2010."

bill1.

.

a party vote
breakdown for the House
vote on
the conference renort
ic not
P ° rt 13
Possible, because the
-

97

Qq

CJM. XIX (September

22,

1961), 1619.
OgWR, XIX (September
29. 1961), 1661.

"ibid., p

.

1685.

235

mber 16 determination
was by voice
vote 100

P

«•”*<»
into law on October
4
+_

blll
iqfii
1961

„
,
00ra P laming
.

’

.

,
include
guarantees "which
ftlCh

that it failed

hoi
be lieve necessary
to
domestic farm workers ” 101
u °wever.
H
he did
make some concessions
for m lnteres
to
+
t0 farm
ts.
He Claimed
.
th
that
braceros would be
needed in some
•

1
1

„
„
protect

•

.

e

areas during

coming year.

But Kennedy pointedly
charged that
exican labor program
was "adversely
affecting
the wages, working
conditions and employment
opportunities for our own
agricultural workers." 102
Upon
signing the bill, the
President sald
said th.*
that even though
was not what he
wanted, putting an
abrupt end to
the program would
seriously harm the
Mexican economy.
Kennedy promised that
Labor Secretary Goldberg
would take full advantage
of his authority
under
Public Law 78 to set
standards for the use
of braceros.
and that he would simply
refuse to certify them
for use
where their employment
would have an adverse
effect on
the workin g conditions
and wages of domestic
workers. 10 3

XIX (September 22,
196l), 1619
**

101 -

cited as

.

r

C^^xvf

102

—

W York

)

Til" e £ >

;

.^

rly A1llwn *H (hereafter

October 5

,

1961, p. 24.

Bracero in^aliLrnia^Pacif a S W Gilmore • '"The
?e Histnrif.a
|r +
i
XXXII (August, iXjt?
r
-,9?
'

•

1
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Of course, this

wa<?

+u
the

solution preferred by
resident Kennedy,
becausee it
1X iert
left the tLabor
v,
Departmen t s actions onen +«
Pen to delaying
courtroom challenges.
the en ,

Perhaps the greatest
gain of the reform
forces during
the year was the
election of Kennedy
and the defeat of
ixon.
Kennedy’s record in
Congress, his reformoriented campaign, and
his political
indebtedness to
orces critical of the
bracero program all
foretold
his attack on Public
Law 78.

Having a friendly
person in the White House
for the first time
brought numerous benefits
to
reform elements.
It stimulated
unprecedented publicity
for the case against
foreign labor and conveyed
its
rationale to the general
public and to Congress
more
clearly than ever before.
The executive branch
has
vast resources for research
purposes, and several careful studies of farm
labor were conducted.
These
findings, mostly favorable
to the reform cause,
were
released to the press, passed
along to friendly

congressmen, and used by
administrative spokesmen at
legislative hearings.
The administration worked
closely with reform
members of Congress.
It drafted legislation such
as

237
the Coad bill.

When reform oongressmen
the administration
obliged.

^

The new administration
mounted an impressive
campaign for reform
of Public Law 78 .
it attacked
early and vigorously
with a unified offensive
mounted simultaneously
by the President
and several
top-level officials of
his government.
Over and over
each emphasized that
he was speaking for
the entire
'nistration.
There was no opportunity
for the
traditional bracero forces
to ally with any
cabinet
official as the reform
forces had done during
the late
1950 -s.
The united offensive
of the Kennedy administration enhanced its power.
The executive branch
gained additional advantage
by integrating its
assault on Public Law 78
with its
broad attack on poverty.
This gained more

attention
for criticism of the
bracero program. As the
government linked the Mexican
labor system more closely to
domestic poverty, new converts
were gained for the
reform cause.

By the end of 1961, Kennedy
had made clear that
some reforms would be undertaken
administratively even
though Congress had failed to
grant specific authorization for them.
This was a bold but risky venture.
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“

WU1

bS rSCalled
that

Roosevelt sisnarly
milar i y
Sought such reforms + h *.
v
thr ° Ugh Use ° f
Farm Security
Administration nni
v to uhave
only
them rapidly
dismantled
y ongress.
As we shall
tv
hall see, Kennedy
was luckier
and his boldness
paid off.
.

.

President Kennedy's
willi gness to operate
from
a compromise
position probably
helped the cause of
reform.
In retrospect,
there seems to have
been very
little chance in 1961 +ho+ n
that Congress would
either abruptly
y
terminate Public Law 7 o
78 or extend it with
no reforms
at all.
By adamantly
opposing all reforms,
grower
interests weakened their
own position.
.

This rigid position forced even
some supporters of
the Mexican labor
system to criticize
it and align
themselves partly with
the Kennedy
administration. By talcing
a moderate position, President
Kennedy appeared more
responsible
than the adamant status
quo forces.
It enabled him
to draw support from
both friends and foes
of the

bracero program.
Kennedy's power to reform
or terminate the
bracero program was limited
by a number of factors.
He had won by a very
narrow margin. Most
congressional
opposition to Public Law
78 had come from Democrats,
and in neither House
nor Senate races had they
done

.
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particularly well in
196o
xlth
6 member
Kennedy had voted ,
°r *
terminati °n of the
Mexican labor
_
ystem. as President
he found several
evera ^ factors
fact
which led
Stop Short Of his
old position.
One was the
ization that conversion
to domestic labor
would
Another was his concern
that relations
with Mexico should
not be endangered by
a too abrupt
termination of Public
Law 78
.

-

.

.

By 1961, interest
groups pushing for
reform of
the bracero system
were more formidable
than ever
^ey were a far cry f ro m the
little group appearing
at the Downey hearings
i„
.
By 196l> the
coalition had won many
new interest groups
to its cause,
including some very
_
ry wen
well financed
fin a n« c j and
politically adept
ones.
These groups were
vocal
ct-L ana
and exuded a new confihence borne of careful
preparation and a sense of
being
allied for the first time
with the powerful executive
branch of government.
Membership in these groups
came
from all major parts of
the country.
This maximised
their chance of getting
a favorable hearing from
Congress
The tactics of the
reform interest groups were
impressive.
The bracero program was
attacked from
many angles.
This approach maximized
the likelihood
that its vulnerabilities
would be found and exploited.

^

m2

,
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Keform forces wisely
tried tQ break
the
tl0n
aPPeaUn ® *>
self- inte r e s t of
Its member groups.

^

^

Although status quo
forces were formidable
opponents, they made
a number 01
of tac
tactical
tical
errors.

lie concern grew
about povertv
poverty and 0emphasis
u
was
placed on society’s
obliffatirm
+
ligation to

P

As

•

provide economic
opportunities, it was a
mistake to charge farm
workers
laZin6SS
d ™nness.
At the time when
PresiKennedy, the media,
and congressional
hearings
were publicizing
rural poverty, claims
that migrants
were enjoying great
progress were not very
convincing.
The claims looked
particularly spurious when
bracerousers justified the
program as a way of saving
Americans from the miseries
of farm labor.
The claim that the
use of Mexican labor
in the
United States was a
liberal
rai reform program
probably
convinced few. Also, by
1961, abuses of the bracero
program were receiving
more publicity, and
this probably helped the reform
cause.
The threat that without
a generous supply 0 f
Mexican labor, southwestern
farmers
would simply use wetbacks
struck some congressmen
as
an effort at intimidation.

^

A number of social
and economic trends were

.

24l

weakening the old
status qUQ
ex ic an labor user
had always
when unemployment
was high.

Pressing

^

^

^

been most
Parm mechanixation
was

and undermining
the rationale
for Mexican
abor.
The American
population was showing
growing more urban.
h
and even with
legislative malapportionment,
farm
strength was slowly
being eroded. Also,
the civil
nights era was beginning,
and it would bring
political
s rength to
groups such as Negroes
and Mexican-Amer
leans
ough in 1961, status
quo forces held reforms
of
Public Law 78 to a
minimum, these eroding
trends
would be intensified
during the coming years.

Although the reforms
achieved in 1961 did
not
satisfy Kennedy and
Goldberg, they were

the only sig-

nificant changes in Public
Law 78 during its
decade
Of existence.
Notwithstanding the fact that
the year brought
some changes long sought
by liberals, bracero-users
and their congressional
allies enjoyed a number
of
crucial advantages. From
about the World War I era
on, it was widely
assumed that western growers
had a
"right" to Mexican labor.
Except during extraordinary
times, the rest of the
country maintained a hands-off
attitude. The government
itself had established
a
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formai system to
supply Mexican labor
during each war.
b6tWeen WarS
h3d
little
effort to keep wetbacks
out.
'

IT

”

-

In Congress, the
users of Mexican
labor had
enjoyed support from
the powerful
alliance of R epU bli.

cans and southern
Democrats. Although
some members
ol Congress thought
bracero legislation
should go
through the more
liberal labor committees,
the conservative agriculture
committees had been
granted
jurisdiction from 1942
on.

For these reasons,
at the end of 1961,
the
future of the Mexican
labor system remained
uncertain.
Whale the reformers
could show some gains,
their opponents continued to enjoy
some powerful advantages.
Events of 1962
The agreement with
Mexico was due to expire
on February 1. 1962.
The Kennedy administration

negotiated its renewal without
fanfare.
announced on January I0. 10if

Agreement was

During 1962, the administration
continued to
push for legislation to
improve the conditions of
104

Ne w York Times

,

January 11, 1962, p. 18.

2^3

domestic farm workers.

r

In January,

COmmittee

the President's

~

° alled
legislation
ovtdtng
P
collective bargaining
rights. minimum
wages>
and unemployment
insurance benefits
neilts tor
for farm
f
workers,
resident Kennedy
endorsed its resolutions.
Committee members
noted that the main
hopes
of the administration
were pinned on House
treatment
of several bills
providing benefits to
migrants.
The Senate had
already passed all of
the measures
during 1961.
It appeared that
the bills providing
grants-in-aid to the states
for health care and
education of migrant
families were more
realistic
possibilities than such
reforms as minimum wage
legislation which were sure
to run into strong
opposition
from farm state
10
?
representatives.
.

During 1962, the Labor
Department made good
on President Kennedy's
promise to achieve some reforms administratively.
Perhaps most
importantly.

Secretary Goldberg found
a way to establish minimum
wages for American farm
workers being used on the
same
farms as braceros. According
to his interpretation,

new legislation was not
essential to accomplish this
purpose, b ut it could be
done quite legitimately

%ew

York Times , January 18,
1962, p. 19.

2kk

through Public Law
78 which
hl0h h*a
had serv ®1 as
.
the legal
„
0
the bracero
program since
.

i 951 .
It will be
recalled that Public
Law 78 Pr ° Vlded
that braceros were
t0
to receive
rec
^e
•

.

.

.

P31d

^

"prevailing wage"

farraers

similar types of „
or k in
area.
The problem was
that well before
the
season had arrived fa v«m
6d> farffiers would
-et and arbitrarily
set a „ prevailing
wage
n„
3ge » Domestics
were offered that
e. a most always
low.
When they refused
to work
at that level,
growers requested
braceros.
Because
Americans had failed
to work for the
wages offered, a
or Sh ° rtaee ""
d6Clared a " d they got
their workers
"cm MeXi °°Under
circumstances, wages could
almost never work
their way up very
much because the
back-up supply of
Mexican labor was always
available
at the low rates.
As Secretary Goldberg
saw it. such
prevailing wages" were
meaningless.
His solution
was to change the
means by which they
were determined.
The Labor Department
proceeded to conduct
hearings in
areas using braceros.
Then a minimum wage was
determined
which took into account
not only grower testimony
but
that of farm workers
as
-

*•"

well.

Farmers offering American
workers less than
this newly established
minimum wage were not to
be

>

2^5

certified to receive v»v»
braceros. The rates
set by
Secretary Goldberg
differed <v„
s amered
from state to
state.
varying from a low
of sixty cents an h
t0 3 high
of one dollar.
Union officials
and other reform
interests
Wel °° med GOldberg
S
** claimed that he had
set the wages too
low.
Bracero users
predictably
charged that he had
simply taken illegal
action to
establish the minimum
wa^es for
wages
for* farm
-r
workers which
Congress had always
flatly rejected . 106
’

Despite their gains
in 1961 and the
first half
of 1962, critics
of the bracero
program suffered some
disappointments. only
Onlv aa single bill
providing for
improvement in the lot
of American farm
workers was
passed by Congress.
It was a bill which
furnished
federal grants for
improving health services
for migrant
workers and their
families.
Three others were held
up
by the conservative
House Rules Committee
after having
been reported favorably
by the House Education
and Labor
Committee and having passed
the Senate.
As is
its

prerogative, the Rules
Committee simply failed
to
provide ru les for the bills
which effectively killed
106 m

XXI (fanuary
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^
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them.

° Urine 1962

er ° Wer interests «aged
a vigorous
f Sht against
reforms then being
carried out and
others which they
feared were imminent.
Moves were
"ad6
COngreSS t0 deprive
S.ere tary Goldberg
of the
roader authority he
had assumed.
He was charged
with creating a
czar-like Department of
Agriculture. 108
The year 1962 marks
the beginning of
a pronounced trend for
grower interests to
recognize that
power was shifting away
from them and the need
.

’

..

“

to

consider alternatives
axives +n
to the increasingly
undesirable
bracero program.
4

The first option was
to seek to continue
using
Mexican labor but to
bypass the bracero program.
One
possibility was to encourage
Mexicans to enter the

United States under
regular immigration status
and
eventually apply for citizenship.
I
n 1962.

~

the
Y ° rk TimeS SUggested
that such a pattern was
emerging.
It noted that while
the Kennedy administration

had been reducing the
number of braceros admitted,
immigration from Mexico had
been increasing. 109

COWR
kWU

10 ?
rk TimeFi May 28,
y v rfri u°
p. 28XX
(October 19, 1962), 1944. 1962, P
108
N ew York Times
July 15, 1962, Part Iv
,
p
1 09
jjew York Times, August
12, 1962, p. 33.
>

’

,

8

2k7
The second
alternative was to turn
.ore and

more to mechanization.

Although this was more
dim
° Ult
° r0PS SUOh
as berries and
fruits, great
Progress had already
been made in large
farm operations such as cotton,
and 1962 brought
marked gains
1,1
dl
laC6ment ° f
l-»>or with harvesting
0
machines.

^

^

Developments of 1963
The administration
continued its assault
on

the Mexican labor
system during 19 6
3

m

January, it
was learned that the
Department of Labor had
been engaged in an investigation
of alleged law violations
by bracero-users.
The investigation was
set off by
the allegations of
a former clerk for
a major lettuce
farm that she had been
instructed to alter payroll
records for Mexican
nationals to indicate that
they
had worked many more
hours than they actually
.

had.

reason, she suspected,
was the company's desire
to
remove any evidence which
could be used to prove
its
discrimination against American
workers.

^

E®

alle g at ions were in turn
used as fuel by

110 -,.
Ibid.
,
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critics of the bracero
program. A California
organization named the
Emergency Committee
to Aia Fa rm
Workers demanded
that the Mexican
Labor Program be
permitted to end upon
its expiration
date at the end
the year.
Committee spokesmen
charged that the
law contained
inherent inducements
tor iUegal actions
indicated by the alleged
payroll alteration
111
event.

In the meantime,

it was disclosed
that the

Labor Department had
investigated several
other growers as well on the
suspicion of similar
legal
violations ^ 2
.

Such developments were
bad publicity for
farm interests and
came at an especially
inopportune
txme inasmuch as the
program was due to expire
at the
end of 1963.
Also dampening the
hopes of those seeking
extension was the fact
that during 1962. the
United
States had brought in
the smallest number
of braceros
twelve years.
The higher wages
required by the
Department of Labor were
bringing more Americans
into
farm work and lessening
the likelihood that
growers
would qualify for Mexican
1
help,

m

^

t
January
y 20

New
.
»

i

Y ork

q6 t

Times January
—
rs~
January

V,
p.

.

N ew York Times

113

T

18;

,

y ~ 211

25,

'

1061 P* 13;
10
1963, p. 13.

January 30, 1963, p. 18.

New York Times. March
26, 1963, p. 17.

2^9

During 1963.
Representative Gathings
once
asain led t h e anti-reform
forces in
th e House.

introduced a

bin

He

(H.R. 2009 ) which
would have , x .
tended Public Law
78 and repealed
several of the
liberal reforms passed
in 1961.

Despite its criticism
of the bracero
program,
e Kennedy
administration was unwilling
to let it
die at the end of
1963.
On March 2 7 . the new
Labor
Secretary, w. Willard
Wirt,, testified in
hearings before the Gathings
subcommittee.
He observed
that

mechanization had reduced
the need for Mexican
labor.
Also, the administration
was concerned about
growing
domestic unemployment.
Yet he called for a
one-year
renewal of Public Law
78.
This was a

compromise, he
indicated, which would
enable the administration
and
Congress "to re-examine
the need for continuation
of
the program in the light
of further and now unpredictable developments in the
labor market situation."

Secretary Wirtz blasted the
Gathings bill as
a "serious step backward.”
He called

for new reforms

which would require farmers,
before requesting braceros,
to offer Americans not
only working hours, wages,
and
Physical conditions of work
identical to those guaranteed
Mexicans, but equivalent
transportation costs,
housing,
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and occupational
insurance. 114
The alignment
of interest groups
at the hearings
ro uced no real
surprises.
Farm

groups generally
supported the
anti-reform Gathings
bill.
Their
m °ny differed
little
^
ittl. fw„
from that offered
at the hearings
wo years earlier.
They claimed that
progress in

u

—°
" " X ““

” h

“

“‘° r -

•‘“'I-!,

lessened

„. a

"•"ei

stseP Jobs
not enough Americans
were willing to do
them.
Coming under especially
heavy fi re was the
Labor Departmerit’s practice of
setting minimum wages
for American
farm workers.
•

•

Various welfare, labor,
religious and other
interest groups attacked
the Mexican labor
program.
Some called for its
termination at the end of
1963
while others supported
the administration's
proposal
Of a one-year extension.
°n May 6, the House
Agriculture Committee rejected both the Gathings
bill and the administration's
proposed reforms. The bill
reported (H.R. 5497) by
a
vote of 19-3 called for
a simple two-year
extension
of Public Law 78 without
reform but also without
114

CQA, XIX (1963), 114-15.
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wiping out reforms
gained in 1961.
The maj0rit
* "Port Of
XlCan W ° rkerS

the committee
claimed

""

needed for seasonal
arm work because
experience
u
P rience hoH
had ’shown
that most
American labor is
unwilling to accept
seasonable agricultural employment.it noted that Public
Law 78
virtually eliminated
the wetbacks" and
that
-d been of benefit to
Pico’s economy
report rejected Wirtz's
call for a one-year
provisional extension of
the program because
it would
cause "unwarranted
hardship." Concerning
his proposal that farmers
furnish American workers
with
housing, transportation,
and occupational
insurance
the committee said
that this would
interfere with
matters properly left
to the states. 116
••

-

*7

^

Committee members opposing
H.R. 5497 were
Benjamin Rosenthal (D-N.
Y. )
Spark M. Matsunaga
(D-Hawaii). and Alec Olson
(D-Minn.).
They proposed
that Public Law 78 be
terminated and a similar
program be established for
furnishing domestic workers
growers. As they saw it, the
importation
,

of

115

Ibid., p. 115,

CQWR. XXI (May 10

,

1963), 72 h.
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Mexican laborers
created an adv erse
effect on the
wages and living
+
ng conditions
of Americans. 11 ?
House debate on
H.R. 5497
<407 was
spirited. Many
tra ,, +
0,
lr„«„ prom*

.

a

w

™
*>

to 0,

b,„„

cause it was3 nn+
^
nox a
c*-*

,y

„„

^

tr, altipnil
»*

•

pi
K vp-atuoir"
away —

program.
Also, it
assured that the
money „ 0U l d reach
the people who
needed it most.
Public Law ?8 was
essentiai
"'r iCa " e00r 0my
because for each
dollar of farm inc
come
which was generated
an additional five
dollars
were pumped into
the non- farm
economy. 1«
fact that H.R. 4
5 97 would extend
can labor program
for two years was
praised.
It was
argued that the
administration's proposal
for a oneyear renewal would
not enable farmers
mers t0
to Plan
olan adequately.
a
_
urthermore, the next
debate over extension
extensi
would come
ln a P res idential
119
election

^

‘

^

’

^

^

year.

the 1963 H ° USe
debata

Il
117

-

reformers attacked the

Ibid.

118,

lst *

$$» ,*>*>

119

IMd.
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pp.

9807-08.
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bra0er ° Pr ° Sram “
ith
arguments.

-nce

conservative and llbe
r al
Because it brought
governmental
inter-

in the

economy it violate,
the principle
of
tree enterprise
t+

^

Zt was a

fading cause of "the
continuing problem
of the outf
„„tfil°» of
American dollars
to other countries.Because of the cost
to the
government of administering
Public Law 7 8. it „
as
an important cause
of the swollen
federal budget.
Reformers again reminded
the House that the
burden of proof should
lie with tk„„
those proposing the
sixth extension of a "-homr^v,
emporary program." They
noted
the wide spectrum
of interest * rou
S r „ PS critical of the
Mexican labor system 120 *
Especially strong criticism
came from two
Mexican-American members of
the House
Henry Gonzalez (D-Tex.)
charged that it was
displacing
many poor American
farm workers,
particularly MexicanAmericans.
Edward Roybal (D-Calif.
)
noted that it
was a program which
thrived -on the poverty
of both
Mexican nationals and
American farm workers." 122
•

Even more than in
1961. supporters of
extension
°f the bra cero program
criticized it and sometimes
120 -,-,.^
PP.

122

Ibid

.

.

p.

9820-28.
9827.

121

Ibid

.

P.

9809.

.

its termination
’

argUed that

-

*— -
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Bass

nationals should
not h
employed in crops
°
characterised by price
c
r° 1S ° r
controlled acreage 12 3
Rp
Representative B. P.
Sisk
,
(D-Calif
alif.)^ while call intr -p
allmg for passage
of H.R, 5 h
97
3 minimUm
f ° r d ° mestio
farm workers. 12 ^
R be
ert Duncan (D-Ore.)
acknowledged that the
hracero
Program had some
-adverse effect on
the employ
opportunities of
'

domestics."^

Some House memhers
noted that they might
drop
on
of the hracero
coalition after the
expected 1%3
extension.
For instance.
Representative H. Allen
(R
Calif.)
Jith
told his colleagues
that "agriculture
have to figure
out some way to
solve this
dilemma during the
next 2 years ” 126 «„ «.
Another supporter
racero program,
Representative Ed Foreman
•)’ Sald that " With
a * extension of
this act.
we win be able
t0 completely get
away from the
for brarpm t ^.1
-

the answer lay in
mechanization. 127

123
,

p<

9804.

125 T *.
Ibid., p. 9824.
127
I.t’Id.
p. 9809.
.

,

124

Ibid.,

126„

Ibid.

P.

9805.

255

Representative Morris
Udall (D-Ariz.),
who
introduced H.R.
5497
W7, told
tolri his
House colleagues,
.

support

.

irLcaSse^think'it 1113

bil1, but

1

not be with us very
much longer. 128
During House debate,
both supporters
and oppo0f the braCSr0
-t. of the increasing
ic opposition
to the use of
Mexican labor. 129

™

^

.

In a surprise move
on May 29, 1963.
the House
rejected H.R. 5497 by
a roll call vote
of 158 _
As expected, heavier
support for the bill
came from
Republicans. While 78
House Republicans

m

voted for it.

53 voted asrainst
gainst it.

Democrats split 80 for

and 121 against.
We have repeatedly
found an association
between
region and support for
the bracero program.
Of the
74 voting representatives
from the states using
the
greatest numbers of braceros
(Texas. California,
Michigan, Colorado. Arizona,
and Arkansas), 50 voted
for
H.R. 5497 while only
24 voted
1 ?0

against it.

There was substantial
negative reaction to the
House vote
Hard-core supporters of the
Mexican labor
.

128
1

30

Ibid., p. 9818.

129

lbid.. p. 9824.

25WR. XXI (May 31.
1963), 832, 856.
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system such as
Gathings 131 and t»
gUe P roBPtly
called
on their- colleagues
„
to reconsider
Teas
Tea
& ue suggested
that
at a ^one-year
extension
n might be
Hp acceptable
af +
n?
lj
2
after
all.
*

.

>

—

Grower response in
the Southwest

*—

;

;r

«h«r

«<.

-

„„

™

A

of tt<ir
elegrams were presented
to Congress by
representatives of braca™
racero areas and
inserted in the
Congress ional
133
,

.

Various western
newspapers featured
articles
or editorials
critical of xne
the Hnuca
+
house action.
These
included the following*
•

Denver Post * 3^
~en ^ ura County Star-Frpp p riaf,„ /p
~ >nt;
(Calif,
3. £resno__Bee (Calif. )136
lbg_fiotton Trade .t~..—i1 137
r ncisco Examinpr.1^
lP
6
f
he Baker
o
^ erside sfield CalT7^ nn 139
iJaily Fnterprigr~(p
\140
8*
n i
f-^
8
}
1

•

_?he

*.

.

f,

;

-

SSsja sj^a^^

e
ist 3. as ?.°i963,n
aff g^"3;

132 TK

.

»

»

p.

9903.

133

U435

PP -

IMd..
Ibid*

140

88th c ° n e-.

.

l£ ld

138

9g;gr^

12785. 15216-17.

>

135^.,

pp. 15217-18.
13

'’

jbid

.

.

p.

12945

.

Ibid*. P* 15208.

139 Ibid.

Ibid*, p. 15209.

141

Ibid.

p . 13639<
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The House decision
on to
xo kill
kin the vbracero
program

n

a so received
considerable attention
ntlon ln Mexico.
•

newspaper Ultimas

The

Noti,.;-..

rtr
— e is inn asked
Are we to interpret
the vote in the h
House of Renreepre
sentatives
„
an act against
slaverv—
V —or as imprudent
,
discrimination?" In
Mexico City
lt y* the
newspaper
hg^Prensa remarked*

„

i

.

.

They would leave
us in -f-v.es . i
lner ble positi
of losing from
on
one day to thp
?
that the braceros
1
dollars
?
send back
maintI*ain our
precarious balance of n*?™
And that means
that some 300,000
MexicarTfamii
fr
t
empl ° y” ent ° f
their'f^i^^f
e a rner
•

.

s?l^

N °t UneXPeCtedly
’

«

was reported that
braceros
»ere stunned by news
of the House action.
Various officials of
thee Mexican
lvlex ican CT
government
commented on the House
vote killing the
bracero program.
A spokesman for the
Interior Department
claimed
that termination would
not result in seriously
increasing unemployment
rates in Mexico. He
claimed that
displaced braceros could
be absorbed into
his country's
industries. Gustavo D{
az Ordaz. Secretary
of State,
emphasized that the death
of Public Law ?8 would
cause
"problems" in the United
l4
3
States.
142

Ibid., p

.

10418.

1 ^3

Ibid

.

P«

12945.
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Some Mexicans
expressed satisfaction
^
that the
program
ogram was apparently
coming to an cna
end
Fran
Francisco
u
Hernandez y Hernandez,
previously
Previously adirector of the
a iona
Farmers Organization,
noted that his
group
had always maintained
that hraceros were
needed at
° me '
Senat0r Albert0
took a similar
standi
On dune 21 .
19 6 3 , the Mexican
ambassador delivered a note outlining
his government's
stand on
the House action
to the American
government.
The note
° almed th3t “
exican lab °r was still
needed in the
United States.
Therefore, the only
question was
Whether it was to enter
legally or illegally.
To
return to the wetback
era was most undesirable
because
would result in
exploitation of the wetbacks
and
would undermine American
workers.
The note continued,
•

•

can^orkers^nder^he ^international® 0

° f Mexi ?S reeme "l has
produced unfavorable effects
® rican workers,
Quite the contrary
b !"®£ lts S™>ted the
contracted braceros
e Pr0Vlde<i a
that can be followed'for'dem
Pattern
+
f ° r d ° mestlc
workers who
lack such protection.

Thfw.SV

The note claimed that
"the virtual extinction

of discrimination
against and segregation
of persons
of Mexican nationality
in areas of the United
States
Wh6re SU ° h P racti des once
existed can decisively be
144

Ibid.
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The United
States government
go-'ernment was reminded
that
Mexico hea , ong
held that any
termination of the

racero program
should occur
gradually.
Th e House
action would have
the effect of
1 creating
creatine serious

rrr*
Uy

in

Mexican economy,

^ ^H

<" ta».ro.

003 Am6ri0an " eWS

•

•*•

~

1„„ „«

medU 3ttemPted

the deer"
decline of the
bracero program.

*-*

-

-PXain

The

observed that
political pressures
againstT^
been building up
for over a decade.
Although reform
een blocked from
the beginning by
farm state
congressmen and their
allies from
ailles
fv™ other
+u
states, the
paper noted that the
nonon larm
farm aliip<3
allies were moving
out
of the coalition. 146
The £^*EX£tian_J2entur^

,

a traditional
critic

of the bracero
program, noted that with
increasing
mechanization there was
less need for farm
labor.
It
concluded that -legislative
cancellation of a labor
system which does far
more harm than good
and which
seems doom ed anyway is
a commendable House
action.- 147

145 T
Ikid., p. 15204.
146
New York Times, May
.

.

.

31

,

1963, p. 52.
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Cofflonseal, another
traditional critic
of
?8 ’ Wel ° 0med wha
* it believed
to be the
end of the Mexican
labor program The
na gazine gaye
substantial credit
u
•teaix to 0
such grour>s
^
as unions and
p sc
social
»e
are organizations

^

against the program.

which had incited
public feeling

Commonweal^ observed
rvea that urban
congressmen had
gone along with the
program over the years
but with
increasing reluctance
as it grew more
unpopular with
public.
Also, the users of
braceros had become
-re concentrated in fewer
states. By 1962 some
„
of all braceros
were in California
and Texas alone.
As other states used
them
m le
less
ss, there was
apparently
less pressure on their
congressmen to "go along.”
,

Finally,

Common^

noted that the reduction
in farm
jobs and the high
unemployment rate had helped
people
he bracero program
for the anachronism
that
148
it was.

Although the Mexican labor
system was nearer
termination than ever before,
some of its traditionally
impressive staying power
remained and it was

revived.
The Senate A § ricul ture
and Forestry Committee
reported

P.

316

Fate of P.L. 78," Commonweal
.

.

June 14

,

1963,

26 l
a bill

(S

1703) on July
y 22

iq^
196 3

Providing for extension Of the
-p
tne program for
one more year.
It
rejected the administra+i nvn
ministration s recommendation
of an
amendment guaranteeing
-p
ng domestic
domeq + io farm
workers against
adverse effect.
However, it did so
with the explanation that because
the program would
be ended at the
close of 196b, there
would not be enough
time to put
the proposed reforms
into operation.
.

.

*

Even the majority
report of the Senate
Agriculture and Forestry
Committee foretelling the
death
of the program was
not enought to satisfy
four members
of the committee.
Maurine B. Neuberger
(D-Ore.).

George McGovern (D-S.D.),
Eugene McCarthy (D _ Min
^ )(
and William Proxmire
(D-Wisc.) were opposed to
extension on any terms. The
program had been hurting
domestic farm workers all
alon^along pnri
and the government
Should cease to undermine
these "neglected and
underprivileged” people 149
In the meantime, efforts
were made to get
the House to reconsider
its early action and to
now

vote for an extension of
Public Law ?8. Southwestern
farm groups, especially
from California, notified
House memb ers that without
the program farm production
149

XXI (July 26

,

1963), 1318.
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would drop
drastically
ai+k
Although
southwestern repre
*•
sent
P
entatives again
took up the fis h+

«**

---

.

*“*•*«

....

labor program,
One such spokesman
was Recre^*
+•
representative
Charles M.
,
Teague R-Calif
)
Ho had
^ ^
fought long and
hard for
theMMexican labor
the
program
Serving on the
Gathings
^
subcommittee. he> had
hen always
t
s P° ken
for grower
interests, praised
f arm spokesmen.
and persistently
hammered away at the
arguments of critics
of the
bracero program.
However, even he
was giving up.
He co-sponsored
bills calling for
an extension of
ublic Law 78 for
three years and its
death at the
ond of that period.
His bill
719a) provide<J
or the use of
150,000 braceros in
1964, 120,000
during the following
year, 90,000 in
1966. and
termination at the end
of that year. 150
.

^

v,

•

•

Even when it looked
as if the House
had killed
program, the Kennedy
administration did
not change its earlier
position supporting a
oneyear extension. Despite
its vigorous criticism
of
Law 7 8, it was
especially concerned
that the

Program not be abruptly
ended so as to bring
serious
^location to the Mexican economy.
Therefore,
the

150

Ibid.
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administration continued
to call for
extension of the
16 inSiSti
n Vari0US
guarantees for American farm workers.

^°

r

On August

1 5.

amended bracero bill
2-25.

1963.

the Senate passed
an

(S 1 703 )

on a

roU caU

^

Qf

It provided for
a one-year extension
of the

Program through December.
1964.
It also included
an
amendment providing
guarantees to protect
American
farm workers from
adverse effect. The
amendment was
introduced by Senator
McCarthy.
It specified that
growers must offer
domestic farm workers
housing. a
specified work period,
occupational
insurance, and

transportation comparable to
the guarantees given
braceros.
Farmers who did not make
such offers could
hot qualify for Mexican
nationals.
The McCarthy amendment
passed on a roll call
of 44 4 3
it was opposed by a
majority of both
.

southern Democrats and
Republicans. Opponents of
the
amendment charged that its
passage would neutralize
whatever merit the bracero
program had had. Senator
Spessard L. Holland (D-Fla.
who floor managed the
)
Mexican la bor bill, recalled
that Congress
,

had

(Aagust'al

^b^fl^?

3

’

JUly 31

'

1963s SSH5- XXI
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i;rr

•”

“

**

»»

« ,™

.n^„„

bl «..,53
Still apprehensive
that
+h« House
w
nat the
might not
resurrect the bracero
program, southwestern
farm
interests continued
to warn
of
arn
the consequences
of
ending reliance on
the Mexican labor
supply.
Por
instance . magazine
called the C ^Iifo^
estimated that the
value of the state-,
multi-million
-liar asparagus harvest
would decline h
y approximately
md if the Mexican labor
program were ended.
It
noted that farmers
were already making
plans to plow
up oome 20,000
acres of asparagus
beds and guessed
that the growing
uncertainty of a labor
supply would
lead to some 10 .000
acres being converted
to other
crops less dependent
on labor.
The magazine predicted
that the acreage
devoted to other crops
heavily dependent on braceros.
such as lettuce and
cantaloupes,
would be substantially
reduced. A University
of
California study reached
the same conclusions
regarding
cantaloupes, a spokesman
for the Grower-Shipper
Vegetable Association
headquarted in Salinas.
California
f ° ret0ld 3 3 °* dr
°P in
acreage devoted to lettuce
.

5

CQWR, XXI (August
23, 1963), 1466.

,
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during the coining
year.* 53
On September
6, I96l3

’

t
ho House
u
the

Agriculture
Cnmm
Committee
reported a bill (H
l«.R.
R
s.oo to extend
8195)
the
bracero program for
an additional
year
its
P
indicated that it had
suggested to the
Labor.
Agriculture and State
Departments that the
Mexican
a or program be
ended gradually over
a three-year
HoweveT aii +u ree
de Paftments
recommended
..
6XtenSi0n be f0r a
year and that it
include the main
provisions of the McCarthy
amendment
“
h
Senate had alread
^ —Pied. The committee
compromised and its report
proposed a single year
extension but rejected
the amendment.
It claimed
that the amendment
"could only result in
confusion
and ineffectiveness”
inasmuch as the
administration
seemed to have only
a "hazy notion as
to how the
proposed amendment would
be administered."
..

.

'

,

’

"

^

The four committee
votes against extension
came from Democrats
Spark M. Matsunaga
(D-Hawaii).
Alec C. Olsen (D-Minn.).
Benjamins. Rosenthal (D-N.
Y.
and James H. Morrison
(D-La.).
They charged that extension of the law would
constitute a "tragedy”
beC3USe lt Pr ° Vided for
Poverty-stricken group
153

New York Times, August
18, 1963, p. 52.

)
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of men to compete
aeain^t
gainst another
poverty-stricken
group to create
still more poverty. "154
n October 31,
1963, the House
reversed its
earlier position and
passed the bin
reported
fey

griculture Committee.

^

The roll call
vote was 173 - l6o
This about-face may
have several
possible explanations.
The bracero program
had come under
such
heavy fi re from a
growing number of
interest groups
and the administration
that its future in
the Senate
was unpredictable
at the time of the
initial House
vote.
However, in the
interlude between the
two
House votes, the Senate
had made clear that
it was for
extending the bracero
program for one year.
It became
obvious that if Public
Law 78 were permitted
to expire
at the end of
1963. the House alone would
be responsible.
Also, the apparent
consensus among senators
that the
.

Mexican labor system
should be terminated at
the end
of 1964 permitted the
House to compromise in
its
second vote without
sacrificing
uc mg its
it. Koobasic commitment
rmination.
In the interval between
the two
House votes. Mexico's
government
had issued its

strong sta tement against
abrupt termination.
1

54

XXI (September

1

3,

1963), 1562-63.

26 7

Anally, it should
be emphas zed
.

*
flrst
House vote was
on a two
two-year extension
To
retrospect.
it was poor
strategy for the H
" AgriCUltu
C°™ittee
to support
PPort that
grower-backed bin *

~

-*

...

^

....

a one-year
extension but nothing
more.

The House votes
of 1963 suggest
g
cert
oartam
•

patterns
of the bracero
coalition. Particularly revealing
are the votes of
21 representatives
represent ..
who
^
voted
against the two-year
extension but
«ere willing to
support the one-year
renewal in the
t6
Wh ° Were th6Se
key congressmen
who held
the al anoe of
power in the House
e
raditional two-year
extension? They were
primarily old supporters
of Public Law
78 who had
grown increasingly
sceptical of it.
Sixteen of them
ted on the question
of renewal in 1961. !55
in the diTio*
integrate

’

^

^

^

^

Thirteen of the 16
had
aa voted tho+
that year to extend
the
racero program by
two years.
The switchers came
overwhelmingly from the
Party which had
traditionally been more
supportive of
the Mexica n labor
system.
Seventeen of the 21 were
The other five had
not yet been elected.

.
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Republicans
Only 4 of the switchers
came from the Southwest.
The others came
predominantly from the
Midwest
and Northeast, areas
which had been less
dependent on
the bracero program.
In summary,

the 1963 House vote
indicates that

the bracero coalition
was breaking up.

The swing group
holding the balance of
power and unwilling to
grant
the traditional two-year
renewal were largely old
friends of the Mexican
labor system. Not even
the
Republican Party remained a
faithful ally.
The swing
group willing to kill the
bracero program then and
there if they could not
hold the extension period
to
one year were overwhelmingly
Republicans.

These

losses to the grower coalition
came mostly from areas
using few or no braceros.
On December 4. 1963. the
Senate voted to accept
the House version of
legislation extending the Mexican
labor system. 156 This represented
one loss for critics
of Public Law 78 inasmuch
as the House had failed to

accept the McCarthy reform amendment.

However, the

reform forces had won their
greatest victory yet because
the consensus was that
Congress would finally let
the

program die at the end of 1964.
^

CQWR, XXII (January

3,

1964), 9-10.
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Events of 1964
in February.

1964, the

NewJorOimes observed
that man y California
farmers hah apparently
given up
them struggle to continue
the bracero program
after
the end of that
year.
They had already begun
to arrange
for the recruitment
of more domestic
workers.
Reconciling themselves to
the new reality, they
had changed the
direction of their political
pressure.
Now they had
begun to request both
the state and national
governments to inventory the
possibilities for acquiring
American farm workers. 157
studies were conducte(J n
a number of states
concerning how the braceros
could
be replaced by the end
of 1964,^-5®
-

Toward the fall of 1964,
Business Weoe wrote
that although some growers
were attempting to cope
with the new reality by
preparing to hire domestic
workers, others continued to
claim that not enough
Americans were available for
farm work.
It noted the
fact that some growers were
clinging to the position
that those without work would
prefer to collect
1

57 Ijew

1

58

York Times

New York Times

,

February 23

r

April 10

,

,

1964, p.
^

1964, p. 23

55
J .*
.

2?0

^^^

unemployment p ay and
that the braoeros
capable workers that
each two of them
would have to
be replaced by
three Americans. 159

Political developments
during i 9 64 brought
no
new hopes to the
bracero coalition.
coalition
„
Upon succeeding
+
_ e presidency
in November,
1963, Lyndon Johnson
showed the same
commitment to the rural
poor that
Kennedy had. On
January
31 ’ 196k
p
y J1
Pre
sident Johnson's
lirst agricultural
messapv* to n
message
Congress called for
several reforms. He
asked
+u
ked that the
program of food
stamps be expanded
and
Q caxled
<
called for improvements
in
housing for migratory
workers
y workers.
Johnson stressed the
low income of the
average farm worker
and noted that
housing on farms was
frequently •’dilapidated
and substandard." He pointed
out that rural people
were
more likely to be
poor and called attention
to the
fact that "almost
one-half our nation's
poor live in
rural areas.
The President promised
that in other
messages he would ask
Congress
ongress lor
for- programs
to fight
poverty and improve train inp 0 j„- n+
n £» education, housing,
and
health care in rural areas. 160
'

.

^
.

1

Week.

59„

August^a^iq^^p^ilo^
CQWR, XXII (February

7

Braceros '" Business

,

1964), 254

.
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In the presidential,
campaign of 1964
,

»as said about
the

Program.

in g
general
nera l were not
prominent.

lltUe
nttle

Farm

i ssues

*ven
Even among
am
farm
these matters
tended to be
hP
overshadowed by
such issues as
race relations
rpi.+i
and the developing
oters

,

+
situation
in Vietnam. 161
.

.

President Johnson was
content to
to accept the
ongressionai decision
to let Public
Law 78 die at
6nd ° f 1964<
°PPonent, Senator
B arry Ooldwater.
was not.
I„ August before
ron. Goldwater
oallea for tentative
continuation of
bra0er °
continue he saia,
until we can find
ways of satisfying
the need of farm
a or through
domestic sources ••^2
In late Ootober
’
Goldwater told a group
of Mexican-Americans
in Los
Angeles that the dohnson
administration was making
a mistake in letting
the bracero program
expired
As recently as the
last Senate debate
on the
bracero program in
1963 . Senator Goldwater
had firmly
aligned hi mself with
the bracero coalition. 16 ^

«

^

.

.

^CQWR,

XXII (October 16,
1964 ), 2460.
W York TiniP . August
-g

—

" Y ° rk

^

164~

3

'

ril" eS

-

’

,

1964, p. 6 .

October 31, 1964, p.

1.

88th cong -’

^
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With the election

o-r
f

1

T-»r»-.ri
L
y nd °n Johnson in
1964

p^

aPP6ared that h0P6S
0f reviving the
bracero
were dead. Even
John Kennedy,
handicapped by his
narrow election and
the Democratic
Party’s poor‘

‘
»•<
1 . ,0
8 eXtenS10n
of Pub lie Daw 78
to a period of
one
year with the
understanding
to die at the
end of

»„ »

that it would be
allowed

1

064
9

Johnson was elected
under
far more advantageous
circumstances. He won
by a
landslide and swept
to power with him
greater proportions of congressmen
of the types most
likely to
oppose the importation
of Mexican labor.
With a
markedly more Democratic
and liberal Congress
than
the outgoing one.
the victory of reform
forces in
late 1963 became less
tentative, and it began
to look
like after twenty-two
years that the bracero
program
had finally come to
an end.
No serious efforts
were
made to revive Public
Law 78 during late
1964. and
.

on December 31. the
long-sought termination
became
a reality.
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Summary and Conclusions

T

nati.°" °

ral rSaSOnS

^

teen 8u

the braoer °
program.

»«.d

termi-

Among these were
various social and
economic trends.
The hieh

»•
7::r

-—

::rrr

aim of a serious
farm labor shortage.
As urbanization
continued, the political
influence of farmers
declined.
This result was
intensiflea
1962 when the Supreme
Court began a series
of
,
^apportionment rulings requiring
both state legis
latures and the United
States House to
increase the
representation of urban
population.

m
•

Unprecedented mechanization
displaced rural
workers and made the
case for foreign
labor less convincing. Experience
with mechanization
convinced some
growers of its superiority
to any kind of
labor program,
ioreign or domestic.
Thus a nrm -political
development
significantly changed the
nature of demands on
the
political system.
The grower cause was
further weakened by certain
priorities of the Kennedy
administration, including
its
commitments to alleviate
rural poverty and to bring

minority group members
into the mainstream of
American

.

2 74

economic

^^

Termination o f Public
Law ?8
as one of the
administration’s
anti-poverty
measures, especi ally
des i g n ed to
increase job opporUtl1 163 f ° r
the gr ° Up which
suffered most from
competition with the
imported workers,
Mexican _
Americans

During the years
1961-64. the reform
coalition
operated from an
unpreoedently favorable
position.
It stood in sharp
contrast to the many
earlier years
when it seemed to
enjoy no political
advantages over
the employers of
Mexican workers and
their political
allies.
Prior to World War I.
organised labor, weak
and unpopular, had
stood almost alone in
its effort
to limit the use
of Mexican workers
in the United
States.
By the early
1960’s, the earlier small
rump
group of reformers had
been transformed into
a broad
coalition possessing the
highest credentials,
it
included the President
himself and increasing
numbers
of congressmen from
both parties and from
most regions
of the country.
It included respected
organizations
such as the AFL-CIO,
various churches, and
several of
the most respected
publications in the United
States.
This new coalition was
a formidable participant
in the political process.
No longer could its
members
be lightly dismissed
as they had been at the
Downey

.
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strengths

its

ChUrChSS

--derat on while
ations
I"; unions focused
Sd ° n „economic
objections to
t
use o , Mexican
labor.
This shotgun
assault on
U
10
78 maxim i 2 e d the
chance that the
vulnerabilities of the bracero
program woul d be
exploiteC.
By the 1960-8.
members of the reform
coalition
Possessed impressive
political shills. Some,
such
as organized labor,
had developed an
enviable record
or their ability to
mobilize large numbers
of voters.
Many of the interest
groups were not tackling
reform
of the bracero
program as a one-shot
cause. Organisations such as the
National Education
Association
and the AFL-CIO had
gained valuable skills
from their
continuous involvement
in the political
process on a
variety of issues. Some
of the reform interest
groups
had their own full-time
research staffs and
legislative
spec ialists

™

.

.

^

All of these advantages
gave the reformers a
a new assurance
during the Kennedy years.
They pressed
their points harder and
demanded greater concessions.
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They could threaten
with more assurance
that their
opponents would take them
seriously.
The bracero program
was further weakened
by
using it as a wedge to
achieve reforms in
domestic
labor.
Some of these were
gained by administrative
discretion. Others were
gained through congressional
concessions to domestic farm
workers as Public Law
78
was extended in 1961
and in 1963.
Perhaps even more
important than the actual
concessions made to domestic labor was the fact
that the increasing
number
of

reformers were more insistent
on more concessions than
ever before. This was
bound to dampen grower
enthusiasm for the bracero system.
After all. farmers
had

originally sought the program
partly as a tool to
use ag ainst domestic workers,
not for them. By 1963,
the attractiveness of the
program to farmers had

diminished while it continued to
bring an increasing
threat of government control
over all farm labor.
Had it not been for this development,
it is unlikely
that many of the Mexican labor
system’s oldest and

most faithful friends would have
agreed to kill the
program, effective at the end of
1964.

It is interesting to speculate
about what

might have saved the Mexican labor
system.

It has

already been suggested that Nixon’s
election in i960
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might have done so.

The vast ^
r 0f the
P
P^sidency
K
could have
v.
been employed to
counter the growing
power of the reformers.

•l

"

History suggests
that American
involvement
maJ ° r War mlght
3150 have salvaged
the Mexican
S -**‘

-

hree formal bracero
programs
programs. All
411 were
instituted
a ortly after
American participation
in a major
ma i
war.
Wars have been thp
xne chief spawners
01
of oracero
programs,
ecause they reduce
liberal opposition to
the use
of Mexican labor.
Once the war ends,
the program is
aced with rising
opposition and it grows
increasingly
vulnerable.
The precarious
position of the bracero
Program in 1 9 6 3 is emphasised
by the fact that
it had
contmued over into peace-time
longer than any other
in American history.
The historical pattern
suggests that had the

massive American involvement
in Vietnam occurred
in
1962 or early 1 9 6 rather
3
than in 1965. the national
security aspect of farm
labor might have saved
Public
Law 78. With United
States soldiers in Vietnam
until
197 3 and American combat
involvement ending under a
conservative president, the
bracero program might
still be in existence.

2?8

CHAPTER

vi

the political
aftermath

Introduction

Nothing so simnle
a 0
38 +y,
P
the
sessional decision
tto terminate
the bracern nr.
P
gram on December
iq 64
31
couid have provided
. conclusive
soiution to the ion
oonmct over the employment
of Mexicans in
the United
States.
Twice before (after
the
formal bracero programs
had ended without
altering the
fundamental disagreements
between its advocates
and
opponents.
.

.

;

^

^

What we have seen
„_
sppd is an
ongoing struggle
punctuated by a series of
rotating and insecure
victories for each side.*
During certain periods
(wartime), growers have sucrp^^fni -i,
successfully pressured the
national
government to guarantee
them a supply of Mexican
labor.
fet the guarantees have
never been permanent.
Reform
forces hav e always
re-mobilized to bring an end
-?

<-.

.

r

to

made for formal bracero
programs onlyf "i^does^nt
dispute
the ^lSHTof
earlier chanters thf? +„
S° ve rnment has often
failed to conscientiously
Which W0Uld hava
denied Mexican workers
to grower^

^
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ms had been
inaugurated

v

neUher

h3d
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—
——

ultimate
ultile concession from
rom it<=
lts opponent.

™

::.r
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«—

«»•

n.

Three

—

the

The "loser"

This historical
pattern observed in
earlier
tSrS l6adS
expectati °P that
termination of
p
10 L
78 W ° Uld n0t SUdden
*°lve the underlying
group conflicts.
That southwestern
growers would
not be content with
the new policy is
aXso prediot _
able from pluralist
theorv
wi-t-w
ory Wlt
h its emphasis
on the
continuous nature of
group conflict.

^

J

^

"

^

While the whole
question of the politics
of
Mexican labor in the
United States has been
relatively
ignored by scholars,
most of their limited
attention
has been focused on
bracero programs themselves.
The
Politics of post-bracero
eras has been all
but ignored.
The present chapter
turns attention to
the aftermath of Public Law
78 s termination,
particularly the
nature of the ongoing
group struggle and the
search
.

for alternatives to
bracero labor. With the
Mexican
labor system so recently
ended, 1965 was the
crucial
year during which grower
protests reached a peak and

280

^

reason, di=,nop„r«
lt,^«
on developments
of that year.

The Aftermath:

—

Alternative smimog0

1

0f
uz

965-68
ex
Mexican
i

jyj

lah^
,

Critics

of bracero
programs have been nrone tn
prone to overemphasize
e importance
of laws specifically
providing for the
.

importation of Mexico
workers.
They have
paid much less attention
to Mexicans entering
under
general immigration
laws and to those
entering illegally.
et these latter
ohannels have brought
far m0 re workers
from Mexico to the
United States.
Nevertheless, during
the early 19 60's,
reformers gave the
impression that
termination of Public Law
78 would solve the
problem
of Mexican competition
with American farm

labor.
This
ignored the fact that
termination of earlier
bracero
programs had never shut
off the flow of Mexican
workers
to the United States.

By no means did the
demise of Public Law
78 end
the group conflict over
Mexican labor.
Instead, the

struggle was re-directed.

Even before the bracero
pro-

gram expired, growers had
enjoyed four additional
supplies of Mexican workers.
After December 31, 1964,
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they turned
increasingly
t0 no
* Y tn
cer +tam of these
alterna+
The Ub0r DePart
“-t effectively curtailed
re xance on some
of these channels
but only in the
aee of furious
pressure from f arm
groups.
To consider the
group struggle over
Public
Law 78 without
regard to this broader
context is
misleading.
The formal bracero
program was merely
one means of
governmental accomodation
to the grower's
broad demand for
Mexican labor. When
he lost that
specific program, he
was perfectly willing
to seek
the same labor by
other means.
In doing so. he
fell
back on many of his
old justifications
for the bracero
ogram.
P
He found that most
groups opposing his
renewed
efforts were old opponents
from pre-termination
days,
and they, too, resurrected
many
of their
y oi
xneir old
oln arguments.
For these reasons, the
grower initiative to
obtain
Mexican labor during
1965 is more accurately
seen as
a continuing, rather
than a new, struggle.
•

.

The employment of
wetbacks had continued
even
when record numbers of
Mexicans were entering

under

the provisions of
Public Law 78. 2

The number of

illegal Me xicans apprehended
by immigration authorities

and af ter termination tf

Putft ° f

"S

tbaoks before
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began a constant
increase as
v
beimy
g Ph3Sed
° Ut

+he>

^ ---

s

" 00 °

3;

" ere apprehend

-k

raCer ° Pr0

^m

a fter lt . expiration.

^ ^

1963.
By 1968
number of annualx
arrests had
h** climbed
t
to over
150, 000.

was

,

the

3

This trend may be
explained in either
of two
ways.
The first possibility
is that the
number of
wetbacks entering the
United States did
not grow
and the upward trend
simply reflects more
vi g il ant
action by American
immigration authorities
inspired
by a reform
administration.
The second
explanation
is that when
Mexicans could no longer
j-onger enter as
braceros,
more came as wetbacks.

During the final days
of the bracero
program,
the Johnson
administration announced
that the border
would be more carefully
patrolled.

However, there is
little evidence that it
made serious efforts
to prevent
the predicted increase
in wetback entry.
The number
of Border Patrol
personnel was increased
only slightly.
In a recent study
of the wetback problem.
Julian
Samora concludes that
the last important
campaign
"
lniUated by the Border p atrol
to tighten up the

(Notre Dame:
p. 46.

—

W
d °S
The Wet back Story
UniversIt
university
v°nf
N ^
b
of Notre
Dame
Press, 1971 ),
'

'
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border

occurred in 1954 ,^

Various annual reports
issued by the Immigration and Naturalisation

Se„i oe

assuffie

^^

increase in the
number of wetbacks
apprehended since
,
1Q L
,,
S the fa0t
that ^creasing
numbers of
illegal Mexicans
were entering the
United States,
or example, the
AnnualJeEort for 1970
states,
"Since termination
of the Mexican
Agricultural Act
at the end of 1
**. the number of in egal
entries
over the Mexican
border continues to
soar."?
The relevant
question which cannot
be definitively answered from
present research is the
extent
to which wetbacks
came to be employed
in farm jobs
previously held by braceros.
However, Samora<s
findings that most
employed wetbacks do
agricultural
work would suggest the
likelihood that many were
in
fact replacements for
earlier braceros. This
expecmcreased by the fact that
large numbers of
wetbacks worked in the
Southwest which had relied
heavily on the Mexican
labor system.

^

.

Approximately 100,000 more
wetbacks were
4

ibid

.

»

p.

50.

•
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apprehended in 1968
than during
s tfte
the last
i aa+ year
of the
racero program.
When these numbers
Ders are adjusted
a
m„
^
upward
to allow for
the fact that
hat man y illegal
Mexicans are never
caught
ght, it becomes
obvious that
termination of the
bracero program did
not* finallv
end the "problem"
of Mexican emni
employment in the
United
States.
,

.

w

ironically, in debate
leading
s UD
p to t.
termination
Of Public Law 78
reformers had said
little about the
wetback problem
r+ WaS
m0Stly friends Of
the bracero
P-gram who had warned
that its termination
would bring
^e return of large numbers
of illegal Mexicans.
Reformers had treated
Public Law 78 as the
big enemy.
and they had paid
little attention to
the gro „ing „umber of wetbacks.
•

,

U

The efforts of
Secretary Wirtz during
19 64 and
1965 were directed
mostly toward making
it more

difficult to obtain leggl
Mexican labor.
little attention to
the wetback
problem.

He paid
To some

extent this neutralized
the liberal victory
gained by
termination of Public Law
78.
Since wetbacks enjoyed
no legal protection,
they could be exploited
far more
than braceros.
This meant also that
they posed a
greater threat to American
workers.
Why Secretary Wirtz
did so little about the
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wetback problem
is not clear.
r^-p
reform
groups during the
ute

p PTrhaps
*
it was becau^P

*

1950-3 and

,

;:;;rr;r

^

The gre

realL

lllnS attentlon
to the wetback
problem.
natl ° nal C0nC6rn
"ever
revived since
Eisenhower’s aborted
crusade
e
Ro form
groups had thus not
laid the same
ation f ° r

b

of 1954 ’

-

rr r
^^^

-

— ^^
-

adminiStration ^ attack
on the

leg
egal1 importation
of Mexican workers.
The faUUre
•

^

on th

SeCretary

Pr0Mem

t0

ntrate

a common pattern
of the

ref ormers.

Historically, they have
tended to equate
favorable laws and
,
formal t,i,m
normal
public policipc?
iC ies with „
p
success.
mu
1
^
h
has been one of
their greatest
+
strategic
errors.
^or example, they
celebrated
orated +>,*
the end of the
World War I
bracero program as
if that p licy
in
change would solve
the problem of
Mexican
an labor
t+ was
labor.
It
fact the prelude to an unprecedented
decade of wetback
entry.
In a book published
in 1954. Burma
concluded
that since 1940,
more Mexicans had
entered the United
States ill egally than
legally.* Between
1924 and 1969.
•

.

•

m

6

Un ited States

pTW;

H
(
'

Durham
urnam.

1

Speaklng G r oups in the
Duke nUniversity Press.
1954)7

"

.
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over five million
wetbacks were a™ u
apprehended 7f As
noted above, large
numbers nave
have bean
been apprehended
since termination
of the br
arpm program in
bracero
1 9 64.
with such massive
numbers of
1 Mexico
*
Mexic ans entering
the
United States illegally,
the reformer’s
~ r s common
on
tendency
to assume that
all is well
X1 if
lf the law is
well has
weakened his own cause.
.

.

To keep the bracero
program alive between
1951 and 1964. growers
had been

forced to mobilise

m

politically,

contrast, they won the
post-bracero
wetback battle by default.
Reformers said and did
little about the problem.
For that reason, the
issue
was markedly lacking
in the flurry of
group activity
which had surrounded
the controversial
bracero program.
Since expiration of
Public Law 78 . a second
alternative source of
Mexican labor has been
the
so-called "border-crossers
.

The Immigration and
Nationality Act provides

that a special Nonresident
Border-Crossing Identification Card (Form I- 186
may be issued to an
)
alien
"who is a resident in
foreign contiguous territory."
This provision facilitates
the movement of many
Mexicans and C anadians who
wish to make short trips
to

^Samora

,

op.

c it .

P-

57.
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the United States
for uleaa..™

Form

I

186 Pe

™ ltS
•

„
topping,
or business.

^ ViSUOr ^

3

of
twent
wenty-f ive miles from
the United
States border.
Although he may remain
in this count™
country no
„
more than
seventy-two hours at
a time, there
wiere is no i
limitation
on how often he
may
return
return.
y
Tin-Mi
T
Until January
•

•

io,

1969,

border-crossing cards
were
re valid for
for- a
period of four
years.
.
Effective
lec tive

that date, they have
been good for
an indefinite
period.
.

While Form I-186
prohibits the visitor
from
working in the United
States, immigration
authorities
claim that many
apprehended Mexicans entered
initially
on the border-crossing
card, then violated
its provisions by finding jobs
and violating the seventy
two hour limit. 9 The
practice of keeping no
record
of the date of entry
probably encourages violation
Of the card’s provisions. 10
Large numbers of Mexicans
hold Form I-186.
Based on data for
1968. Samora reports that
each 'month,
over 2,500 of the cards
are issued in El Paso
and
"several hundred are
canceled monthly, primarily
for
violation of the work
restriction." Approximately
g

Ibid., pp. 155 - 56 .

10 T ,
.

p.

145,

9

Ibid.. p. 23.

,

.
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7:5,000 residents
of Ciudad
n
During

t»,

.

the years 1961-67

arez hold Form
1-186 11

.
the number
of
lssued
in the Southwest
nwest (not exclusively
,
overwhelmingly
to Mexicans)
cans)
•

w

increased annuaUy

issued in 196l

.

In 196?> oyer

0ver

_

Were

vu 000 were issued. 12
The marked
increase in the
number of cards
-

*

and since 1964
surestuggest. the likelihood
t, ,
that some
of the braceros
,
werp
were hoi^r.
being replaced by
bordercrossers
.

We have now
examined two non-bracero
sources

of Mexican labor
which were being used
even during
the bracero era.
After Public Law 78
expired, both
brought increasing
numbers of
1 Mexican
v
workers

to the

United States.

Our attention
atten tion +turns now
to a third
source of non-bracero
Mexican labor.
In the southwestern
United States, Mexican

immigrants are commonly
called green-carders.
The
name comes from the
color of Form I-151.
the Alien
Registration Card, which
is issued to all
immigrants
to the United States
irrespective of their
country of
° rigln H ° WeVer> inf0 al
-age ordinarily applies

™

11

Ibid., p. 23.

Working on^arms
October, 1967, p*

3^

12

Ibid

.

.

p.

184.

Maxican Migrants
a^o r Developments
Septemberf

.
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the green-card
label to

Mexico
xican immigrants
,*

only.

Green-carders have almost
all the rights and
responsibilities of American
citisens.
They are
free to work at
almost any
iob and +„
v jod
to nlive wherever
they Please.
Legally, the green-carder
•

,

is no

different from all other
immigrants to the
United
States
Prospective immigrants
from Mexico apply
for
a regular immigration
visa.
It is issued only
to applicants who meet all
specifications for immigration
as
set forth in the
Immigration and Nationality
Act of
1952, as amended.
°n July

1

*

1963>

the Kennedy government
began

taking administrative
action which made it more
difficult for prospective
immigrants to enter the
United
States for the purpose
of working here. Effective
that
date, the Department
of Labor was given a
veto over the
entry of such prospective
immigrants. With few exceptions, the State Department
began denying visas
to

them unless the Labor
Department certified a shortage
of American workers with
their particular skills and
verified that admitting the
prospective immigrants would
have no adverse effect
on domestic workers.
14

Ibid.

,
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The Johnson
government continued
this restricrestric
tive scrpp^vu,
S 33 3 matter <*

UntU Decemb -.
.

administrative discref
1965f when Congress
gress amended
ame h a the

emigration and
Naturalization ACX
Act to require
re
the
°r department
to make a judgment
ab *
•

r

,

"

diSCUSSed Pr0SPSCtiVe
immigrants. T 5 This
ve
ent W3S lmPOrtant
be0ause ingress
ratified
the labor
secretary's earlier
assumption of that
power
P°r decades,
growers had looked
upon the Labor De
art

Z

i7

— --

irr

o strip

-in.

they

J

away its allegedly
illegal power
over foreign labor.
Thus the 19 6 5
congressional
action was another
loss for the grower
cause.
Before the Labor
Department's assumption
of
authority
1963, Mexicans who
could not
qualify as braceros
could sometimes be
admitted as
immigrants,
if there were nQ
secretary could refuse
to certify their
entry as braceros.
However, they might
then bypass him by
applying
for entry as immigrants
sranxs to do
Hn +>,«
the same work.
Labor
shortage or not. until
1963. the labor secretary
had
no voice in deciding
which prospective
immigrants
would be g ranted visas.
As noted earlier,
as the

m

^

15

Ibid.

p.

40.

291

^

bracero program was out
baok dur ng the
i96o g
the number of Mexicans
entering as immigrants
increald.
After Secretary Wirtz
assume, this veto
over
prospective immigrants
desiring to work in
the United
States, the number of
Mexican farm laborers
admitted
as immigrants dropped
sharply. During the
fiscal year
preceding the new policy.
6.797 Mexicans were issued
immigrant visas for the
purpose of doing farm work
in
the United States.
In the first year the
new amendments were in effect, only
1,748 Mexican farm
.

,

workers were admitted as
immigrants. 16
A special type of
Mexican immigrant needs

some separate explanation.

He has all of the rights

and responsibilities mentioned
above as characteristics
of Mexican immigrants,
because he is legally an "immigrant” to the United States.
As they, he must meet
the same requirements for
obtaining a visa. Known as
a
commuter, " he enjoys a special
privilege which
is shared only with certain
Canadian "immigrants."
That is the right to commute to
the United States for
work while continuing to live in
his own country.

Thus,

the paradox of "immigrants"
who do not immigrate.

While living in his native country,
the commuter enjoys
16

Ibid.

7
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the same legal and
employment rights in
the United
States as do all other
persons admitted as
immigrants
to this country.

The commuting practice
was created by administrative rulings of the
Immigration and
Naturalization
Service (INS), while
immigrant visas indicate
that
the immigrant will
reside in the country
to which he
is immigrating.*? the
INS has long
permitted certain
Mexican and Canadian
"immigrants" to work in
the United
States without living here.
It ruled decades ago
that
admission as an immigrant
entitled them, but not
other
immigrants, to live in the
United States but did not
require them to do so. 18
As Samora has pointed
out.
the immigration visa often
turns out to be nothing
more than "an alien work
permit." 19 The INS has
claimed that this special
treatment of Mexican and

Canadian immigrants is justified
by the special relationship which the United States
has long enjoyed with their
20
countries.
Being granted immigrant status
does not automatically entitle Mexicans and
Canadians to commuter
rights.

According to a recent INS statement,
the
1

19

Samora,

Q£>

L cit.,

Ibid., p. 22.

2Q

p.

l8

29.

Ibid

.

.

p.

Ibid.

157

,

p.

158.

.

,

.
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,
solution
is the Border
Crossing cr arda which
u-+-U
enables
he commuting
worker to return
to his status
as an
mencan immigrant each
time he oomes
comes t
to +h
this coun_
try. 21
Some of the laborers
enter i„_, under
„
entering
this
procedure return dailv
+u
daily to their
homes in Mexico
and
anada.
Others work a week nr- i
longer between trips
home 22
•

v,

.

.

-

•

^^ttics have claimed
Lalmed that +1..
the commuting
practice
legally questionable.
Samora has called
it a
"legal fiction" because
the commuting
workers are not
really immigrants 2
'

Because the INS bnnceeps no systematic
record of
the number of Mexican
immigrants who actually
commute
regularly to work in the
United States, the
numbers
and characteristics
of such commuters
are not entirely
clear.
However, two post- 19 64
studies of commuters
have been undertaken.

During November and December,
196?, the INS
asked ente ring green-carders
to complete questionnaires
21

IM£.

22

Ibid .

p.

20.

23

Ibid

.

p.

22.
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if they commuted
dailv
ly t0 Jobs

“

the United States.
The study found that
about 40.000 Mexicans
were living
^ "
in Mexico and crossing
the border each
day to work
the United States.
Some 40 percent
indicated. that
they were employed in
agriculture. 2 ^

m

Although the findings
of this study are
useful.
they do not indicate
the full scope of
the commuter
Phenomenon. First, only
daily commuters were
surveyed
and it is known that
some Mexicans with
commuter status
hold jobs in the United
States while returning
frequently.
but not daily, to their
homes and families in
Mexico.
Secondly, the study may
have underestimated
even the number of daily
commuters.

Samora has written,
It is known that when
counts are hpinrr + v
p obabl y apprehensive about
wha?
beinfnf’
^
1
a
th
r StatUS
eibh
?he Unild li t
«*.
United States

no^oL ^*

In January,

-

- is^

1968, the United States Labor

Department did a study of the
wages paid commuters in
and around Laredo, Texas. 26
It
found that those

doing farm work were paid less
than those employed in
24

,

Stanley M, Knebel, "Restrictive
Admission
d r Sl
Probable Impact on Mexican Alien
J
Commuter^
Pa
!m
f
_arm Labor Developments. November,
1968, pp. 8, 13.
o+

,

25

Samora, op. cit .. p. 22.

^Knebel, loc. cit .. p.

8.

"
*

,

,
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other jobs and well
below the
xne minimum wage
which
Congress had by then
set for
r a
aerie.,
it,
,
S r icultural
7
workers. 27
The number of
commuters doing farm
work may
seem small on a
national scale
Caie
Ho
However,
their concentration near the
Mexican border has
had an
important impact on the
labor market of these
areas.
The INS study found
that about h 9 percent
of the
daily commuters worked
in Texas. 38 percent
in California. and 13 percent
in Arizona. 28
Because ending
Public Law 78 did not
affect the
xne llow
flow of
-r
commuters,
these border areas
were adequately supplied
with
Mexican labor while many
previous users of braceros
were claiming a catastrophic
labor shortage during
-

u

A

A/

1965.

7

Still other studies deal
with the composite
of Mexican immigrants,
including commuters.
In a sur
vey conducted in
1965. James Nix found that
about
631.000 Mexican aliens were
registered with
the INS.

From a sample of the
registration cards, it was concluded that approximately
39,000 had listed their
27

Ibid

.

p.

17

28
.

Ibid

.

p.

8.

29

See the remarks of Senator
Sp essard Holland!
u.s.
fireSsional Recnrd (hereafter
indicated as
CR), Vi09th Cong., 1 st Sess.,
1965, CXI, Part 3 3099

^?

,

.
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occupations as

so.

form of farm wort.

However. Nix
believes this fi gure
is too small to
reflect the
Mexican -migrants'
impact on agriculture>
numerous others who
listed non-agricultural
jo bs
probably do farmwort
at least occasionally. "30
He
concludes that during
1965. the first
post-bracero
year, about 24.000
Mexican immigrants were
employed
on farms in California
morn ia. That was about 20
percent of
all seasonal farm
workers in that state 31
Nix study found that
a large proportion
of Mexican immigrants
doing farm wort in the
United
States "were relative
newcomers." Approximately
38 percent had been
admitted during the
1950 -s.
The
number increased markedly
during the first few
years
of the 1960 's.
Some 35 percent came
during the 1961-64
As noted earlier,
this increase in Mexican
immigration corresponded
with the declining years
of
Public Law 78. Some
growers were apparently
replacing
braceros with immigrants.
.

This trend was checked
by three developments.
The first was the July
1963. action of the Kennedy
30 „

on Farms,
31

a

1S

locr cit f. pp
Ibid., p. 39.

CS

3°5iS
32

eXICan Immi Srants Working

Ibid

j

^
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^^

administration giving the
Labor
g
the admission of
prospective immigrants
wanting to
enter the United States
for farm worh.
The second
was congressional
ratification
-tun oi
of xnis
this new procedure

m

1965.

Congress made historic
reforms in the
immigration
laws during 196 ,33
5
and fall . out from
resulted in a ceiling
being placed, for the
first time
on immigration from
Western Hemisphere
countries.
The’
*ey bill was H.R.
258o .
It provided for ending
controversial national
origins quota system which
provided a country-by-country
ceiling for annual
immigration from countries
outside the Western Hemisphere. As discussed
earlier, the Latin American

^

^

countries and Canada had
always been specifically
excluded from the quota
limitations, and no ceilings
had ever been placed on
immigration from those nations.
The Johnson administration
enthusiastically

championed H.R. 2580 and its
provisions for ending the
quota system
However, various conservative
congressmen sought to add amendments
to that bill which would
.

(1965),

fcY!

SS10nal gU?)rterlv Almanac
,

34

Jbid

.

»

p.

459.

XXI

.
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Place a ceiling on
immigration from Western
The

lnSS

1

pat-bl

'

wlth our

—

^

°n » as 0PP0S e d

ItS SPOkeSmen
Said they were
inco
"s

oial

;:
of ;
this hemisphere
33
h

ons hip

..

*
-

with nations

In the House,
Clark MacGregor
(R-Minn.)

introduced an amendment
to H.R. 25 8o which
would
have limited annual
immigration from Western
Hemisphere countries to
115 OOO
113
a-f+
000
After
reportedly strong
pressure from the
administration
is tra t ion, the
amendment was
rejected by a roll call
vote of I 89 - 218. 36
,

.

m

The administration's
fight against the
ceilings
was lost in the Senate.
As H.R. 258o was
being considered by a subcommittee
of the Senate Judiciary

Committee, it became
obvious that only a
minority of
its members were
willing to support that
bill (to end
the quota system)
without demanding a price.
The
administration needed to win
over two additional
senators on the subcommittee.
Everett Dirksen

(R-m.)

and Sam Ervin, Jr. (D-N.C.)
let it be known that
they
would support H.R.
25 80 only if the administration
W ° Uld dr ° P its
°PP° s ition to a ceiling for
Western
35 Ibid.

36

Ibid., p .

q.

62

.

)
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Hemisphere countries,
it reluctantl
-Luctantly agreed.
„
S penator
na+
Ervin then
introduced and the
Se
t
an amendment
limiting
Hemisphere immigration
to 120
1^0.000
000 annually,
elective duly
1( 1968 .37
The
Ervin amendment
was htp,
HoUSe
-eluded in the i aw I
(Public Law 89-236)
„ h i oh was
signed by President t v
dent Johnson on
October 3, 1965. 38
Inasmuch as it set
an upper
^
limit on immifrre
+ i™ from
e
gration
the Weq+ov^
u
western Hemisphere,
the Ervin
amendment to H
R
H.R. 2580 may be
seen as another
setack to the grower
cause.
Viewed from that ne
perspective.
it is paradoxical
that
h3t the
thS lni tiative
for some kind
oi ceiling came
predominant
minantly
lv from
conservatives. For
example, the five
members 01
of the Immigration
Tmmi
and
Naturalisation Subcommittee
supporting the Ervin
amendwere a combination
of southern
Democrats and Republicans.
opposing it were
Senators Edward Kennedy
(D ' MaSS ' ) ’ PhUiP
<«*>•> and Jacob Javits ( R-N
Y
Viewed from a second
perspective, establishment
o
an lmmigrati0n ce
ili n S for Western
Hemisphere countnes was not a serious
setback to growers
seeking

^

.

•

•

•

.

37

Ibid.

38

39
Ibid., p.

Ibid., p p . 459, 4
66<

.
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Mexican labor.

Southwestern farmers
rs had long
i
noted
ey preferred
temporary workers
unencumbered
by families
They had idealized
llzed the bracero
h
because
once the harvest
u
had enripn
ended, he returned
to Mexico
rather than remaining
S a3 ''onni
S ° Clal
in the United
s+
States.
While wetbacks cnnin
C0Uld meas «re up
to this standPe a
of immigrant
farm workers might
th=+

.

.

’

lMne

™ -P^
" w " “* "* -«•*

».«

«».

in domestic workers.

Consideration of this
perspective makes more
understandable the 1Q6^
1965 position of certain
traditional
nends of the bracero
program.
For example. Senator
Allen J. Ellender (D-La.)
claimed that the
termination
of Public Law yd had
resultprf
resulted

m

farm labor.

Nevertheless
iess

a serious shortage
of

rm q
OT,+
on
September
22, 1965, he
,

*

told the Senate,

"It mak es little sense
to me to continue to accept large
numbers of immigrants
when we
have almost four million
unemployed in the United
States
at the present
Yet during 19 6 5 he
was harshly
critical of Secretary Wirtz
for not permitting more

tW*>

,

temporary Mexican workers
to enter the United
States.
Although the Ervin amendment
probably reduced
the number of legal
Mexican farm workers entering
the
40

Ibid., p. 4?9,
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UnitSd Stat6S> Uberal
°PPosition to it is understandable
Mexican iabor reformers
ha d never been
critical, of the employment
of all Mexicans.
Most of
their criticism had been
aimed at the use of
foreign
labor which undermined
American competitors.
A more
permanent labor force of
Mexican immigrants
accustomed
to higher living
standards would hardly
p0S e the same
threat as impoverished
wetbacks and braceros
who had
no meaningful alternative
to working quietly
for the
American grower.
.

We have now discussed
three types of non-bracero
Mexican labor, wetbacks,
border-crossers and immigrants
A fourth type was
the so-called "H-2" worker.
,

Consistent with earlier American
immigration
laws, the Immigration and
Nationality Act
of 1952

(Public Law 4lh) provides for
the temporary admission
of certain foreign workers.
Type H-l applies to the

relatively skilled laborer and is
not particularly relevant to the importation of
agricultural labor. A type
H-2 entrant is defined in
Public Law hl4 as "an alien
having a residence in a foreign
country which he has
no intention of abandoning"
and "who is coming

temporarily to the United States to
perform other
temporary services or labor, if unemployed
persons
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capable of performing
such service
rvlce or 1labor
k
cannot
,
be found
in this country " 4l
ry ’
c
Section 214 D f the
same law provides
that
oat the Attorney
»++
General shall
prescribe conditions
to "egulate
regulate the entry
of nonimmigrants to the United
States
tates
T* specifies
that
admitting temporary
workers
oncers, the
prospective employer shall submit
a Petition
petition „containing
*
whatever
information the Attorney
y General
cneral shall
Rh »n prescribe.
Regulations issueda bv
*
by th
thea Attorney
General for
administering this section
"
state.
A U.S. Employment
ervice clearance order
concerning the
nonavailability
of qualified persons
in the United
States and stating
that its policies have
been observed shall
be attached
to every submitted
non-immigrant visa petition
to
accord an alien" an H-2
classification "unless the
petitioner has been informed
by the Service that
a
clearance order for the
beneficiary’s occupation
is
not required."^ 2
,

.

.

»

'

-

Although Public Law 78
authorizing the bracero
program and Public Law UlU
u
1 *+ contained
contain obviously
similar
provisions 03.ch sgtvph
rved aq distinct purpose.
The latter
•

______

f

.1
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was the general
immi^rati™
"deration ilaw and
made no specific
provision for rep^niov*-;
regularizing the entry
of Mexican labor
as such.
Of course
+
term Mex i=an
workers could
and h-h Snter
UndSr PuWic Law
*14 Just as could
workers from other
countries. As noted
earUer
.

.

’

temporary

Mexi^

workers have long
entered undlr
spec ial loopholes
written into the
general immigration
laws.
However, this broad
authority to import
shorten™ labor from any
country did not give
the same

specific recognition to
the demands of
southwestern
growers as did P-ivino^
giving them their own
special Mexican
program under Public Law
7 8.
This is not to say
that
bracero-users had not
welcomed the H- 2
provision of
Public Law UlU
t+ was a
convenient, supplementary
legal basis for
r continuing
contimHnrr +w„
the importation of
Mexican
labor should the bracero
program be ended.
.

•

debate leading up to
termination of Public
Law 78. reform forces
paid little attention
to this
loophole.
However, the great pressure
group struggle
of 1965 centered around
the temporary worker
provision
of Public Law 414.
Of the four alternative
sources of
Mexican labor, this was the
only one on which growers
and the administration
clashed vigorously. Farmers
were able to use increasing
numbers of wetbacks and
border-crossers without the
administration indicating
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any serious desirp -Fn~
f° r 3
°° Ul<1 1,6 n ° ”’ a

"

'

° lash

those issues.

i0r battlS ° n
the

Emigration

committed to keeping
it open.
11 ^ere
thp „ was to be
a
battle approximating
the intensitv
he 8tru «le over
Public
UDlic TLaw op
7 8, it had +r»
via
t0 be ° Ver the
final

„

•

•

option.
„ ,2 +tem
P°>-ar-y Mexican
workers.
Both the administration
a
and growers decided
to focus on it k
ocause those workers
C
617 reSemble<J bra ° er0S
That »as the only
one
of t h e four alternatives
which could have
been used to
-ng back, under another
name. a Mexican
labor supply
closely resembling the
bracero program.
•

'

-

r

Unlike immigrants,
braceros and H-2 workers
could be brought to the
United States for
temnorarv
work.
When the season ended,
they returned to
Mexico,
and farm communities
did not have to face
yearlong
migrant problems. Whereas
growers might have to
furnish housing for the
families of immigrant
migrants.
H 2 workers, like
braceros. came alone.
Although wetbacks and border-crossers
furnished a cheap, docile
force, their illegal
status presented problems
which braceros and H-2
workers did not. First,
not
all growers who wished
to use Mexicans were
willing
to employ illegal
ones.
Secondly, even those who
were could not be sure
that a reform administration

,
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would continue to
tolerp+*
er at e widespread
use of an
ni
,
illegal Mexican
labor force.

Sls - Ji ^S£_DeB artment' R

~

^

+
^^-^ns_
£ ove a

n 0 .. re£ni

entry of t.e,^

,

.

As observed earlier,
refrul^
regulations issued
by the
Attorney General had
given the TLabor
ah
n
Department broad
„
iscretion to determine
policies governing th
the admission
nf
+
Of temporary H -2
workers under Public
Law 4i4. Even
efore the bracero
program expired,
Secretary wirtz
correctly anticipated
that many growers
would attempt
o replace braceros
with massive numbers
of H -2
Mexicans
Consequently, he took
early steps to defeat
that effort.
.

.

.

During December,
1964, Secretary Wirtz
held
a series of public
hearings at which
criteria for the
admission of foreign workers
were considered. 4 3

On

December 19, he issued
tough new standards,
effective
January 1 1905 for
employers seeking H -2
44
,

,

workers
The importance of the
new criteria was that
they
forced growers to make
substantially more attractive
J ° b ° fferS
t0 Amer T°ans or forfeit
any hope of obtaining
.

Develop: ESu&f* 9*5
44

Ibid

.

pp.

6- 7 .

.

^

1

*/ ^^™labor

,
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temporary H -2 workers
from Mexico.
The new standards
specified
P ^med that
applications
would be considered
onlv
if
„„
,
y f em Ployers had
first made
reasonable efforts"
»
to utilize
llze aln sources
of
available domestic
workers « Reasonable
Ro
efforts were
a efined
to include offers
of
f daii
daily transporta
tion
- +
other appropriate
recruitment efforts."
and . willing.
ness to employ
workers from other
states.
The
secretary also issued
a state-by-state
suited
minimum waffp'?
1
wages.
Only growers
offering to
hire Americans for
no leSS
less than *u
the wage specified
for
+u
that state would be el
eligible to
hire foreign labor.
Also, employers were
required to furnish
family
housing "where feasible
and necessary."
The new regu .
lations required that
"except as otherwise
provided,
domestic workers must
'

.

.

be offered, as a
minimum, all

the terms and conditions
of employment that
are
offered to Mexican workers
under the migrant labor
agreement of 1951. as
amended, including
a

written
contract embodying these
conditions." Any growers
failing to honor these
contracts would be ineligible
to receive foreign
workers.
The regulations further
specified that foreign
workers could not be
employed "for a period
exceeding

-

307

days.

If domestic workers
became available for

jobs already filled by
braceros, -the domestic
workers must be given
preference." Finally, foreign
labor could not be used
by employers "involved
in
strikes or other labor
4
5
disputes.
The new standards once
again spotlighted the

foreign labor parodox of
southwestern growers. They
had long sought Mexican
workers as a means of reducing
the power of American
farm labor.

However, they were

again finding that legal
Mexican labor could be obtained only if they first
agreed to important demands
of American farm workers
and their political allies.
Mexico’s con cern with the rights of n_o
workers.

As noted earlier, the Mexican
government

took the position that the
United States had terminated
the bracero program too rapidly.
However, that did not
mean that Mexico was now willing
to supply massive
numbers of H-2 workers on whatever
terms southwestern
growers wished.
It will be recalled that Public
Law 78
and the agreement with Mexico had
outlined the rights
of braceros in detail.
Many of these guarantees represented American concessions to persistent
pressure from
the Mexican government.

^5

Ibid.

In contrast,

the H-2 provision
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Of Public Law 414
made no specific
reference to the
rights of these foreign
workers.
Consequently, any

grower effort to simply
substitute massive numbers
of H -2 workers for
braceros posed the danger
that the
Mexican government would
u
ia lose
lo^p tv
0 hard-won
the
concessions
hich it had gained in
Public Law 78
Therefore,
,

.

notwithstanding its desire
to continue sending
workers
to the United States,
the Mexican government
attempted
to head off what it
suspected were grower efforts
to
simply substitute H-2
workers with few rights
for
braceros who had enjoyed
substantial guarantees.
Secretary Wirtz supported
its efforts.
In his statement of
December 19

1964, Wirtz
noted that any continued
importation of Mexican
workers, even under the tough
new standards, would be
done only in cooperation
with the Mexican government 46
On December 31, 1964,
Antonia Carrillo Flores,
Foreign Minister of Mexico,
issued a statement concerning
the new regulations issued
by Secretary Wirtz.
He noted
that the provision for consultation
with Mexico had
,

.

taken into account "the views
expressed for some months
by the Mexican Government
and, particularly, by President Diaz to President Johnson
last November."
The

46

Ibid

•

,

p

,

7

•
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Foreign Minister further
explained:

;K4^sri £=£=£*'*-»
as having to be offered to
the U.S. workers 47
The Foreign Minister noted
that American
.

growers had already been asking
Mexico for H-2 workers
on these terms.
C riticism of the

new regulations

From the
time Secretary Wirtz issued the
new standards governing
.

admission of H-2 workers under Public
Law 4 l 4
were vigorously criticized in various

they

,

forums by

grower interests and their political
allies.

Spokes-

men for growers associations sent letters
and telegrams
to congressmen,

Johnson.

the Department of Labor, and President

Associations passed resolutions which received

wide publicity.

Their spokesmen met with congressmen

and representatives of the Labor Department.

testified in congressional hearings.

They

Also, various

congressmen criticized the new standards in congressional
47

Senate Agriculture Committee Hearings (hereafter cited as SAC Hearings), loc cit .. pp. 35-36.
.
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debate.

Some congressmen
attacked
a them
cnem ln
in „
congressional
hearings. Some sent
critical
i
++
critical letters and
telegrams
resident Johnson and
Secretary Wirtz. Various
newspapers featured
articles, editorials,
and letters
to the editor which
criticized the new
standards.
Critics of Secretary
Wirtz argued that he
had
gal authority for
setting farm wages.
Congress
had repeatedly refused
to extend
XXtnd minimum
mini™,
wage coverage
to agricultural labor. 4 ?
The hourly wages set
by
Wirtz were unreasonably
high and would encourage
workers to loaf.-50
,

.

critics charged that the
new regulations
would drive the cost of
production to an unreasonably
high level.
This would result from
such factors as
the excessively high
wage rates, reliance on
untrained
domestic workers, and
skyrocketing costs of recruitment.
It was charged that the
new standards were predicated on a highly unrealistic
assumption about American
workers which had been
repeatedly disproven. Wirtz
had assumed the existence
of an adequate supply

of
able and willing Americans
who could be hired for farm

49
50

CK, loc. cit.,
pp. 3100, 3102, 3111.

IMd.

.

pp.

3100, 3111.
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work.

During the early
months of 1965. the
critics
charged that even the
higher wages and
additional
benefits required by
the secretary were
failing to
attract enough domestic
workers to
save the crops.

They argued that
intensive recruiting
drives had been
undertaken at great expense,
but almost all were
disappointing. Many of the
available workers were
lame,
drunkards, lazy, or otherwise
undesirable

employees/
Most newly recruited
Americans quit their farm
jobs
after a few days. 51
Growers repeatedly explained
that their best efforts
to attract
domestic workers

had been a bitter
disappointment.

A typical case

is

illustrated by a letter from
the president of a
sugar company to Senator
Holland.
Advertising for

workers at a minimum wage of
$11.50 per day and
furnishing transportation in
air-conditioned buses,
he was able to hire only
one man, and he worked
only a

day. 52

The critics charged that
because many farmers

were denied reliable foreign
workers and forced to
depend on expensive and unreliable
domestics, the farm

pp.

For var ia.'t ions on "this ‘thomp
3100, 3105-3107. 3110. 3113.

3m;

52

Ibid

.

,

p.

4475.

qpp

T'hiri

31197^22-24.
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economy and the nation
would suffer.
Unless the new
regulations were rescinded,
devastating crop losses
were certain.
As early as January,
1965. various
senators were telling their
colleagues
that crops

were already rotting.

This theme occurred increas-

ingly during February and
March. 53

Farmers would not continue
to invest tens of
thousands of dollars in the
production of crops which
could not be harvested. Many
growers would cease
planting altogether or convert
their land to low
labor crops.
This would bring food shortages
and
skyrocketing costs to consumers.
The critics of Secretary Wirtz
noted that some

growers were leaving the United
States and buying farms
Mexico.
They claimed that labor there was
much
cheaper and far more dependable. Senator
George
Murphy (R-Calif.) told his colleagues
that he knew of
five major farmers who had already
moved their operations
to Mexico.
He claimed that this exodus would
undermine the secretary’s goal of putting
Americans

m

to

work.

As farmers left, American farm workers
and all

whose jobs were dependent on them, such as
teamsters,

would lose their jobs.
53

Ibid

.

.

Also joining the exodus, the

pp. 3100, 3110, 3128.

.
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critics claimed, were
various packing companies.
This pattern had been
developing for several
years,
and it was helping
Mexico to increase her
volume of
farm exports to the
United States. Because
companies
could produce more cheaply
in Mexico than
in the

United States, they were
able to undersell American farmers.
This too would adversely
affect

domes-

tic farm workers.-^

Critics of Secretary Wirtz
argued that his
120-day limit on foreign workers
was unrealistic.
Some crops, such as dates,
take up to ten months to
develop, and it would make
no sense to force growers
to employ two or three
different crews of foreign

workers during the season. 55

Secretary Wirtz was portrayed as
an impractical,
ivory tower official who had
listened
too much to

"do-gooders."

Although he was well meaning, he
knew
very little about the problems of
farmers.
As one

congressman stated the critic ismi

"There is a con-

test going on, an imposition of
the will by someone
who has a theory, on people who
have had years of

practical experience
54

-~bid

‘

»

PP*

t

p.

3106, 3108, 3110, 3117,
3100.

^ Ibid

.

.

pp.

3144.

3108-3109.

31k

.

On

January 15 , 1965,
Secretary Wirtz
responded to the
attack on his new
standards for
d6fenSe WaS Presented

Sporting H-2 workers.

-

testimony before the
Senate Agriculture
and Forestry Committee.
Secretary Wirtz was
particularly concerned
wtth the charge that
after Congress had
repeatedly
refused to regulate
farm wages and working
conditions,
1,6 had artitra
^ne just that. „ e noted
that no
farmer was being forced
to abide by the new
regulations.
They governed only
those growers who
voluntarily chose to ask for
the special privilege
of
importing temporary workers
from other countries.

^

Congress had provided in
Public Law 4 l 4 for limiting
the conditions under
which farmers could obtain
such
labor.
Section 10 specified that
temporary workers
could be imported only "if
unemployed persons capable
of performing such service
or labor cannot be

m

found

this country."

Referring to that section,
Wirtz
explained to the committee*
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T

ro\\eVa^

which we
p
in terms of whether
mUSt be
work to
b * cb
e are re ~
+° whlJ
fernng is work with the
res^ot
* hlch Vit cannot
be said that there
0
of performing such
apable
service^r^abo^to
° r labor to be J
found
this country. 57

^

m

Congress had not specified
the standards for
determining when such conditions
exist.
However, it
had provided in Public
Law 414 for the Attorney
General to decide on the
admission of H-2 workers
after consultation with other
governmental agencies.
Wirtz pointed out that the
Attorney General had
issued regulations giving the
Labor Department the
authority to veto the entry of H-2
workers when
Americans were available to fill
the
’

jobs.

By

issuing the new regulations,
Secretary Wirtz claimed
that he had simply been meeting
his responsibility.
It was unquestionable that
there were unemployed persons in the United States.
He noted that they numbered
almost four million. The only question,
then,
was to

determine whether this huge labor
surplus contained
enough persons capable of doing the
necessary farm work.
At starvation wages, the decision
required by Congress
could not be made. Even capable unemployed
persons
57 SAC

Hearings, loc. cit .. p. 65.

$
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"Xght very well refuse
to harvest crops
if they were
unable to earn a living
by doing the work.
Nor did
Congress provide in Public
Law 4i4 that -'labor
shortages" resulting from
substandard wages and
working conditions could
be solved by simply
i mpor t.
ing alien workers.
As Secretary Wirtz
explained it, his primary

responsibility under Public
Law 4l4 was to come up
with some meaningful system
for determining if an
adequate supply 0 f capable
unemployed Americans could
be hired to fill vacant
farm jobs.
He claimed that
determination could be made only
when wages and
working conditions had been
lifted above
the sub-

standard.

That was the purpose of his
new regulations.
He believed they would make
farm labor sufficiently

attractive to prove that all vacant
agricultural positions could be filled by American
workers . 8
T he

dispute ove r congressional intent, in

t ermination of the bra cer
o

program

.

During early 1965

,

much of the disagreement between
grower interests and
reformers centered around the question
of congressional
intent in terminating Public Law
78 .
More specifically,
38

For the secretary’s defense of the new
regulations, see Ibid
pp. 64-100.
.

.

”
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was the decision
to end the brace™
racero program
motivated
desire to convert
to domestic farm
labor?
r was congressional
intent limited solely
to ending
a or importation
under Public Law
78 with no implications at all for
Mexicans entering as
temporary
H-2 workers under
Public Law 4 i 4 ?
Reformers predictably advanced the
former argument. They
claimed that
the congressional
decision to end the
bracero program
had been a clear
message to the Labor
Department to
tighten the administration
of Public Law 4 l 4
so as
not to undermine the
broad purpose of Congress.
In hearings before
the Senate Agriculture
and Forestry Committee
on January 15.
1965. Secretary
Wirtz responded to
suggestions that Public Law
4l 4
could be used to supply
substantial numbers of farm
workers "to American srowsrc;
uQ „
growers.
He
replied that
.

the

law which Congress had
terminated would "not be
reinstated by administrative
action through a back
59
door.

Even before the bracero
program ended, various
interest groups warned that
any attempt to bring
large numb ers of Mexican
workers into the United States
59 Xbid.

,

p.

66.

.

,
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under Public Law 4 l 4 wnnin
1
Would v i°late
congressional
->

tent.

F 0r instance,

in-

the executive
council of the

AFL-CIO expressed the
following position at
its
meeting on November 24
1964:
,

The AFL— C 10 was srra + i -p* qj u
n
Con ress put an
end to the importation
of Mev" ar farm
under Public Law 78
laborers
\f
We
that some large agrlculLnf? ? p P alled to learn
making efforts to « + Ura i in terests are
S me pro ra“
under Public Law 4 l 9
S
? ear
^This^e
to the intent of
con trary
Congress fndd * ust
not be
allowed to happen. 6o K

™

™

-

I

P

Another statement of the
reformers- interpretation of congressional
intent was submitted
at the
January hearings of the
Senate Agriculture Committee
by the legislative
representative of the Amalgamated
Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen of North

America.
He claimed that Congress
had focused on Public
Law
78 only because it was
the primary source of
foreign

workers 61

Andrew

J.

Biemiller, head of the AFL-CIO

Department of Legislation, argued
for the same liberal
interpretation of congressional
intent.

In a letter
he sent to all members
of the House in early
1965,
the former congressman

observed*

6o T
6l

,

Ibid

.

Ibid

.

.

p.

198

p.

258.

.
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13
the Immigration
and Natural? ? Public Law 4l4,
as a means of
Act be
ciroumvtS
clear intent of
Congress to stop all fnl- g
01"
The growers have
embarked unon^ C * import ation.
mpai n
Secre r y of Labor
^because
Decause he has S against
maneuver. 62
opposed this
.

'

k

L

viewpoint that the
intent of Congress
in
terminating P ublic Law
?8 00uld

^

fee

^

UStlfy thS t0Ugh nSW
re S u Tat ions was
stated especially
;
fully and on different
occasions by Senator
Holland,
on March
9.

196 5

.

he told his
colleagues

that Congress had not
even considered
terminating
the H -2 provision
of Public Law 4i*.
The whole debate
had focused on the
wisdom of ending Public
63
Law
78 .

Senator Holland observed
that in debate leading
up to termination
of Public Law 78 a
.
number of
congressmen had pointed out
that the end of the
bracero
program would have no
effect on the admission

of H -2
No reformers had
challenged that interpretation at that time.

workers.

CR,

63

loc. cit .. p. 4483

Ibid .

64
Ibid-

.

p.

3104.

.
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m

Th e revival of
grower interests a
ur:ir g
,

,

^

early January,
1965>
whole
over fore ign labor
changed dramatioally
as late 1964

Q^ C

^ ^ ^^

the s hort s Pan of
a few months from

^

^
.

^

growers had generally
seemed reconciled to termination
of the bracero
program.
Although the struggle
over Public Law 78
had been long
and bitter, many of
its traditional
supporters had
actually agreed to its
death.
The reformers
appeared
to have won at laqt
last.
Yet ln early 1965.
the grower
demand for* foreign ilabor
g
was so loud and vocally
supported by so many
Luuerests that it was
y interests
reminiscent
of the World War II
era.
Even some senators
such as
Ellender who had agreed
to ending the bracero
program
were now in the forefront
of the grower demand
for
foreign labor. Senator
George Aiken (R-Vt.).
who had
supported reform of the
Mexican labor system, emerged
,

'

•

-

in early 1965 as a
leading critic of Secretary
Wirt 2

.

What had happened in this
short period to revitalise
the Mexican labor cause?
It was noted earlier
that the strength of

supporters of Public Law 78
had weakened as braceros
came to be concentrated in
fewer and fewer areas,
Reformers had used this
increasing geographic isolation

‘

321

zz r

1'

“

re " i,

,h '* ,h *

served a narrow
regional interest.
Secretary Wirtz’s
issuance of new
governing the admission
of temporary foreign
labor
under Public Law
4l4 was oertainiy

-rms

of his concern
that

ended in name only.

^

^^^

^

For termination of
Public Law 78
to be meaningful,
loopholes needed to be
plugged, and
that was what he had
done.
On the surface,
that action
seemed to be an unmixed,
further setback for the
users of Mexican labor.
Although they might
still
obtain some temporary H-2
Mexican workers under
Public Law 414 . they
could do so only after
markedly
improving their treatment
of American workers.
Viewed from a different
perspective,
the

secretary’s attempt to plug
the H-2 loophole
enabled
bracero-users to overcome
some of their previously
fatal isolation and gain
important new support from
non-western regions. Because
Public Law
78 had pro-

vided a supply Of Me xican
workers only, growers in
regions using non-Mexican
foreign labor saw that
program as being only indirectly
beneficial to them.
However, once Wirtz began to
fight bracero-users by
tightening the administration
of the H-2 provision of
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Public Law

Ui U

hie?

tl0n dlre °tly
threatened growers
of various eastern
and southern states
which used
substantial amounts of
-offshore" and Canadian
labor.
Of Which was H-2
workers.
The new regulations
brought these interests
into a dramatic new
coalition
with southwestern
growers. More than
anything else,
this accounts for the
rapid growth of
’

opposition to’

Secretary Wirtz.

When the administration
chose to
crack down on the users
of all temporary H-2

workers,

not just employers of
Mexicans, it guaranteed
a
broadening of opposition to
its policies.
Now that Florida's offshore
labor supply was
in jeopardy, a great
variety of organizations,
interest
groups, and newspapers from
that state joined the
assault on the administration.
Spessard Holland.
one of Florida's senators,
led the fight against the
new regulations. 65
The new regulations struck
directly at the
users of Canadian labor in New
England.
In an aboutface, Senator Aiken decided
that farm labor reform had
gone too far.
On March 9. 1965, he told the
Senate

that Canadian labor was needed
in New England.
Fair
wages had long failed to attract
an adequate supply
65

Ibid.
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of American workers. 66

Why did 0ld friends
of P ^lio Law 78
such as
ender, „ ho abandoned
it in 1963 and
1964. suddenly
see a gr*6a.t need
for Mevir'caKi
exican workers
1965? The
answer necessarily
involves speculation.
One possibility is outlined
below.
These old champions
of
Public Law 78 abandoned
only that law. not
their conviction that Mexican
labor was needed.
There are
several strategic reasons
why these congressmen
may
have agreed to termination
of the bracero
program.
First, by 1963, it was
clear
ar that
xnat 11
if th
tho+
at ilaw remained
in effect, the
administration would continue
,

.

1

m

to use
it as a wedge for
reforming the conditions
of domestic

farm workers.

This made the program
increasingly less
desirable to growers.

Secondly, reformers had
focused so heavily on
Public Law 78 's vulnerabilities
that they had discredited that law far more
than the practice of using
Mexican labor as such.
Therefore, when the grower
coalition agreed to termination
of the bracero program,
they were abandoning an
unpopular program, a "sinking
ship." On the other hand,
liberal reformers
had

66

Ibid

.

.

p.

4483

.
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rarely criticized the
H-2 provisions of P
ublic Law
Gr ° WerS thUS hoped
t0 achieve their
same old
purpose the continuing
acquisition of temporary
Mexican labor, under
the more popular Public
Law 4l4.
Thirdly, until Secretary
Wirtz’s new regulations were issued,
growers were less obligated
to
Mexican workers entering
under Public Law 4 l 4
than
to braceros coming
in under the provisions
of
,

Public
Because farmers and their
congressional
allies saw the former as
the means by which the
importation of Mexican labor
could be continued even
after expiration of the
bracero program, it is little
wonder that the secretary’s
effort to plug that loophole brought vehement
opposition from bracero areas.

Law 78

.

.T

he foreign labor c o alition
during 196^

.

a

large number of interest
groups, congressmen, farmers,
and newspapers blamed
termination of the bracero
program for creating a serious
shortage of farm labor.

During late 1964

,

some news media warned that

termination of Public Law ?8 would
result in a farm
labor shortage. After January
1, 1965, others
claimed that the warnings had come true.
Some went
no further while others advocated
removal of the new
restrictions on the entry of H -2 workers.
Most of
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these publications
were located in the
South and
Southwest. Among them
were the Tampa Tribune
the
.

?iia!!UU:i£2yi

’

and the Los Angeles
Herald-Eyamirov. 67
-

During 1965. many
western corporations
and
interest groups claimed
that a farm labor
shortage
had developed.
Among them were many
growers associations.
Many claims of labor
shortages

also came
from corporate farms
and interest groups in
the South,
particularly Florida.

During early 1965,
traditional users of
Canadian labor in New England
exerted considerable
pressure against Secretary
Wirtz's new regulations
governing entry of H-2 workers.
These interests were
particularly outspoken at hearings
held on Marc.h
29,

1965.

in Presque Isle. Maine, by
a subcommittee of the
House Committee on Education
and Labor.

Especially

well represented were state
officials and potato
growers opposing the new
regulations. 69

^

ing February and March.
1965, a number of

67 TV .
Ibid., pp.

SAC

3098-4145, 4472-84.

Hearingr^LS 168 “*
69

Law ^

S

C

ngr

House

thr ° Ughout

General Subcommittee
?!S’
on Labor of ;^
the pCommittee
on Education and Labor
earings, Investigat i on on Importation
of Farm Labor*
i nto the United Stajtes,
89th Cong., 1s t Sess., 1965.
’

)

))
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-ate,

made a sustained

^

^

administration that a
serious farm lab or
shortage had
arrived and that it
should permit
substantial numbers
H-2 workers to
enter the United

States.
The
initiative was led by
newly elected Senator
George
rphy (R-Calif.) a nd
Senator Spessard
Holland (D-Fl a .)
Also joining the
grower cause in Senate
debate during’
February and March were:
1

.

1 en J
Ellen der (D-La.)
T i
m
John
Tower (R-Tex.
Gordon Allott (R-Colo.
George Smathers (D-Fla
Peter Dominick (R-Colo.’))
h Y rb
Ugh (°- T ex.)
r^o
M p
°f°
Gale McGee
(D-Wyo.)
Frank Lausche (D-Ohio)
Paul Fannin (R-Ariz.)
Wayne Morse (D-Ore.)
George Aiken (R-Vt.)
Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.
Carl Hayden (D-Ariz.)
Phillip Hart (D-Mich.)?°
'

2.
3.

4.
5.
6
7.
8
9.
.

.

10

.

11

.

12
13.
14.

.

Grower oriented congressmen
rendered various
types of assistance to
farmers seeking foreign
labor
during 1965. These
legislators often acted as
intermediaries in communicating
grower dissatisfaction to
the Labor Department.
For example,
in January,

1965,

various spokesmen for Florida
citrus organizations
expressed their dismay with
Wirtz's new regulations
loc

,

cit

.

f

pp.

3098-4145, 4472-84.

’

327
in meetings with
several members of
that state's

congressional delegation
Legation.

A& -p
few days iater,
a Florida

newspaper reported
that Secretary Wirtz
had just
experienced "10 days of
unrelenting pressure
from
senator Spessard Holland
and other Florida

lawmakers. "71

a similar pattern
of channeling grower
unrest
to the government
developed in Wyoming.

The Wyoming
Sugar Beet Council
sponsored a meeting at
Casper on
February 12, 1965, for
the purpose of airing
complaints about the labor
situation. Attending
were
beet growers, spokesmen
for major sugar
processors
located in the state, and
federal, state, and

local

employment service officials.

Wyoming Senator McGee

sent a member of his
Washington staff to
participate
in the meeting.
In a letter dated
February 15, 1965,
the senator communicated
the outcome of that
meeting’
to Secretary Wirtz and
solidly endorsed the grower

demands for foreign labor.

McGee wrote that there was

no hope for meeting his
state's farm needs from the
domestic labor supply. He
urged Wirtz "to take immediate steps to authorize and
certify the need for
7^
foreign workers."'
71

IMd.,

p.

3133.

72

Ibid

.

,

p.

3118.

^

1
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Sometimes congressmen
met with President
Johnson to request
foreign labor. At
a press conference in early
April. 19 6 5 Senator
Holland
announced that he had
met with the President
to
dxscuss the urgent
need for foreign
labor in Florida
Senators Holland and
Murphy acknowledged
that they
were involved in
an effort to get the
President to
personally intervene with
Secretary Wirtz so more
alien workers could
be imported.
They threatened
to attempt to have
Johnson fire Secretary
Wirtz
unless the new
a
1
guiations governing H-2
workers
were relaxed.
,

•

npte on interests sunnort.in
g the
tr ation-s fo r e ign
labor p olic y
Reform forces were
not nearly so active
during 1965 as they had
been the
previous year. While the
grower coalition
A-

.

.

in the

Senate was mounting a
major assault on Wirtz >s
new
regulations, they were answered
in debate by only one
or two supporters of the
administration.

At the January, 1965,
hearings of the Senate
Agriculture Committee, eight
congressmen testified

against the new standards, while
only one, Senator
Harrison J . Williams (D-N.J.),
defended them.
73 New

York Times, April

3,

1965, p

.

32

.

329

At those hearings,
spokesmen for reform
groups were
outnumbered by interests
seeking
to increase the

number of „- 2 workers.

Practically all of the
re
form groups had been
active in the earlier
struggle
against Public Law
78
.

What had happened
since late 1964 to
transthe noisy, persistent
reform forces into
such
a passive coalition?
At least four answers
suggest
themselves.
One possibility is
that the reform
forces
were simply repeating
the mistake of letting
down their
guard once a narrow
legal victory had been
won in
terminating Public Law
78.
Secondly, some of the
m ° re marginal
ma y have had second
thoughts
about the merits of cutting
off foreign labor
once

Public Law 78 had expired.

Once the bracero program

had expired, the grower
coalition took the offensive
again and "evidence" of
labor shortages and crop
losses was presented during
the first six months
of
1965.
Some "reformers" who had
thought there would
be an adequate supply
of domestic labor began
to doubt
that they had been correct.
A third explanation for
the cooling of reform

enthusiasm during 1965
Wirtz

•

s

is

related to the fact that

attack on Public Law 4l4 alienated
some

330

eastern congressmen
who had been
critical
bracero program.

0 f the

Fourthly, the problem
of achieving
reform
under P ub i io Law
in 1965 was Qf
^
different nature from
the task involved
in getting

^

U bUC

^^

te

™ inated

-d the bracero program,
Co n gress had to be
convinced and that
required reform
groups to be active.
The power to reform
the adminisration of Public Law
klk lay with Secretary
Wirtz
and he needed no
convincing from the
reformers be-’
cause he already agreed
with them.
This may account
for some of the
surface passivity of
liberals during
1965.
-

T he reduction of
temp orar y foreign

As noted earlier,
grower initiative to
obtain H -2

workers intensified as
the months of
1965 passed.
Although Secretary Wirtz
had firmly insisted all
along
that he believed the
domestic farm labor supply
was
adequate, he had never ruled
out the possibility
that some foreign workers
might be needed for the
transitional period.
By late March, Wirtz
was still holding his

ground and had refused to admit
a single Mexican H-2
worker.
He continued to maintain
that he saw no

s
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convincing evidence of
a domestic labor
shortage
However, he could not
ignore the rising
tide of
Protest against his
position. Growers could
point
to some crop losses.
and this furnished
them with
the hind of emotional
levers which might
eventually
be used to undermine
the secretary.
In late March. Wirtz
journeyed to California

for an on-the-spot
evaluation of the alleged
labor
shortage. * Walking the
fields, he talked with
workers, union spokesmen,
growers, and local
officials.
California farmers hoped
that the secretary's
trip would convince
him that Mexican labor
was
desperately needed. Many
told him that although
they
had substantially increased
wages, they simply could
not hire enough capable
workers.
They were scraping
the bottom of the barrel
and had hired many workers
who would never have been
employed under less pressing
circumstances. Some crops had
rotted, and many more
were in great danger.
Only Mexican nationals could
save them.

Farm workers had long seen
Public Law 78 as
74

Th( Following account
of Wirtz*
r
trio to
f
based heavily on New York Times
larch 27^1
torch'
27, 1965, p. 6 and March 29,
1965, p. 1.

n Ql

i

.

.

oV

,
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a major barrier to
unionization.

As soon as it expired, efforts to
organize agricultural
workers
increased.
This was very much
on the minds of
growers when Secretary
Wirtz arrived in
California.
They claimed that his
new regulations
placed them
at the mercy of union
organizers.
Some boldly asked
him to pledge that the
government would guarantee
a supply of Mexican
workers to save any
crops
threatened by strikes.

Farm workers and union
spokesmen told Secretary Wirtz that there
was no shortage of
domestic
farm workers. While
1,500 union members were
unemployed in the Salinas Valley,
farmers there were
requesting 5,100 Mexicans.
Union spokesmen told
Secretary Wirtz that growers
sought Mexican labor
not to meet any labor
shortage but simply to prevent
unionization.

Various comments which the
secretary made on
his California trip indicated
that he was not very
convinced by grower claims that
they had made reason
able efforts to obtain domestic
labor.
For
example,

he characterized a labor
camp near Salinas as being

"filthy" and proclaimed it shameful
that such conditions existed in the United
States.

333

H33 inspection
completed, Wirtz held
a news
conference
Los Angeles on March
28
He noted
that Congress had
ended the hracero
program. Some
people had refused to
accept that congressional
dec is ron.
They were seeking
to import massive
numbers
of temporary foreign
workers under Public Law
kik.
He bluntly said
that he would not

m

.

permit that.

The

time Of a governmenmentally
supplied labor force
was over.
Farmers could get workers
in the same

way other employers
did,
labor market,

compete for them in the
wirtz rejected the
argument
that

higher wages would bring
prohibitively high food
prices.
Nor was he impressed
with the grower claim
of catastrophic labor
shortages in the
State of

California.

Secretary Wirtz claimed that
the transition to domestic labor
had been accomplished
with
minimal problems for growers.
However,
he did

acknowledge that the fall harvest
would require more
labor, and he admitted that
some foreign workers
might be needed then.
On April 15, 1965, Secretary
Wirtz established
the California Farm Labor
Panel and assigned it the
task of assessing the farm
labor situation in that
state and evaluating requests
for foreign workers.

334
Its members were
appointed from the three
campuses of
the University of
75

California.

Wirtz promptly noted that
creation of the
panel was not a retreat
from his initial position
on
foreign labor. He recalled
that he had never claimed
that all temporary Mexican
labor could be banned
from
California. Now he said that
perhaps a few H-2 workers
would be admitted but only
if the panel objectively

determined that the domestic
labor supply „ as inadequate 76
The panel held public
hearings to gather information on the alleged need for
foreign workers.
Growers testified that Mexicans
were essential to save
.

the crops.

Representatives of organized labor
denied
it.
A spokesman for the
California State Federation
of Labor testified that 4 2,000
?
people were
unem-

ployed in California and that many
of them were in
the very areas to which growers
were seeking to import Mexicans. 77
The California Labor Panel recommended
that

Secretary Wirtz admit a small number of
Mexicans.
75 U.S

In

Department of Labor, Year of Transitio n.
Spaqn , 3ll Farm Labor:
Seasona
196^ p. I-50.
.

New York Times. April 16, 1965,
p. 12.
77

Denied,

Gladwin Hill, "Need of Braceros on Coast
New York Times April 21 1965,
p. 34.
.

,
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late May,

1
.

965

,

he authorized
2,700 for work in
the

asparagus and strawberry
harvests.

However, according to a publication
by the Labor
Department,
r

th
f 1
U
er f
rk
U * h ° riZed had
;ut |o :o rk? Se
g?o w:rs :r ? ® d to
them because they
rele ase
had no fWh
eed for Me xican workers. By July
20
y®
* M
X1Can
workers had bee£
^triate'd. 78

|en

On May 7. 1965.
Secretary Wirtz set up
a

Michigan Farm Labor Panel
to evaluate requests
for
Mexican labor in that

state.™

Ten days later

the panel advised
him that five thousand
alien
workers would be needed
for the pickle harvest.
Howthey were never brought
to Michigan.
According to
the panel’s final
report, that was because
the

prospective employers lost
their eligibility to use
foreign workers by their
“refusal or failure to
accept all of the domestic
workers that had been
referred to them by the
Employment Service ." 80
By the fall of 1965,
it was clear that
Wirtz
would cert ify far fewer
foreign workers than growers
78

Employment Trends 1964-196^
^

D evelopments

1

July, 1965, p. 5

.

79 U-S..
80-r-u

•

.

Far.™
arm
—

t

-k
Labor

Department of Labor, op. cit
.. p

,

Ip id

"

,

,

p.

j -2

.

.

j. 37
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wanted.

Consequently, an effort
was made to transfer authority over
the admission of H-2
workers
from the Labor
Department to the Department
of AgriAt the suggestion of
Senator Holland, the
Senate Agriculture
Committee amended the
omnibus
farm bill to give the
Agriculture Secretary the
responsibility for deciding
when temporary foreign
agricultural labor was needed. 81
As noted

earlier,
farm-bloc interests had
long sought to put
foreign’
labor under control of
the Department of
Agriculture
on the assumption that
it was less sympathetic
to
farm labor reform.

President Johnson. 82 the
Attorney Ceneral, and
the Departments of
Agriculture and Labor opposed
the
Holland amendment. 88 0n the
floor of the Senate,
Ross Bass (D-Tenn.) introduced
an amendment to nullify
the Holland amendment and
leave control over foreign
farm workers in the hands
of the Secretary of Labor. 84
The vote was 45 - 45
It became 46-45 for the
Bass
.

8l

N ew

York Times

,

September

3,

1965, p. 4.

82
S

cited as
pp

^rx 1

x °(l 9 pgr» 7 r

Ibid

.

,

p.

84

down

"
»
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lY A1manar (hereafter

.

a ld R
JOneS
"Farm Labor Curb Faces ShowNP! v
L
o
New
York
Times. September
12, 1965, p. 53.
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amendment when Vice
Preside*
w
reoident Humphrey
broke the tie.
Democratic senators
split 43-17
fnr the amendment.
7
7 for
Only two Republicans
voted for it while 28
OH opposed
-LX#

85

During 1964 ,
approximately

1 ? 8,000
Mexicans
worked in the United
States as braceros as
or as
H -2 temporary
workers.
They were employed
a
Of seventeen states. 86
According to Secretary
Wirtz
"the major change
in 19 6 5 was the
greatly reduced
importation of Mexican
workers." During that

^

^

year,
he certified a
total of 200,100
ion w
H-2c workers from
Mexi=0.
All were employed in
8
California. ? During
1965.

there was also
substantially less reliance
on British
West Indian and Canadian
H-2 workers than there
had
88
been during 1964,

Measured in man-months,
from 1964 to 1965,
there was a decrease of
about 83 percent in
American
reliance on foreign workers. 8 ^
85

£3A, xxi (1965), 87.
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The use of H-2 workers
declined even further
during 1966. Secretary
Wirtz
J

certify
certified

approximately

34 percent fewer than
he had the previous
year. 90
Reliance on H-2 labor
continued
to decline

during 1967.

According to a publication
of the

Department of Labor:

the f rst Period
in more than 24 years
}
vear4 when
«b™’ all
V? crops in
+
the
ited States were tended
without the hpi^
h lp
of temporary

foreign workers. 91

Collective discussion of H-2
workers obscures
some important facts about
the shifting relative
position of legal temporary
Mexican labor. During
the years of Public Law
78, the number of braceros
working in the United States
had greatly out-numbered
all of the non-Mexican workers
entering under
the H-2

provision of Public Law 4l4.

By 1967. the other

nationalities had come to out-number
the Mexicans. 92
The year 1968 set new records
for decreased
reliance on H-2 workers.
In 1969, the Labor Department
reported:
90„
”

ment
nt

’

ment
nt

»

”

Fa™

Tr ® nds in Foreign-Worker EmployLabor Developments. January,
1967, p. 21.

iiarm

T ™nds in Foreign-Worker
EmployLabor Developments. February, 1968,
p. n.
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Last year was the
Slnce the beginning
of World War II that
no
n contract workers
were employed in aerir>ni?
Uni * ed .States
Further, for nearly
half
968^?^-rom April
September, no foreign rnr\ o^i
to
+
nationality were
-

In creasing reliance on

farm

1aW

.

As the bracero program
was being phased out
in late
1964, the Labor Department
clearly accepted an obligation to assist growers
in recruiting an
adequate
number of domestic workers.
On December 14, 1964,
before issuing the new
standards governing admission
of H-2 workers under
Public Law 4l4, Wirtz called
for a massive state-federal
initiative to recruit
American farm labor.

Secretary Wirtz paid particular
attention to
growers who were likely to
request foreign
workers.

A special program of
"mobile teams" was established
to help them recruit domestic

labor.

efforts were guided by two goals.

The Department's

The first was to

supply farmers with enough workers
to replace braceros
93..

Farm Labor Devel

Marcht

196^.

9 4,,

1965?

^™

Workers »" Farm
<

Laboj^Sf^

8?

34o

The second was to
olacp
Place thoop
those persons most
in need
of work. ^
The Department of
Labor summarized its
initiative as follows:
r

V
t
t WaS
t' e ^ r
sibility°to 'undertake
respon
whatever
"
re
hi'
e
e
a
t0 a
that
d:me s?Io°
r s w Srbe
an °PP°rtunity
to be employed
Thev
tary-s fiegulations^and^ere
he Seore '
J
^ncoura g d to
orders for domestic
place
workers
conditions of emolo-vmpn+ ^ offe nng wages and
with these
Regulations?
to them that a
request for foreign
unless such a iob offer h h°v 1<1 not be considered
ad een ma de to
workers. Where an emni
domestic
r ^
had alrea dy placed
an order, he was
1
“Pportunity to revise
his job offer.
It u,o« o'
0
0
workers would’be
0
brourh^L^f^suff^'"
ufflclent
domestic workers coni!
Uld be \i
obtalned under
these c onditions 9?

^ ^

S fn=w
T

^

!

L

/ ^®

-
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A dozen mobile teams,

staffed jointly by the

Labor Department and state
employment offices, were
created in early 1965.
They fanned out from
base
cities in Florida, California.

Arizona, and Texas. 97

Later in the year, ten
additional teams began recruitmg for the apple harvest in New
98
England.

95 »
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growers had already
re
quested.
Techniques included
advertising vacancies
radio and television
and in newspapers.
The teams
also sought workers
through unions, churches,
service
clubs, and welfare
are agencies.
aapncio.?
mu
They even made
door-todoor inquiries in
various low income areas."
A second

recruitment program
undertaken by
the federal government
during 1965 was known
as the
"A-Team" system.
It was established
for the purpose
of recruiting
high-school, male athletes
for farm
work.
Each team consisted of
students and a counselor
from the same school.
The counselor supervised
the
student workers on his
team.
A total of 3,225
A-Teams were placed during
100
1965.
A third federally
operated effort to hire
farm

workers was known as the
College Summer Recruitment
Program.
Inaugurated in 1964, it was
intensified
during 1965. and it placed
about 5. 000 students in
agricultural jobs. 101
99

Groom, loc cit
100
U.S., Department of Labor,
op. cit .. pp
101
Ibid
P« 13.
,

.

1

.

.
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fourth federal
recruitment program
was known
Project Growth.”
Secretary Wirtz described

as

it as

"an experiment to
determine whether
opportunities
for seasonal
agricultural employment
could be utilised in the
rehabilitation of disadvantaged
youth.”
The young male
recruits first went
through a pre-job

orientation program lasting
two to four weeks.
Secondly, they did
farm work for six to
eight
weeks.
That was followed by
one month of testing
counseling, and "referral
to other manpower

develop-

ment activities.”

At the end of 1965

Secretary
Wirtz concluded that
the program "did not
result
significant additions to
the agricultural labor
force.
There had not been
sufficient time for the
Proper planning and staffing
of the project, recruitment of the youth, or
provision of the kind
,

of a

working environment necessary
to the success of so
102
complex a project ."
The program also ran
into
considerable opposition within
the Labor Department
where certain officials
thought "dead-end"
farm

work was a n inappropriate
basis for rehabilitation 10 3
.

102 T
Ibid .
,

.

,

103

Work
Work.

"

J P hn fcmfret
"Jobless Youths to do Farm
M-,
New
York Times. May 9 1965,
p. 82.
,

.

3^3
To fill farm labor
nee(Js after terminat
on Qf
Public Law ?8 the
federal government
.

(

also urged state
governments to intensify
their efforts. State
employment agencies expanded
their traditional methods
of
104
recruitment.
During 1?65f a number Qf
state
governments sponsored special
recruitment drives.
For example, the
California Department of
Labor,
through the Summer Youth
Employment Program, placed
25.292 young persons in
agricultural work. Several
other states operated
similar projects during
the year. 10 5
Reminiscent of the World War
II era, California
developed a new policy giving
parole preference to
certain types of inmates willing
106
to
do farm work.

By 1965, a number of
states had established information stations for farm
workers.
These offices
supplied information on such
matters as crop conditions
and wage offerings. Some could
refer migrants to
107
particular jobs.
104„ D

Recruitment Programs for Farmworkers,”
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1
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U.S., Department of Labor,
op. cit- .. p. i4.
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Gladwin Hill, "Paroled Convicts
to Help
M
P on
New
York Times. May 15, 1965,
p. 15.
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Also attracting
more workers to
farm jobs
by 1965 was the
~
exiqtpnr. 0 of
existence
an increasing
number of
annual worker plan*Plano.
The purpose of these
pi ans was
t0 get tentative
pre-spa^r,
P
season „commitments
from both
workers and growers anH +<-. j
and to draw up an
itinerary
accordingly. Migrants
participating < annual
worker
Plans could thus be
assured of a succession
of jobs
rather than haphazardly
seeking new employment
after
each job was completed.
This attempt to
rationalise
the movement of
workers also brought
the grower more
confidence that workers
would be available
when
loy
needed.

m

Of course,

intensified recruitment
of domestic farm workers
during 1965 was not
limited to
governmental efforts. Near
the end of the year,

Secretary Wirtz attributed
much of the increase in
domestic farm employment
to "improvements by
the

growers in wages and in
working and living conditions." 10 ?
Of course, some of this
may have resulted from
the
government s making clear to
growers that if they
failed to seriously seek
domestic labor, they would
108
109
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be denied foreign
workers regardless of
what happened
"to

their crops.

During 1965, the increase
in domestic farm
employment was less than
the decrease in legal
foreign workers. According
to the Labor Department,
this was due to increasing
mechanization and more
efficient use of domestic
labor. 110 it probably
also
resulted from greater reliance
on illegal Mexicans.
However, the increase in
domestic farm employment
was
substantial. During peak
season (August), about
86,200 more Americans were
employed in farm work
than at the same time in
1964.
According
to the

Labor Department, termination
of the bracero program
combined with the tighter
administration
of the H-2

provision of Public Law 4l4 enabled
about 100,000 extra
Americans to hold farm jobs sometime
111
during
1965.

E ffects of the transitio
n to domestic labor
According to an official study by
the Labor Department,
the markedly decreased reliance
on foreign workers
.

during 1965 had few ill effects
on American growers.
The study found that "the total
of even the claimed
losses due to labor shortage in
1965 is estimated at
110

IMd.

f

pp.

9-10.

Ibid.
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less than * of

perc ent of the value
this year of
crops which foreign
labor worked on in
1964. " However. the study
concluded that some
labor shortages
had developed as
a result of the
termination of Public
Law 7 8, although
they -were substantially
less serious
than anyone could
have predicted in
advance
1

Surveying crops which
had used substantial
numbers of alien workers
during 1964, the study
concluded that some
produced smaller harvests
in 1965
while others produced
larger ones. “3 Crop
values
in 1965 were greater
than during the previous
year. 11 '*
The Labor Department
found that the conversion
to domestic labor
had brought important
benefits to
American farm workers.
In the peak month
(August)
of 1965. unemployment
among agricultural

workers was
only 4.8 percent compared
to 6.5 percent one
year
earlier. 115 The study
reported that farm wages
averaged six cents more per
hour during 1965 than
during 1964.
It noted that this was
"the largest
recorded one-year increase
since the Korean War
period." 11 6 Finally, it
concluded that a variety of
IIP
llZj

'Ibid., p.

116

113

Ibid., pp. 15-16.
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g and living conditions
improved due to
the de
creasing reli ance
on foreign f

;

r

^

Se and
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established, phasing

the hracero program
coincided with the
beginning

3 S6riOUS thitiative
to unionise farm
labor

H8

Orowers had argued
that an end to the
Mexican
a or program would
cause major increases
in consumer
f ° r fari”
S °° dS
However the Labor
Department
’
'

.

"*

declined during- 196^
5

P«~.

'

U
t+

•

-u
attributed
this to the more
,

abundant harvests of
that year.
from November,
1964,

to November.
1965, fruit

and vegetable prices
declined by 4.5 percent
while
the Consumer Price
Index was increasing
l, 7 percent.

Separating out crops on
which large numbers
of braceros
had been employed in
1964, the Labor Department
found
that the prices of some
climbed during 1965
while
119
others fell.
117
-Upj-d.

,

pp.

20-21.
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Emerging Farm Labor Issuer
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The Nixon Era

introduction.

After approximately
three years
relative inactivity,
pressure group controversy
over Mexican labor
accelerated during the
Nixon era
Once again critics
of foreign labor
seised the
initiative.
They began to show
signs of recognizing
the fact that
although the bracero
program had ended
and the H -2 system
had been greatly
curtailed, southwestern growers continued
to use large amounts
of
Mexican labor.
Reminiscent of the early
l96o's,

attention turned heavily
to the growing
wetback’
problem and to alleged ahn«
abuse of -n.
the commuter system.
Despite some important
differences, there is
a certain continuity
between the Johnson
administration's
foreign labor policy and
that of the Nixon
adminis-

tration.

The simple and easy
conclusion that the

former was pro-labor and
the latter pro-grower
should
be avoided.
The Johnson administration's
efforts to

reform foreign labor usage
focused overwhelmingly
on
curtailing the flow of workers
entering the United

States legally.

There is no doubt that
it greatly

reduced the use of this
labor, but it paid little
attention to the growing
wetback problem. Likewise,
the Nixon administration
has admitted few H -2 workers

3^9

and. Of course,
no braceros, but
the problem of
illegal Mexican labor
has
ached new

proportions,

he Johnson
administration's reform
image notwith-

standing.

it tolerated the
growing wetback problem

which faced the Nixon
government in 1969.
Th e four types of
Mexican labor
2B years.

It was explained
earlier that termi-

nation of the bracero
program left four supplies
of
Mexican labor intact.
During 1965, the big
controversy was over the
admission of H-2 workers.
As we
have seen, the Johnson
administration had largely
won that battle within
a year after the
bracero program had ended. From
1966 through 1968. growers
had
more or less resigned
themselves to doing without
massive numbers of H-2
workers.
There has been no
significant change in this
pattern during the Nixon
administration.
Growers have made no major
efforts to
greatly increase the amount
of H-2 Mexican labor
admitted, and the Nixon
administration has shown no
sign of creating a new
bracero program through
this

provision.

Since 1968, the largest
number of Mexican
H-2 workers admitted
during any single year was
less

0

*
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than one thousand,

Although not all growers
would consider wetbacks a satisfactory
substitute for legal
temporary
workers from Mexico, the
massive growth of wetback
entry during the past
few years has probably
been a
major factor in the
continuing low demand for

H-2
In annual reports
issued since Nixon became
President, the INS has
noted an increase in the
labor.

problem of illegal entry
from Mexico.
During 1969,
ov.r 201,000 Mexicans
were apprehended. 121 l
n
5972

,

the number exceeded
390 000

.

22

,

There is evidence that
many of the wetbacks
on farms.
Over 25^ of those apprehended
in 1969
been doing agricultural
work in the United States.
If that proportion holds
up through 1972 it would
indicate that about 100,000
of the illegal Mexicans
apprehended were employed on
farms.
That is more than
half the n umber of Mexican
nationals who entered the
,

120 tt q

a
121

122

gay .ri rijwpi.

Annual Report

.

INS Annual Report.

1969, p.

12.

1972, p.

1
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United States as braceros
during 1964.
Inasmuch as
it is commonly
estimated that not more
than onethird to one-half of all
illegal Mexican nationals
are located by the INS.
it is possible that
by i 972>
the wetback problem
had grown to proportions
’

large

enough to have completely
replaced the bracero
program.

Throughout much of this
dissertation, we have
seen that when southwestern
growers

have lost a particular type of Mexican
workers, they have tended
to
increase their reliance on
other types.
This would
suggest that if a serious
effort should be made
to

seal the border and rid the
United States of wetbacks,
growers would again seek large
numbers of Mexican
laborers under perhaps a new
bracero program or
under the H-2 provisions of Public
Law 4 i 4
.

During the last year of the
Johnson administration, 442,205 "temporary
visitors" from Mexico
were admitted to the United
States.
Since
then the

numbers have grown dramatically.

million

In 1972,

over one

entered. 12 ^
As noted earlier in this chapter,
immigration

authorities have found that a substantial
number of
123

Ibid

.

,

p.

56.
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Mexicans admitted as
temporary visitors
violate the
provisions of their
admission and accept
jobs in the
United States.
Because of the ceiling
set on Western
Hemisphere
immigration by the Ervin
amendment, it might be
expected that immigration
from Mexico would have
declined since Nixon became
President. However,
there has been a moderate
upward trend. 124
One reason why legislation
enacting a Western

Hemisphere ceiling has not
prevented an increase in
Mexican immigration is the
fact that since Nixon
became President, there
has been a steady decline
in
immigration from Canada to the
United States. 12 5
In 1971,

President Nixon unsuccessfully
pro
posed that Congress enact
legislation authorizing
a greater number of
immigrants from the Western

Hemisphere, particularly Mexico
and Canada. 126
O ther Mexican labor
developments during
Ni xon years .
During 1969, reform interests
revived
substantially.
There was growing recognition
that
although g rowers had lost the
bracero program, they
12

Sbid.

126

,

p.

CM. XXVII

54.

125

Ibid.
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had not really lost
their Mexican labor.
Most of
the reform initiative
of i 9 6 9 centered
around

Congress
During the year, three
congressional committees
held hearings on
migrant labor at which at
least
some witnesses attempted
to connect the hardships
of American farm labor
with the increase in
Mexican
workers.
Intermittent hearings on
farm labor
unionization were held by a
subcommittee
of the

Senate Labor and Welfare
Committee in April, May,
June.
Cesar Chavez, the director
of the United
Farm Workers Organizing
Committee, claimed
that the

availability of Mexican national
labor was making it
more difficult to unionize
American
farm workers.

He

called on the government to
ban Mexicans from agricultural work. 127
Intermittently in July and August,
1969, a
subcommittee of the House Committee
on Education and
Labor conducted hearings on the
use of alien labor
during strikes. Chairman Frank
Thompson,
Jr.

(D-N.J.)

claimed that green-carders had long
been employed as
strikebrea kers in the border regions
128
of the nation.

127

XXV (1969), 757-58.

128 t
Ibid., p. 759.
,

.

.
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A spokesman for
the AFL-CIO told
the subcommittee that even
when green-carders
were not used
as strikebreakers
,
employers sometimes
took advantage

their foreign status
to intimidate them
from organizing and joining
unions. A representative
of the
INS testified
that over 700.000
Mexican greencarders were living
in the United States>
Ported that another
*7,315 green-carders were
eligible
Mexico and commute to
jobs in the United
States.
A spokesman for
the State Department
claimed
that the practice of
employing commuters to
replace
Americans on strike was
likely to harm United
States
relations with Mexico.
°

^

^

m

A representative of
the El Paso Chamber
of
Commerce told the subcommittee
that few Mexicans
were
used as strikebreakers.
He claimed that only
ten

thousand green-carders lived
in Mexico and commuted
jobs in the United States.
A spokesman
for the

National Council of
Agricultural Employers told
the
subcommittee that green-carders
were needed in the

Southwest due to the rapidly
declining farm labor
force 129
129

Ibid.
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^

Hearings on migrant
farm labor problems
held intermittently
from May 21 to
September
1569, by the Subcommittee
on Migratory Labor
of the
Senate Labor and Public
Welfare Committee.
Chairman
Walter F. Mondale
(D-Minn.) announced
that "the
underlying theme of all
our hearings is
powerlessHe claimed that
thousands of green-carders
were commuting to
jobs in the United
States each day
end that substantial
numbers of wetbacks were
doing
farm work in the border
region.

^

A former Labor
Department official testified
that the commuter system
should be ended. He said

that all immigrants
should be treated alike 1 31
The
director of the California
Rural Legal Assistance
.

Program testified that Attorney
General John
Mitchell was experiencing
"a law and order crisis
in
his own department" because
of his
failure to con-

trol the movement of wetbacks
to the United States for
farm work.
He claimed that 20
percent of the agricultural work force in the United
States was made
1
2
up of wetbacks.
-^

13

131

°Ibid.

132
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Ibid.. p. 760.
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During 1969, two Senate
bills concerning Mexican labor were
introduced.
I„ March Senator
Kennedy (D-Mass. )
introduced legisi ation
which wQ(jld
have given the Labor
Departs authority to act on
each commuter’s status
every six months.
If the
commuter were found to
be having an adverse
effect
on American labor,
he would not be
certified

again.
The bill also provided
that commuters violating
the
provisions of their admission
would lose their labor

certification.

Thirdly, Kennedy’s bill
would have
removed that section of
the Immigration and
Nationality
Act which exempted from
criminal penalties those
who
hire illegal aliens. 133

Kennedy's bill „ as considered
and killed by
the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary. 13 ^

During 1969, Senator Kennedy
also took more
direct action to protest
what he considered the misuse
of certain Mexican workers.
On May 18, along with
Senator Walter Mondale (D-Minn.
and Ralph Yarborough
)
a>-Tex.), he joined a march
to the California border
33

7730 - 31

-’
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1
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for the purpose of
ashing Mexican citizens
not to
enter the United States
as strikebreakers. 1
During 1969 other le
gis i ation aimed at
limiting Mexican labor
was introduced by
Senator
Mondale.
His bin would have
made it "an unfair
labor practice for an
employer to employ an
alien unlawfully present in the
United States, or to
employ
aliens whose principal
dwelling places are in
a
orei^n country during
a labor dispute."
The latter
provision was aimed at the
problem of commuters
being
used as strikebreakers.
In a Senate speech
on July 8
1969. Mondale charged that
"commuters constitute

^

,

.

about 85 percent of the
farmwork force in California's
Imperial Valley." He
continued,

u^ed'as'strikebreakers^uring^labor™^?

6

^

^

?rganizing

efforts to obtain collective
S in Cal fomia
and Texas,
ft JJa^befP"
rer hi y S f
ed hat 40 P ercent of
the
workers at
J
r ? nohes in the California
ua area in 1196b
Qfift were
Mexican national
I
naxional
green-card
holders. 136

lr^

fP

m

Mondale

bill died in the Committee
on Labor
and Public Welfare.
135

s
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ful to hire illegal
aliens. 137

^

a second suit
challenging the employment
of

wetbacks was initiated
by California Rural
Legal
Assistance, an agency
of the Office of
Economic
Opportunity. The decision
was handed down

in October.
judge in Santa Rosa
Superior Court ruled
that
growers could be Duni^hpri
punished -Fm-.
for uhiring wetbacks
while
refusing to give jobs
to American citizens. 138
A

•

Curing 1970, the wetback
problem continued
to attract attention.
Representative
E.

de l a Garza
(D-Tex.) told the House
that the wetback problem
was
increasing dramatically.
He suggested, however,
that
nature of the problem had
been changing. Relatively
fewer illegal Mexicans
were doing farm work
because
the demand for agricultural
labor had been reduced by
mechanization.
He said that, like
Americans, more and
more wetba cks were being
attracted to industrial jobs
3
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in large cities
where they
ney couth
m v
could make
a better
m 5
Q
1
-

living

,

The farm labor
unionization movement
achieved

-me

unprecedented successes
during 1970
In April
and May, Cesar Chavez’s
United Farm
F a rm w
v
Workers
Organizing
ommittee (consisting
heavily 0 f Mexican-Americans
succeeded in signing
contracts with grape
farmers
representing some 4
percent of the industry.
This
success came after a
long emotionally
charged,
nationwide boycott of
non-union table
.

.

grapes.

During 1970, Senator
Edmund Muskie (D-Me
)
introduced a bill aimed
at reforming the
commuter
system.
It would have required
all immigrants to
the United States to
1 ^*
actually live
here.

A second

part of the Muskie bill
provided for
a nonresident work
permit system. Rather
than becoming
immigrants, Mexicans who
merely wished to work in
the
United States would be
issued a permit upon
certification of the Labor Department
that American workers
were unava ilable.
However, Mexicans living
more than

139
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twenty miles from the
United
nixed ^-t-o+oe.
btates uborder would be
ineligible to receive work
permits. 142

Muskie

bill was considered by
the Senate
Judiciary Committee which
declined to report
'

s

it out. 145

In 1971,

Muskie again introduced
legislation
to abolish the commuter
system as such.
In a speech
to the Senate on April
5, he said that daily
commuters
from Mexico were only
a small part of the job
competition for American citizens.
He claimed that
between 100,000 and h-00,000
Mexicans commuted
to

the United States for
several weeks or months of
work
at a time, then returned to
Mexico to live. Muskie

charged that many of the Mexicans
were undermining the
wages and working conditions
of American farm workers
and that they were often
used as strikebreakers. 144
Muskie 's bill was considered by
the Senate
Judiciary Committee. As during the
previous
year,

it did not report it to the
full Senate. 145
In October,

1971, the wetback problem was spot-

lighted in a House speech by
Representative
142
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Richard White (D-Tex

i
He claimed
that while unemployment rates were
W6re risin
ri^inoS
the United States,
•

)

•

*“"* !•-

™»

H,

charged that while
the P
lem was s °aring,
the immigration authorities
were reducing their
efforts. „ e
claimed that their
surveil lanoe had been
reduced an<j
that federal officials
ncials had
her) advised
a
certain local
policemen to stop
arresting wetbacks. 146
October 14, 1971,
Representative Robert
Price (R-Tex.)
introduced a bill to
reinstate the
bracero program. He
claimed that growers
"throughout much of the
Southwest still stand
in dire need
of steady and
dependable farm labor."
Although unemployment was high, farm
work was too hard for
many
Americans. He suggested
that another bracero
program
would help reduce the
wetback problem. His
bill
would have placed the
new program under the
Department of Agriculture lk?
it died in pcommittee.
-lx
The foreign labor
highlight
•

m

.

of 1972 was

passage of a bill by the
House to control the
wetback
problem.
On September 12. the
House passed (by voice
V ° te) H-R
16188 ' which w °uld have
’

Part 2?,
l47

made it illegal to
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knowingly employ
illegal allens .l 48
voice vote does not
permit a breakdown of
support
for the measure,
relevant information
is contained in
a roll call vote
on an earlier move
to recommit the
bill to the House
Judiciary Committee,
which would
had the effect of
killing H.R. 16188,

^

m ° Ve Was defeated

That

^

a 53-297 vote,

a total of
^2 of the 53 votes
for recommital came
from representatives from the
southern and western
states of
Alabama, Arizona.
California, Florida. Kansas.

Louisiana, Mississippi,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia
and Washington ^9
.

The Senate failed to
act on H.R. 16188,
thus

killing it. 1 * 0

However, when the Senate
Labor and
Public Welfare Committee
reported a minimum wage
bill on June 8, 1972, it
included an amendment
which
would have made it a crime
to knowingly hire
illegal
aliens
The House had also
passed a minimum wage
bUl, but it was significantly
different from
the

Senate version (in ways
having nothing to do with
the
question of illegal aliens).
The House voted not to
148

149
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send its bill to a
Senate-House conference
committe e
to reconcile
differences between the
^2
two.

result was that both
minimum wage bills,
including
the Senate-passed
amendment dealing with
illegal aliens
*53

died.

The paradox was that
both the House and
the
Senate had passed
legislation

prescribing criminal

penalties for the knowing
employment of illegal
aliens, yet neither bill
was enacted
into law.

During 1973

another effort has been
made in
Congress to deal with the
wetback problem.
,

This

initiative is closely related
to certain proposals
made by the Nixon
administration during the previous
year.
In 1972, Nixon called
for legislation making
the knowing employment
of illegal aliens a
criminal
offense.
Administration officials noted
that year
that the wetback problem
had grown to alarming proportions.
in response to the
administration’s proposals,
the Immigration and Nationality
Subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee held
hearings in six cities
across the country.
It was from these hearings
and
extensive study of the problem by
the subcommittee
152
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that H.R. 982
emerged in 1973.

th

lrS

X ° n admln - str
ation had proposed
that even

° ffense

hiring illegal aliens
should be
punishable as a crimp
r
nsiderable opposition
to
3 ar ° Se
the
was argued that
as a
matter of selfprotection> employers
hire anyone who
appeared to be ••Mexican."

“

»

^^

^

As a

result, MexicanAmer icans might
experience serious
problems of job
discrimination. 1
Predictably,
this argument came
from certain growers,
but it ’also
came from more
liberal groups and
individuals.
The subcommittee's
major task was to
reconcile
two mam goals.
It was concerned
with drying

^

up the

wetback problem by making
it unlawful to hire
illegal
aliens.
However, it wished
...
+e do this
1Shed to
without drafting
legislation likely to result
in overly

cautious employers

Who would discriminate
even against
Mexican-Americans
Consequently, H.R. 982 was
a compromise measure
designed
to cope with both
concerns.
It met the administration’s
concern by providing that
knowing employment
of illegal

aliens would be a crime.

However, it provided two
safe-

guards des igned to prevent
excessive caution on the
No.

1St SeSS -' 197

^

cxix.

.
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part of employers which
might
gnx result in *•
discrimination
against Mexican- Americans
First, employers
getting
a signed statement
from employees to the
effect that
they had not entered
the United States
illegally
would be innocent even
if they hired wetbacks.
The
second safeguard took
the form of a three-step
set
of progressive penalties
for repeated violations.
A
first offender would
merely receive a warning
while
second and third offenders
would be subject to
greater penalties.
.

On May

1973, H.R. 982 passed the
House on
a roll call vote of 29763
Those voting against
this
legislation to make the knowing
employment of illegal
3,

.

aliens a crime were a mixture
of liberals and conservatives.
The liberals included
Bella Abzug (D-N.Y.)
and Shirley Chisholm (D-N.Y.).
Among conservatives
voting against H.R. 982 were
Barry Goldwater, Jr.
(R-Calif.) and John Rousselot
(R-Calif ) *55 The
conservative opposition to the
bill centered around
arguments concerning the need for
foreign labor while
liberal opponents of H.R. 982
stressed that it might
lead to discrimination against
Mexican-Americans
.

.

As of the summer of
1973. the Senate had not

passed anti-wetback legislation, so
the possibility
155

lj?id.

.
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that H.R. 982

wiu

be enacted into

or Congress is
uncertain.

^

ses

^

Summary and Conclusions
have seen that while
grower pressure to
obtain foreign labor
receded during 1964,
it reached
a new peak during
1965.
The new initiative
involved
a full-scale
mobilisation of pressure
groups.
However. the group
struggle of 1965 had
changed.
Reform
groups were much less
active than they had
been during
the previous year.
With some exceptions,
they were
willing to let the
administration fight the
foreign
labor battle.
The impressive organized
power which growers

mobilized during 1965 failed
to secure the massive
numbers of H-2 workers
which they wanted.
Although
their initiative to strip
Secretary Wirtz of his
power
over foreign farm labor
mustered an impressive vote
,n the

Senate, it was not a
particularly meaningful
move.
Even if Congress had
adopted the Holland amendment and given control
over H-2 workers to the
Agriculture Department, it
probably would have brought
no immediate victories
to the farm coalition.
Unlike
the Eisenhower
administration, the Johnson
administration

.
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was unified in its
commitment to the goal
that the
H-2 provision should
not permit a revival
of the
bracero program under
another name. There is
no
reason to think that the
Agriculture Department would
have certified more H-2
workers than did Secretary
Wirtz

Secretary Wirtz 's willingness
to take bold
administrative steps to reduce
the admission of temporary foreign labor and to
improve
the lot of

domestic farm workers helps
account for the increasing
opposition to him during
1965.
The close vote on
the Bass amendment suggests
that he had gone about
as far as he could in
reforming the farm labor
situation without alienating a
fatal number
of his

supporters.

Yet the fact is that he was
permitted to
get away with unprecedented
reforms.
The year 1965 stands by itself
as a special
era
the struggle over foreign
farm labor.
It was
the last year that growers
made a vigorous effort to

m

receive massive numbers of H-2
workers.

By the end

of 1965, they appeared to be
reconciled to the fact
that the H-2 provision of Public
Law 4l4 could not be
used to resurrect the bracero
program under another name
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The year 1965 was
a crucial trial
period for

the administration's
new foreign labor
policy.

succeed

,

In

it had to be
demonstrated that

ruination of the bracero
program and Wirtz's
tighter administration
of the H-2 provisions
of
Public Law 4 i 4 would
not produce the
catastrophies
predicted by many growers
and their politlfial
Had the predicted
losses occurred, Congress
would
probably have legislated
another bracero program
or
forced Secretary Wirtz
to greatly increase
the number
of H-2 admissions.
Wirtz set out in 1965 to
disprove the pessimistic predictions.
He was not content to
merely
restrict foreign labor and
count on the domestic
farm labor supply to
automatically fill
the vacuum.

By requiring growers to
offer higher wages and
better
conditions to domestic labor in
order to qualify for
H-2 workers, Secretary
Wirtz stimulated a greater
movement of Americans into farm
work.
That trend
was

reinforced by various recruitment
programs instituted
by the federal government.
Consequently, one of
the

grower^

moot convincing arguments was
undermined.

By

the end of 1965. the claim
that a year without braceros

would bring a devastating shortage
of farm workers was
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no longer credible.

Also, by the end of io£c;
6
•

j

,

developments had

largely undermined
two other key
grower predictions:
that catastrophic crop
losses would occur
and that
the consumer price
of farm goods would
skyrocket.
After a year without
braceros. Secretary
Wirtz’s position was
stronger
ger
ThP
hr
lhe bracero
program
had been ended without
serious harm to growers
or consumers and the change
appeared to have helped
domestic
farm workers considerably.
*

The heavy reduction
in the number of
foreign
ikers during 1965
encouraged growers to turn
more
to mechanization
which,

in turn, made them
less eager

to receive H -2 workers.

Developments such as these
enabled Secretary
Wirtz to deflate the foreign
labor
initiative.

His

t y t° re sist

giving in to it was also
aided by
the fact that the liberal
Democratic Congress continued
to be concerned about
rural poverty.
For
example,

in 1966

.

it passed legislation
which included the

unprecedented provision of extending
minimum wage
coverage to certain farm
^ ^
workers.
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During 1966

1967, and 1968 growers
and their
political friends made
no serious effort
.

large numbers of H -2
workers.

to obtain

After the flurry of
pressure group activity
in 1965. these latter
years
are marked by the
almost total lack of
congressional.
media, and interest
group attention to the
foreign
labor issue.
Once Nixon became
President, there was no
substantial increase in
the number of H-2
Mexicans
entering the United States.
Mexican immigration increased moderately. Nixon
unsuccessfully sought to
get Congress to raise
the ceiling on immigration
from
Western Hemisphere countries.
The United States was
liberally supplied with
"temporary visitors" who

sometimes illegally used the
visitors' pass to enter
the United States to
find jobs.

During the Nixon administration,
the subdued
pressure group activity of
the 1966-68 era gave way
to a more active group
struggle.
The initiative

was

regained by reform forces which
turned their attention
to the growing wetback
problem and to the commuter
problem in general and the use
of commuters
as strike-

breakers in particular.

Several bills were introduced

to deal with these problems.

Those dealing with

commuters and the use of aliens as
strikebreakers
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died

m

committee.
.

During
ng i1972
Q7?

v„
+v u
both
houses passed
,

’

3 malClnS the

em PB°yment of illegal
aliens a
crime.
However, disagreement
between the House
and
the Senate on
non-wetback issues kept
the measures
from being enacted
into law despite an
apparently
road consensus in
both houses that such
legislation
was desirable.
In 1973, new
legislation making the
knowing employment of
illegal aliens a crime
was
once again passed by
the House,
the summer of
1973
that bill awaits Senate
action.

m

,

Both the Johnson
administration (after
1965)
and the Nixon government
permitted little legal
foreign labor to enter
the United States,
but
neither made a major effort
to control the
problem
of illegal immigrants.
Reminiscent of the early
1950-3,
the wetback problem
had reached major
proportions by
1973
Like every administration
since Roosevelt's,
the Nixon administration
appeared to be guided by
no
consistent policy on the
wetback problem. While the
.

President called for even
stronger legislation than
many liberals were willing
to support,
the Justice

Department failed to take full
advantage of administrative discretion which it
already had

and which could

have been used to patrol
the Mexican border more
vigorously.
While the wetback problem grew,
there was
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some evidence that
the herder was being
guarded less
carefully than before.
Critics charged that
the

administration's continued
low budget requests
for
the Border Patrol
indicated a lac* of
commitment to
dealing with the
problem of illegal
immigration.

Also

in contrast to
President Nixon's request
for tough
legislation making the
employment of unlawful
immigrants a crime were
recent

revelations that wetbacks
were employed at the
Western White House itself.

During the Nixon era,
the mood of Congress
became increasingly
sympathetic to passing
meaningful
g' lat-on to
deal with the wetback
problem.
However, on other matters
concerning foreign labor,
it
appeared to be content with
the status quo.
It was

apparently unwilling to accomodate
the demands of
either grower interests or
reformers. Liberal bills
dealing with the commuter
problem and the use of
aliens as strikebreakers
died
in committee.

But so
did legislation which would
have reinstated a
traditional bracero program.
Although Congress may
well take action on the wetback
problem, it appears to
be unwilling to take
either conservative or liberal
action on other foreign labor
issues at this time.
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CHAPTER

VII

A PLURALIST SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSION

Pluralism,

a Recapitulation

After outlining pluralist
theory in Chapter II,
much of our discussion
of the Mexican labor
struggle
has been in terms of
pressure group activity
and
other variables included
in the pluralist model.
How’

ever,

little attempt has been
made to explicitly
relate these findings
to theoretical
considerations.
The purpose of this
chapter is to summarize,
in more
explicit pluralist terms,
some of the developments

summarized in Chapters III-VI.

The most relevant

pluralist propositions are
summarized below.
In a pluralist system
such as the United States,

public policy springs primarily
from pressure groups
competing for government favors.
Officials produce
policies which disproportionately
reflect the claims
of the most powerful groups
rather than abstract prin
ciples of justice.
However, with few exceptions,
the claims of even the
least consequential groups are
accomodated to some extent, and
most

policies reflect

concessions to all of the most
interested parties.
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According to pluralist
theory, no group
win
permanently dominate
a particular policy
area
Countervailing, or
opposing interests,
will organize
and mobilize
political power to reverse
policies
WhlCh thSy d °
f3VOr
Wh
they are strong enough,
new policies will
be made which more
faithfully reflect
their demands, yet
retain some concessions
to the
new losers.

-

-

In a pluralist
system, all legitimate
groups
are free to compete
for

political power.

However,
those with certain
characteristics will have
the
greatest impact on public
policy.
The favored groups.
(1) are organized.
( 2 )
have a large membership.
(3) possess money and
various other resources
such

as political knowledge
and skillful leaders,

(4) can
form alliances with other
powerful pressure groups,
(5) have a high degree of
accessibility to important
public officials,
(6) enjoy high prestige
in the
society,
( 7 )
pursue goals whioh
00nsistent
prevalent values in the broader
society, and
(8) are

^

^
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self-confident and pursue
their goals vigorously.!
Pluralists Claim that
in American society,
these favorable
characteristics are possessed
by a
great variety of
groups.
However, even interests
with
few of these traits
will have some impact
on public
roixcy, although not
a predominant one.
Their influence is guaranteed
because the pluralist
system
values the minimisation
of conflict.
Giving all
important interests a
say in public policy
increases
them commitment to the
system.
The interests of
weaker groups are
represented in the political
arena
by certain stronger
ones whose own interests
overlap
with theirs.
In the political
structure of the pluralist

system, there are various
points of access at which
interested groups may pursue
their claims. Useful
distinctions include those
between the three branches
of government, between
different departments within
the execut ive branch,
and between different
congressional
S
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influence at the
various points of
access.
F or
ample, a group might
have major influence
with the
Agriculture Department
but little impact
on the
Department of Labor.
the policy process,

the pluralist model

identifies two important
stages at which
pressure
groups may wield
influence.
The first is at the
lawmaking stage. The
second is at the point
of law
enforcement. Groups
compete not only to
enact the
legislation they
u
tavor but to have
y favor’
it administered
with
favortism toward their
political demands.
+-

Pluralist Explanations
Ini tiation and operat ion
o f the hn.np ro
Many aspects of the
initiation and operation
of the
bracero program are
explainable in terms of the
pluralist model.
,

As southwestern growers
szuwers snnrrVa-f
sought a guaranteed
Mexican labor program in
1941 and 1942, they
measured
up very well on most
of the group characteristics
which
pluralists identify as sources
of political power.
arge numbers of farmers
actively pressured the national
government for such a program.
They were strengthened
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by the fact that
they
woiked th.
y worked
through numerous
growers
organizations, ranging
from thoS0 with
locai
ship only to huge
powerful, national
organizations such
6 AmSriCan Fa
B
organizations did
place the grower
cause before Congress.
Th e y
h aa ample f unds
to sen d Mexican
labor spokesmen to
Vari ° US COnSreSSi °"
al
around the country
and
to retain full-time
lobbyists in Washington.
Many of
these lobbyists had
gained valuable experience
through
their groups- broad
and long political
involvement on
numerous issues. Over
the years they and
their
organizations had built up
an impressive number
of
political contacts,
it was not unusual
for these
lobbyists and grower-oriented
congressmen to recall
their earlier warm
relationships involving
matters
other than Mexican labor.

"

™

—

Growers seeking Mexican
labor further strengthened
their case by being able
to win the support of
many
other powerful and high
ranking organizations.

Numerous non-western farm
organizations, particularly
southern ones, actively
pressured Congress and the
xecutive branch of government
to inaugurate a bracero
program. Many non-farm,
western groups, including
railroads, and chambers of
commerce, joined the
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Mexican labor coalition

Also supporting them
were
various national
groups organized around
nonagricultural interests.

AloO favoring the
grower cause was their
wide
access to government
officials. Congress was
broadly
sympathetic. Access to
it was increased by
the fact
that rural interests
were over-represented
in both
houses. Many congressmen
were farmers or came
from
agricultural backgrounds
and were especially sympathetic to the e
grower
notii + inn
a
r position.
Assigning
bracero
legislation to the two markedly
pro-grower agriculture
committees of Congress
strengthened the Mexican
labor
cause.
While President Roosevelt
was interested
in

improving the conditions
of American farm workers,
he
was receptive to inaugurating
a bracero program as
a
wartime necessity.
The ability of farmers
to pressure the government to institute a Mexican
labor program was increased
by their high prestige
in American society.
They

approached Congress as respectable
and important people.
Even the critics of importing
foreign labor were careful to pay an almost
reverential respect to farmers
who were acknowledged to
be "the backbone of America."
Not only did farmers, as
individuals, command respect

^
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by C ° ngreSS and
the

“can

people.

Many of their
organizations had long
since established a
reputation
Of utmost
respectability. The American
Farm Bureau
National Grange had become
important American
institutions. During
congressional hearings,
various
spokesmen for farm groups
stressed their membership
in
mam-stream organizations,
their commitment to capitalism, their patriotism,
and the reasonableness
of
their demands.
The attempt to import
Mexican labor during the

war was relatively
compatible with broader
American
values.
It was not generally
perceived to be a radical
effort.

Southwestern farmers had long
used Mexican
labor, and many people
thought the traditional flow
of
Mexicans across the border
was natural 2 During
the
foreign labor initiative of
1941 and 1942, grower
spokesmen attempted to depict
most prospective bracerousers as poor small farmers
who desperately
.

needed

government assistance.

This strategy played on the

g

0
g
t0
the United States^is°Charles
C .^Cumberland
"Immi0
t0 :he Ul lted States from
Mexico,"’

?c
?
i
Rural Sociology
(Supplement), XXV (June,

i

960 ), 90-102.
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——

widespread sympathy
for the poverty _
stricken

it
a

ened by the maS5

^

the shortage of
f arm labor might
seriously
threaten the war
effort.
Taken together, these
facts
-ant that the initiative
to

get a bracero program,
was fac ilia ted by
its compatibility
with these
widespread concerns of
the early I94 0 s
Consistent with the
pluralist advice for
maxie political influence,
growers seeking Mexican
labor pursued their
cause vigorously and
selfconf idently. Belief
in their ability to
get a Mexican
labor program was a
natural by-product of
their many
policy victories during
previous years, including
'nitiation of a bracero
program during World War I,
keeping Mexico outside
the quota system during
the
1920 S and 1930’s, retaining
a substantial Mexican
labor supply even during
the Great Depression,
'

.

successfully resisting the
unionization of farm workers,
and getting them excluded
from the expanding social
legislation enacted during the
1930’s to protect
industrial labor.
Standing in sharp contrast
to the powerful
grower coalition were those
whose interests would be
most threatened by a brae
ero program, namely
American

38l

fa™

workers.

Although they were

^

^

prospective bracero-users
they were not
organised
at all,
The farm workers
had
nad little
lit+io prestige.
Many
were members of
minority groups. Xived
in great poverty.
had Uttle
r politically relevant
Public opinion was
preoccupied more with
guaranteeing an adequate
wartime labor supply
than
with improving the
conditions of agricultural
laborers
and their families.
Practically powerless,
farm
labor had no reason
for confidence that
it could have
an important impact
on Mexican labor policy.
,

.

t

“^

-

.

—

As a

result of all these
disadvantages, farm labor,
as
such, did not directly
enter the group struggle
over
institution of the bracero
program.
The failure of farm
workers to enter the group
struggle does not mean that
their interests had no
impact at all on public policy.
In accordance with the

pluralist expectation that even
the weakest groups
will have their interests
represented by more powerfully organized groups,
organized labor and certain
other groups introduced
a number of farm worker
interests into the group
conflicts of 1941 and 1942
Also following the pluralist
model, bracero legislation
and the American agreement
with Mexico were compromise
.

382

measures which
incorporated some of
these workerrelated demands.
Examples include
that braceros could
be imported only
to cope with
a domestic labor
shortage and that they
were to be
paid the prevailing
wage so as not to
undermine
American farm workers.

^

Administration of legislation
governing Mexican labor follows
rather closely the
pluralist
expectation that law
enforcement will favor the
most
powerful interest groups.
grouns
wi-h* -p
With
few exceptions, the
federal government did
not seriously attempt
to enforce the immigration
laws and stop the
large-scale
entry of illegal Mexicans
during the bracero

years.
The fact that the
government still failed to
act even
after the critics of
imported labor had been
able to
mount a strong offensive
against the bracero program
is not at odds with
the pluralist model.

Except

during the late 1940's and
early 1950’s when they
were still weak, reform
groups did not direct their
political pressure toward
eradicating the wetback
problem. Although by 1961 they
had grown strong by
many pluralist criteria of
power, they failed to
meet the pluralist requirement
of pursuing the
anti-wetback cause vigorously.
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On the wetback issue,
growers were much
more
actxve.
Their pressure against
law enforcement
took
a variety of
forms.
When Eisenhower attempted
to rid
the country of
wetback labor in 1954
farm interests
.
sent representatives
to Washington to
appeal to the
national government not
to enforce the
immigration
laws at the Mexican
border. A number of
congressmen
from states heavily
dependent on wetback labor
accused the immigration
authorities of unreasonable
ac tion, and they,
too, asked the national
government not to enforce the
law.
Vice President Nixon
apparently joined their effort.
It was not long
until President Eisenhower
abandoned his attempt to
enforce the law and bowed
to the impressive show
of grower pressure.

Grower pressure to prevent
enforcement of the
immigration laws has often been
directed against immigration authorities. Some have
testified that when
farmers have wanted more
wetbacks, they have pressured
higher authorities in Washington
who have then ordered
the immigration authorities
to permit illegal Mexi-

can workers to enter the
country.

Particularly in

times of greater Border
Patrol vigilance, local residents sympathetic to growers
have used social pressure
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against the Patrolmen.
f

^"

3611 t0 th

Examples include

-

“«

raerc

—-ts

charging
em higher prices
than other customers.
From 1942 through
at least 1960,
bracero
egislation was generally
administered with a
pror bias.
This is consistent
with the pluralist
assumption that the
strongest pressure
groups will
^om.nate not only the
law-making process but
the stage
0
aw enforcement as
well,
while the law
guaranteed
braceros could be
imported only i n the
event of
a shortage of
domestic farm labor,
those shortages
were not objectively
determined. When growers
set
low wages which
failed to attract enough
domestic
workers, they claimed
a labor shortage
and requested
braceros.
The federal government
permitted state
employment services
r vices, which
whir>v. were
generally growerdominated, to verify the
need for braceros.
They
often did little more
than take the farmers'
word at
face value.
Consequently, farm workers
had little
voice in the administration
of this provision of

bracero legislation
although it was of crucial
importance
to their interests.
A similar example of
predominant grower influence
in enforcement of
Mexican labor legislation
involved

the provision that
braceros must be paid the
prevailing
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wages,

once again, officials
tended to let growers
th<!
POli
’«*»* of a legal guarantee
ostensibly meant to
protect American farm
workers
from adverse foreign
competition. What typically
happened was that
growers would arbitrarily
set and
offer low wages well
before the season began.
Because
few people would be
seeking farm jobs at
that time,
the wages offered
had no meaningful
relationship to
the supply of labor
and the demand for it.
Yet the
Labor Department would
customarily certify those
wage
offerings as the
"prevailing wage." If they
did „ ot
attract sufficient numbers
of American applicants,

^

^

growers would be permitted
to import braceros.
Various other provisions
of the Mexican labor
program were also administered
with a pro-grower bias.
Although the law forbade
using braceros as strikebreakers, they sometimes
were.
Provisions concerning
the food and housing of
Mexican workers were not
always
honored. Contrary to at
least the spirit in which
bracero legislation was
enacted, the men were
sometimes
used in yearlong and skilled
jobs.

Pluralist theory postulates that
when previously
weak groups grow strong,
administration
of the law will

become more accomodating
to their demands.

As reform
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interests grew stronger
during the late 1950's
and
early 1960's, the
pro-grower bias in law
enforcement diminished.
During President Eisenhower's
second term, Labor
Secretary Mitchell began
administering bracero legislation
more rigorously.
For
example, rather than
merely accepting the
"prevailing
wages" arbitrarily set
by growers, he began
establishing
his own scale.
He grew increasingly
critical of grower
violations of rights
guaranteed by bracero
legislation.
This shift away from
a pro-grower bias in
administration of the Mexican
labor program grew
even more pronounced as
reform groups grew stronger
during the Kennedy and Johnson
eras.
Like Secretary
Mitchell, Secretary of Labor
Goldberg established wage
scales for particular areas.
Farmers had to first
offer these wages before they
were eligible to receive
braceros. Secretary Wirtz continued
this policy.
Grower claims of domestic labor
shortages were no longer
taken at face value.
Both Goldberg and Wirtz removed
braceros from farms which were
being struck by American farm workers.
This diminution of pro-grower
bias in execution
of the bracero program under
Kennedy and Johnson is

consistent with the pluralist model.

During the late

38 ?

1950’s and early 1960’s,
reform groups had developed
more of the traits
which pluralists associate
with
political influence.

Termination and ^ttgnnath.

The pluralist

proposition that important
changes in the relative
strength of competing
groups will result in policy
changes is one useful
perspective for explaining
term!
nation of the bracero
program. As the characteristics
of reform groups more
closely approximated
the

pluralist outline of influential
group traits, public
policy toward Mexican labor
changed.
The bracero
program was first reformed,
then terminated.
These

group characteristics are
discussed below in terms of
growing reform advantages during
the late 1950's

and early 1960’s.
The sheer number of people
opposing the

bracero program apparently increased
substantially
during this era. Perhaps even
more significantly,
various organizations, claiming
to speak for millions
of members publicly joined
the reform coalition
,

the first time.

for

Far fewer newly involved organizations

opted to support the Mexican labor
cause.
Each side tried to impress Congress
that it
represented greater numbers of grass
roots Americans
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<w«l.

sp„ k ,„«„
organizations supporting
Public Law 78 claimed
to
P ak for their rank
and file members.
They charged
that the leaders
of reform organizations
had never
their membership on
the question of
Mexican
labor so their
impractical proposals
represented only
isolated pockets of
opinion. Spokesmen for
reform
organizations claimeda t0
+n ho
be s Peakmg for
their rank
and file members.
Thev
0 lesson
ey t00k a
from their
opponents and warned
Congress that grower
groups
function oligarchic ally
and that their leaders
do not
faithfully represent the
millions of farmers
(especially
poorer one 0 ) for whom they
claim to speak.
i

•

r.

Although group spokesmen
on each side probably
exaggerated the number of
members for whom they
spoke, it is clear that
the total number
"belonging"
to reform organizations
was far greater

than the total

membership of groups actively
supporting Public Law 78.
For example, there were
more Catholics than farmers,
more union members than
cotton ginners or bankers.
Although congressmen wishing
to be re-elected are
not
so naive as to assume
that such an undifferentiated
head-count can determine the
outcome
of elections, even

some pro-grower congressmen
were suggesting by 1962
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that it was the
leaders of reform
organizations who
could more accurately
claim to speak for
the grassroots American.

Critics of Mexican
labor usage were long
dicapped by their
lack of organization.
For
example, during the
1920's, there was
considerable
opposition to the
importation of Mexican
workers,
but few organizations
represented this viewpoint
at
congressional hearings.
At the 1942 Downey
subcommittee hearings on
the Mexican labor
program, only
one reform organization
sent a representative
to testify.
At congressional
hearings during
the 1950's, the bulk

of testimony was
given by pro-grower groups.
By the beginning of
the Kennedy era.
organized

opposition to the Mexican
labor program had begun
to
seriously challenge the
grower coalition. Far
more
reform organizations had
become actively involved.
This unprecedently
organized opposition
to Public

Law 78 enabled critics of
Mexican labor importation
to
overcome some of their previous
weaknesses.
The advantage of organization
permitted more deliberate and
systematic consideration of
problems and a more preelse formulation of goals.
It encouraged greater
coordination of efforts with other
reform groups, with
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liberal congressmen.
and with top offioials
in
ennedy and Johnson
administrations. No longer
did
each reformer go
his own

^

way.

'ncreasing organization,
the burden of
the reform case
was left more to
specialists.
The
Cath ° llC ChUrCh
f0r examPle re ii
ed heavily on its
migrant ministry.
This division
slon of labor
encouraged
8 SpeClalists
t0 acquire an
intimate knowledge
of
-levant farm problems.
Grower forces had
always
tned to discredit the
reformers as well meaning,
but
misguided city people
who did not understand
farm
labor problems. Once
reform organizations
developed
their own knowledge
specialists, they were
less
vulnerable on this charge.
’

,

.

,

Many of the reform
organizations had their
own
legislative specialists
and lobbyists. Most
of these
groups were politically
active prior to

their involvement in the struggle
over Mexican labor.
Consequently,
their legislative
specialists already had
substantial
political experience which
could be used in the
new cause.

During the late 1950's
and early 1960-3, the
reform case was more
convincingly presented. Much
of the improvement was
made possible by
organizational
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resources which would
have been beyon<j the
almost all individual
reformers. Earlier
emotional
arguments were replaced
by detailed statistical
statements based on careful
research.
Organization money
made it possible for
full-time lobbyists to
remain
in Washington and
for group spokesmen to
travel

^

to

congressional hearings around
the country.
Since the beginning of
the bracero program,
growers had been powerfully
organized.

This did not

change.

What had changed was that
by the 196o's,’
they were faced by
formidable opponents equally
well organized.
The pluralist model assigns
coalition building
an important role in the
acquisition of political

power by pressure groups.

During the late 1950's and

early 1960's, the reform
coalition grew rapidly. It
converted a number of previously
uncommitted groups
and even some groups from the
grower coalition. Pew
newly committed groups chose
to join the Mexican
labor forces.
The net gains of the reform
coalition were

encouraged by the tendency of growers
and their
political allies to take rigid
positions on Public
Law

78

and the issue of domestic farm
labor reform.

.
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Having dominated Mexican
labor policy for years,
it
was as if they were
unable to adjust to the
new
reality of their increasingly
formidable group op-

ponents
ginning in 1961, most reform
groups followed
the lead of President
Kennedy, and his position
was

one of considerable
flexibility.

The bracero program
had problems, he argued,
but it should not be
terminated immediately, when
Congress enacted some
reforms but failed to pass
nearly all he had requested, the President signed
the legislation anyway.
Hy 1961, increasing
numbers of congressmen, even
some grower-oriented ones,
were convinced that Public
Law 78 needed some reforms
to protect domestic farm
workers
The unwillingness of grower
interests to compromise forced some members of
Congress and some
pressure groups to reluctantly
align themselves more
closely with groups opposing the
bracero program.
If
tney wanted even moderate
reforms, they had nowhere
else to go.
.

The broad base of the reform
coalition probably

increased its political influence.

This was in marked

contrast to the 1920’s when sometimes
unions were
practically the only organized, countervailing
power
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to challenge the
employers of Mexican
labor.

By the

early 1960*s, unions
had come to include
a much
greater proportion of
the working force and
their
to reform the
Mexican labor system had
been

joined by much of the
news media, certain
organizations of minority
people, many churches,
consumer
groups, and others.
Organisations of an unprecedented
diversity were telling
Congress that the traditional
bracero program was no
longer acceptable.
According
to the pluralist
model, politicians are
more responsive to this type of
pressure than to the
protests
of more narrow isolated
groups.
By 1961
the base
of the Mexican labor
coalition was not nearly so
broad.
,

In the United States,
each of the two major

political parties is
disproportionately dependent on
certain groups for its bedrock
support.
If the party
alienates these most consistent
supporters, it will
have little chance of winning
elections.

Consequently,

it tends to pay special
attention to them, especially
if they are well organized

and have established and

vigorously articulated their
priorities.
early 1960's, the reform coalition

During the

was fortunate to

’nclude several organizations
whose memberships were
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traditionally and heavily
Democratic.
Organized
labor, various
Catholic pressure groups.
and organi .
zations representing
Mexican-Americans and Negroes
were among the most
outspoken critics of the
Mexican
labor system.
Consequently, the Johnson
and Kennedy
administrations as well
as many Democratic
congressmen from districts
with large numbers of
these people
may have found it
politically expedient to
lead the
assault on the bracero
program.

During earlier years,
the critics of Mexican
labor usage had often
contradicted the arguments
of
each other.
Some would have banned
the practice because it was allegedly
racist, others because
they,
themselves, were unashamed
racists.
Some disapproved
because they believed the
United States could not
trust any foreigners,
others because they felt
the
rights of Mexicans were
disregarded by
employers.

on„equently, until at least
the end of World War II,
the critics of Mexican
labor usage were a coalition
less in fact than in name.
By the Kennedy era, if
these contradictions re
mained, they were less
articulated.
The publicized
reform case had become much
more internally consistent.
Claim., that the bracero
program was adversely affecting
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American farm workers
and small farmers,
that it was
inconsistent with
principles of free
enterprise,
and that it was
harming United States
relations ’with
Mexico were not
contradictory.
Before the Kennedy
era, the reformers'
very
limited access to
government officials was
a serious
handicap.
Growers had enjoyed
greater access to all
presidents (with the
possible exception of
Roosevelt),
to Congress, to the
agriculture committees of
the House
and Senate, and to all
of the relevant cabinet

officials except Secretary
Mitchell.
Reformers had initially
enjoyed greater access
to President Roosevelt,
but after the defeat
of his
farm labor reforms by
Congress in 1942 he made
little
effort to champion their
cause.
During Eisenhower's
second administration, the
critics of Mexican labor
importation found a friend in
Labor Secretary Mitchell.
However, his isolated position
in the administration
limited his effectiveness.
,

The access enjoyed by
reformers was often to

officials with limited or no
direct power over the
Mexican labor issue. For example,
they had friends
on the labor committees
of the two houses, but the
decision had been made in 1942
to grant jurisdiction
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over bracero
o+
+
-Legislation
to 4.u
the pro-grower
agriculture c ommittppc;
mu
„
ttees.
The reformers
enjoyed good access
to President
Truman's Migrant Labor
Commission. but
ltS P0W6rS Were
merel y advisory.
Their cause was
consistently supported
by a substantial
minority of
congressmen in both
houses, but their votes
were not
enough to reform the
law.
i

'the

break-through in reformers'
access to
the executive branch
of government came
with Kennedy's
election. His sympathy
for their cause
gave them

access to the highest
level of government.
The willingness of other
administration officials to
work with
reform forces, to listen
to their ideas, to
advise
them, and to coordinate
a course of action
with them
was encouraged by Kennedy's
order for a united administration reform initiative.
This "open door" policy
did much to publicize
the reform case.
Cabinet level
officials, who could easily
get publicity for their
own concerns, often used
their public statements
to

re-emphasize information or
conclusions which pressure
group leaders had discussed
with them.
As noted earlier, growers
had long sought to
transfer control of the Mexican
labor program from the

Labor Department to the
Department of Agriculture.
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his Strategy became
less meaningful
during the
Kennedy era, because
the Agriculture
Secretary let it
be known that
he fully approved
of reforms
Y the Labor Department.
Grower access to him
would
been no greater
than it was to Secretary
Wirtz.
Critics of the Mexican
labor system also
gained greater access
to Congress during
the Kennedy
and Johnson eras.
Although the agriculture
committees
b ° th h0US6S rSmained
s °^ly pro-grower,

“

as the

reform coalition grew
stronger, its spokesmen
at
committee hearings were
received more courteously.
By 1961. even solidly
pro-grower committee members
went out Of their way
to commend testimony
given in behalf of reform
organizations.
By 1961, unprecedented
numbers of congressmen
were willing to support
reform of the bracero
program.
Many worked closely with
pressure group leaders.
Also,
during the 1960-s, more
congressional committees than
ever before held hearings
on migrant labor, and
this
provided a broader forum for
critics of the bracero
system to present their case.
In

the political struggle
over imported Mexican

labor, southwestern growers
had long enjoyed the decisive
advantage of an excellent
public image.
The farmer was
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seen as the ideal
American,

hard working, frugal

honest, healthy.

Feeding
eedmg the people
op
i
was a good thing,
and he received full
credit for it.
It was widely
assumed that he was
treated unfairly, that
despite
his back-breaking
work and vital services
to the
country, he was
poverty-stricken. Even farmers
who
did not fit the image
gained from it because
public
pinion did not allow for
rich farmers.
Although
many farmers were poor,
some grew very wealthy
and
bore little resemblance
to the stereotype.
For
example, some growers
owned lands so vast that
the
crops could be inspected
only by plane.
The Bank of
America owned large farms.
Some growers owned not
only vast lands but also
trucks, trains, and ships
for hauling their crops
to market.
Some even
owned

the auctions at which the
crops were sold.
the public image of farmers

However,

was not updated to reflect

this new reality.

Consequently, farmers, even those

with multi-million dollar
operations, were given concessions by the government
that were denied to
industrial corporations.

Examples include the

congressional decisions to exempt
farm workers from
the right to unionize and
from social security benefits
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(-en

if they worked for
millionaires).

Long after
other corporations
were denied the
right to import
foreign labor, corporate
farms (and others,
of course)
could use Mexican
workers.
Like individual farmers,
the organizations
they
formed likewise enjoyed
high prestige.
This enabled
them to achieve such
impressive political
power that
a grower -° rie ”ted
congressman admitted in
l 9 4 2 that
an official of the
American Farm Bureau had
actually
written the bracero
legislation passed that
year.
The prestige of farm
workers was very
low.

Although they, no less
than the farmer, did
hard work,
helped feed the nation,
and earned little,
public
opinion did not grant them
equal concern. Having
little education, money,
or property, they were
not
considered ''important" people.
Their low status was
reinforced by the fact that
many were members of
minority groups.
Organizations which championed
the farm worker
did not initially enjoy
high social prestige.
Prior
to the New Deal, labor
unions were perceived as
radical, somewhat un-American
institutions. After improving
their image during the
Roosevelt era, they suffered
some loss of standing at
the close of World War II
when
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a number of stri.es

occurs.

„ aving been
inoon .

vemenoed by shortages
and rationing during
many PS0Ple W6re
Unh
caused by these work

^

-w

stoppages.

the war

consumer problems’
The result was

passage in 1948 of the
u
Taft-Hartley
Act with its
provioiono for limiting
labor unions.
Before the civil
rights movement dating
from
the late 1950*s.
minority group organisations
such
as the National
Association for the
Advancement of
Colored People and the
American GI Forum were
handicapped by their low
prestige.
By the time of the
Kennedy era. several of
the pressure groups
included in the reform
coalition
had improved their social
standing. Moving from
the
generally pro-business
atmosphere of the Eisenhower
years into the New Frontier,
labor unions benefited
from the increasing concern
with the poor and the
new climate of criticism
of corporate abuse.
Civil
rights activity became
fashionable, and minority or-

ganizations gained social standing.
Reform activity
by consumer groups became
more acceptable and more
common.
Some of the prestige of
high political offices
probably rubbed off on pressure
groups in the reform

coalition.

In 1961, for the
first time,

they were
ailied with the
President himself. They
enjoyed the
upport of his cabinet,
most members of Congress,
and
any of the most
respectable newspapers and
magazines
the country,
if groups are judged
by
they keep, the critics
of the bracero program
had
gamed a new respectability
by 1961.

m

^

While reform groups
were gaining prestige
during the l at e 1950’s
and early l 9 6o’s, the
grower
image was being hurt.
The reformers helped
contribute
to this decline by
documenting abuses of the
Mexican
labor program and publicizing
the fact that many
employers of braceros were
wealthy corporate
farms.

One reason why it took
so long for critics of
the bracero program to
get it reformed was that
public
opinion did not initially
support the change. The
public was more concerned
about the problems of growers
than with hardships of the
workers. Farmers enjoyed

many advantages in keeping it
that way.
Being well
organized, they were able to
systematically present
their case to the public.
They
tended to dominate

congressional hearings (which often
made good headlines
and conveyed their views to
newspaper
readers).

Even
Democratic Presidents Roosevelt
and Truman articulated

402

justifications for using
Mexican labor. Until
at
least the late l
9 40's. even liberal
news media
accepted so many of
the grower premises
that news
articles often sounded
like press releases
from farmers.
Congressional supporters
u
pporters of
oi the bracero
program were
more vocal than its
opponents.
The cumulative effect
of these events was
that the reform case
was less
frequently articulated
and less often
communicated to
the public.
The widespread
pro-farmer bias probably
meant that even when the
public heard facts conducive
to reform, they were
not taken as seriously
as facts
favoring the grower
position.

Although their chance for
immediate success
was small, reformers
struggled patiently to change
public opinion even during
the l 9 40's.
Many of their
efforts were small, but the
cumulative effect was
substantial.

Even during the World War
II years of overwhelming grower predominance
on bracero policy, the
case for reform was kept alive,
and sometimes it
filtered through to the public.
In 1942, a minority
of congressmen opposed to
initiation of a Mexican
labor program spoke forcefully
against

it in debate.
By the late 1940's, elements
of the news media, began
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to question
grower premises and

*

hardships of American
farm i a bor. Some
Chicano critics of
Mexican labor importation
made
citizens- arrests of
wetbacks and escorted
them to
the border.
Such events made
dramatic news.
Two historical
events helped soften
the public
iderxng the reform
case more seriously
durinthe latter
1940's.
One was the end of
World War 11.^
he supposedly
temporary program
justified by the war
was more vulnerable
to attack in peace
time.
The other
event was the large-scale
entry of wetbacks during
the
late 1940- s.
Reformers mounted
a

major anti-wetback

initiative, and it
received widespready
publicity,
eventually being championed
even by President

Truman.

News media began to
pay much more attention
to the
problem.
Also helping to publicize
the reform case was
President Truman’s Migrant
Labor Commission.
If the reformers
had not won public
opinion by

they had probably changed
it substantially.
However, the involvement
of the United States
in the
Korean War returned a
decisive advantage to the
growers.
With the national security
aspect of farm labor again
1950,
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prevailing,

need ior
for Mex-ip^n
Mexican workers was
given
the benefit of
the doubt.
-the

i

During the late
1950's, Labor Secretary
Mitchell did mU ch to
publicise the case for
reform.
He was joined by
increasing numbers of
the news media.
Mexican labor critioc:
n
Co *gress grew more
outspoken
as did pressure
groups in the reform
coalition.
The
attempt to change
public opinion was
continued and
intensified by the Kennedy
administration. Although
opinion on Mexican labor
apparently was not studied
by pollsters, the
vigor of the administration's

^
m

initiative probably increased
the number of people
sympathizing with reform.
The broader climate
of public opinion during
the Kennedy era was
conducive to Mexican labor
reform.
The civil rights movement
was proceeding, and it
was
publicizing the idea that the
political and economic
system should be opened to
the disadvantaged.
A

broad theme of the New
Frontier was the need for
re-assessment and change. The
administration talked
much about the need to
eradicate poverty.
It gave a
great deal of attention to
rural poverty, which it
blamed in substantial part on
the use of Mexican labor.
The cumulative effect of
these developments
was that from 1942 to 1963
public opinion probably
,
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farm or S a nizations
lobbied intently
for the kind of Mexican
labor program they
wanted.
As^ the strength
of reformers grew,
so did their
self-confidence. By late
1961, it had become
apparent
that President Kennedy
and his administration
would
vigorously champion their
r oause
cause and
snu that
- Congress would
accept moderate reforms
a
reiorms. As
more and more pressure
P
joined the coalition,
as more news media
offered
support, as the reformers
enjoyed unusual opportunities
'

o.

2
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to Capitalize on
trends such as high
unemployment and

mechanization

they became increasingly
self- assur ed.
For these reasons
and others, growers
were
losing confidence
in their ability
to keep the
program
n act.
Beginning in i960, some
began stating publicly
that its days were
probably limited.
It was not just
that growers were
losing power, but the
loss had come
so suddenly.
As recently as the
late i 95 0-s. the
y reak in the dike had
been Secretary Mitchell.
President Eisenhower was
a good friend of the
Mexican
labor program. Annual
importation of braceros
reached
unprecedented numbers.
Congress consistently
refused
to reform the program.

Then from i960 through
late 1961, there were
two crucial developments.
The pro-grower Eisenhower
was replaced by a President
who, as a congressman,
had
voted against the bracero
program. Congress, which
had never significantly
reformed Public Law 78,
suddenly agreed to liberalize
it.
As the Mexican labor
coalition lost power,
its vigorous effort to
keep the bracero program
also

slackened.

Having taken a rigid,
no-compromise stand
as recently as 1962,
a year later many agreed to
termination of Public Law 78
after another twelve months

«

as the price for
any extension at
all.

Some tra-

ditional members of
the grower coalition
began to
express the position
.hat +termination
would create no
serious problems because
Mexio^
Mexican workers could
be
replaced by machines.
,

Another reason for the
e decline*.
aec lining vigor with
which growers championed
Public
11c Law 7
78 was that some
had come to see it
as more of a liability
than an
asset,
unlike its early days
as a weapon against
American far™ workers,
the bracero program
was used
by the Kennedy
administration as a wedge to
•

improve

their conditions.
DUrinf

1965, onl y an occasional
grower organization called on Congress
to re-institute the
bracero
program as such.
In accordance with the
’

pluralist
proposition that legislatures
do not initiate programs
unless pressured by interest
groups to do so, no
serious effort was made in
Congress
to revive Public

Law 78.
The pluralist model
provides for the continuation of group conflict
after Congress has either

passed or repealed legislation.

During 1965, the

struggle over Mexican labor
was vigorous.

Grower

organizations pressured Secretary
Wirtz to open wide
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the H -2 provision
of the general
immigration law and
the importation of
massive numbers of
Mexican

workers

Reform groups mounted
a defense, but they
fought much less
vigorously than they had
to end
the bracero program.
While some Mexicans
were admitted under
the
H -2 provision,
there were far fewer
than requested
by southwestern
growers.
The number of H-2's
Emitted
Steadily declined each
year during the rest of
Johnson’s administration.

Growers were unable to
get the policy sought
although they mobilized
more pressure for obtaining
H-2 workers than
reformers did against opening
that
loophole. However, the
pluralist model is still of
some explanatory value.
First, although growers
did
not receive all the H -2
workers they wanted, Wirtz
did
admit some. Secondly,
pluralist theory does not claim
that the group mobilizing
the greatest pressure
on a

particular issue will necessarily
wield predominant
influence on policy. While

group pressure is an im-

portant variable determining
political influence, it
IS only one of several.
Impressive though grower
pressure was in 1965, many of
their handicaps which
lost the bracero program
remained. Public opinion
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apparently remained on
its liberal course.
Govern .
ment concern with
poverty was greater
than ever
Although re form groups
were not as active
as during
the previous
year, any attempt
to simply substitute
H-2 workers for
braceros would surely
have fully re _
at_d them.

Also, it should be
recalled that
Plural ists do not claim
that public officials
are
merely referees of
the group struggle.
While officials
tend to be responsive
to it. they also
develop their
own group identities.
President Johnson was
deeply

committed to anti-poverty
reforms and any retreat
on
the question of
formal Mexican labor
programs would
have been out of
character for his administration.
Also,

the 1964 congressional
elections had swept

into office far more
liberal Democrats, the
type of
congressmen most apt to
oppose bracero programs.
By the fall of
1965, Secretary Wirtz had
been
able to effectively defuse
the grower initiative
for
H-2 workers. As more
crops were cultivated
and harvested by machinery and
as the federal government

mounted a successful program
to supply domestic
workers, farmers pursued
the H-2 cause less
vigorously.

During the post-bracero era,
reform interest
groups have exerted moderate
pressure on Congress to
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cope with the
apparently large number
of Mexican
workers who enter the
United States as commuters
and
border-crossers
Faithfully reflecting the
low
level of pressure.
Congress has responded
a little,
Ut n0t mU ° h
legislation has been introduced
and
explained on the noor
floor o-f
u
of the House
and Senate but
has consistently died
in committee.
.

'

rrom 1965 to 1968,
reformers said little about
the growing wetback
problem.
No serious effort was
made in Congress to cope
with it. However, since
President Nixon's election,
traditional critics of Mexican
labor programs have turned
their attention more
to the

wetback issue, and increasing
pressure has been placed
on Congress to come up
with a solution. During
the past
two years, the pressure
has reached something
of a peak.

During that time, President
Nixon has called for tough
new legislation to penalize
the employers of wetbacks.
Each house of Congress has
passed a wetback bill,
but because they have been
unable
to agree on a

compromise version, no law has
yet emerged.
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Some Problems with
the
Pluralist Explanation
In this chapter,
various aspects of the

initiation, operation,
termination, and a fter
ma th of
the bracero program
have been discussed
in terms of
the pluralist model.
However, some of the
findings of

diSSertati0n Seem

consistent with certain
patterns suggested by
critics of pluralism.
The purpose of this section
is to briefly
discuss a few of
these criticisms and
relate them to some
of the findings reported in
earlier chapters.
luralisto claim that
unorganized interests
will have only minimal
impact on public policy.
However, they assume
that almost all important
interests
are in fact organized,
and that this helps
assure that
political power will be
widely shared. Yet critics
have alleged that many
interests are unorganized
or
only minimally organized
and that these groups
enjoy
very little political
power.
They are said to be
primarily poor and disadvantaged 3
.

People
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Beginning with World War
I, the national
government allowed a
generous flow of Mexican
workers
to southwestern
growers.
Although American farm
labor had the most to
lose by this policy,
it was
not organized so it
could effectively check
the influence of growers who
had long been organized
into
powerful groups. Nor were
American farm workers
organized so they could
speak for themselves as the
World War II bracero
program was instituted. Only
during the l 9 60's did they
achieve some modicum of or
ganization and begin to apply
pressure in an effort
to shape the Mexican
labor policy of the American
government. Even now their
organizations wield only
minimal influence on the
national government.
Inasmuch as even this small degree
of success came over
half a century after their
interests began to
be

threatened by the widespread use
of Mexican workers,
the pluralist assumption that
groups will almost
naturally organize to protect their
political interests
seems exaggerated. For such
organization
to occur,

certain political skills, financial
resources, and
awareness of interests are necessary.

These are pre-

cisely the attributes that persons
such as poverty-ridden
farm workers are least likely to
have.
The equilibrium
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postulated by pluralists
is apparentlv
apparently nn+
not inevitable.
At the height of
controversy over the
bracero
program, many domestic
farm workers were
MexicanAmericans.
Yet certain scholars
have reported that
the Chicano subculture
discourages organisational
activity.
The pluralist
assumption of natural
joining
does not adequately
account for such possibilities.
•

Pluralists suggest that
unorganized interests
are generally defended
by organized ones.
They

imply,
that this representation
will adequately defend
those interests.
We have seen that
too,

organized labor
and various other
pressure groups attempted
to represent domestic farm workers
in the Mexican labor
struggle.
They achieved some degree
of success.
For example, bracero
legislation contained the
guarantee that Mexicans would
be imported only in
the event
of domestic labor shortages.
However, it is plausible
to expect that this
indirect representation will
sometimes be less successful
than when the threatened
group is itself organized.
One reason is that the
"stand-in" group has other
concerns which it considers
more important and which led
to its organization in
the first place.
If its commitments come
into conflict
with each other, it may
tone down its representation
of

4i4
the unorganized
group.

^

At least one author
has
gested that the reason
organized labor made
no serious
effort to unionize f
arm workers until the
l 9 6o-s was
its unwilligness
to endanger its
primary commitment.
which was to industrial
labor.
Allegedly, unions
agreed to refrain from
organizing farm labor as
the price for growers
moderating their opposition
to
urban unionization.
Had farmworkers been
organized, it is likely
that they would have
driven a harder bargain
than
organized labor did in
their behalf. With few
exP ions, unions did not call
for outright abolition
of the bracero program
until the 1960's. They
had
been content to settle
for reform, even when
many
American farm workers were
unemployed.

During the late 1940's and
early 1950’s, a
few farm workers were
organized into very weak
unions.
These organizations took
a considerably more
militant
pooition than did national
spokesmen for the
AFL-CIO.
It was the leaders of
these small, weak, short-lived

unions which took such
unorthodox steps as making
citizens arrests of wetbacks
and personally returning
them to the Border Patrol
with a demand that they
enforce the law.

While pluralists
suggest that powerful
organised interests win
voluntarily derate their
political
critics such as Lowi
suggest that their
demands
*,
4

*

appear to be

«„ l..ed.„«

pluralist model.

t„

^

m „„

^
tly

Once somp
me initial concessions
had
been made to worker
interests in 1942.

southwestern
growers rather consistently
opposed all reform of the
racero program, no matter
how minor. They often
used Mexican workers
who had entered the
United States
illegally. When efforts
were made to enforce
immi-

gration laws, they sought
to force officials to
ignore
those laws.
To keep the bracero
program intact and
unreformed, they threatened
to use even more wetbacks.
Such demands, perhaps,
seemed less extreme because
government often encouraged them
and concocted elaborate
arrangements to give the impression
that the laws were
being vigorously enforced.
For example,
on one

occasion, the Border Patrol
made massive arrests of
wetbacks and '•paroled" them to
work for Texas growers.
Pluralists emphasize that a
particular public
policy will consist of compromises
to the different
4
Theodore J, Lowi, The End of Liberpiidm
„
(New York,
W.W. Norton and-C^iH7TT
969K p 91

.
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groups whose interests
are at s+akp
mu
Stake<
The Y imply that
ese compromises
are meaningful, because
they are
said to increase
commitment to the system.
Critics
question the prevalence
and meaningfulness of
concessions to weaker
groups.
noted earlier, some
concessions were made
to worker interests.
They are most obvious
at the
law-making stage, where
they included such
things
as a guarantee that
braceros could enter only
if
there were a shortage
of domestic farm labor
and
that braceros would
receive the "prevailing
wage."
Yet domestic labor
shortages were certified even
during times of high
unemployment and while the news
media were reporting that
farm workers could not
find
jobs.
w e have discussed
earlier the arbitrary manner
in which "prevailing
wages" were set by growers
instead of through the interplay
of supply and demand
in a free labor market.

Despite all the compromises
reflecting the
interests of domestic farm labor,
southwestern growers
consistently received generous
numbers of illegal Mexi
can workers. Even when domestic
workers had received
the ultimate "concession,"
termination of the bracero
program, farmers never lost their
Mexican
labor.

The
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pluralist model, then,
does not seem to pay
enough
attention to the m eaningfulness
of concessions to
weaker groups.
The pluralist system
allegedly enjoys a high
level of commitment
from all legitimate groups.
This
supposedly results from its
willingness to permit all
interests to compete for
influence and to have an impact on policy decisions.
On the other hand, critics
charge that many weaker
groups are seriously alienated.
It is difficult to
evaluate these conflicting
claims

by applying them to farm
workers.

The reason is that

over three decades after the
bracero program was
instituted, they have still to
be heard from.
Even
at the height of the Mexican
labor controversy during
the Kennedy era, farm workers
offering testimony could
be numbered on one hand.
However, it is difficult
to

believe that they would perceive
"justice" in the
same way pluralists do.
To the pluralist, the key to
justice lies in group Bower.
The strong predominate,
and that is as it should be.

By this standard, it was

"just" for the United States to
import braceros during
periods of high domestic farm labor
unemployment. Yet
it is questionable whether
unemployed Americans un

successfully seeking farm jobs during those
times
considered fhai policy "to be fair.

4i8
The pluralist
expectation that organized

groups will pursue
selfish interests in
the political
has been borne out
at numerous points
in this
dissertation.
The bracero program,
itself, sprang
basically from the
growers' desire for a
"dependable"
labor supply.
The greatest
opposition came from
groups which had no need
for foreign labor.
Yet
ritlcs of the pluralist
model claim that it
exaggerates the extent to
which groups pursue
purely
selfish goals.
They argue that some
groups seek
markedly selfish goals
whereas others support
causes
which may actually threaten
their narrow self-interest.
Some groups involved
in the Mexican labor
struggle
were apparently motivated
by certain abstract
principles
of right and wrong.
For example, consumer
organizations
advocated farm labor reform
even if it would bring
higher consumer prices. The
pluralist model does not
adequately explain such cases.
Finally, critics of pluralist
theory claim that
it exaggerates the extent
to which public officials
are group-oriented. Some
may be very responsive to
organized group pressure while
others adhere more to

abstract principles of "good"
public policy.
tainly, many examples in
this dissertation

Cer-

are consistent

with the Pluralist
model.
sought to liberalize

President Roosevelt

the bracero program
and reform

domestic farm labor
conditions until grower
forces
aborted his plans.
At that stage, he
more or less
gave up the battle.
President Eisenhower
to enforce the
immigration laws until
it became
obvious that group
forces opposing him
were stronger
than those supporting
him.

Not all officials
seem to have been so
responsive to group
pressure,
1942, the Farm
Security Administration
was committed to farm
labor
reform, and it never
backed down although its
group
critics were far more
powerful than its supporters.
When President Eisenhower
permitted unilateral
recruitment of Mexican workers,
the Office of Management and Budget cut off
funds although grower
interests
were powerfully organized
and actively supported the
President. Even during
years of greatest grower influence, some immigration
officials pressured their
superiors to permit them to
apply the law.
These
examples suggest the possibility
that elected
officials are more group-oriented
than are bureaucrats
and that higher bureaucrats
are more group-oriented
than lower ones.

m
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Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter,
highlights of the case
study
presented in earlier
chapters

have been rearranged

in accordance with
selected aspects of
pluralist
theory.
It has been found
that two dimensions of
the pluralist model
are especially useful
for ordering and explaining
several of the findings.
First,
the model outlines
group correlates of
political

influence.

It has been found
that these are useful
for explaining the
initiation,

operation, termination,
and political aftermath
of the bracero program.
So
long as grower organizations
enjoyed such advantages
as prestige, political
resources, and favorable
public
opinion, Congress maintained
the Mexican labor system
for them. When many of the
advantages shifted
to re-

form groups, Congress
accomodated them by terminating
Public Law ?8.
It has been found, too,
that nonlegislative officials, over the
long run. tend to be

unusually accomodating to whichever
coalition of
groups enjoys the several advantages
postulated by
the pluralist model.
Secondly, the pluralist model notes
that law
enforcement officials enjoy some discretion.
How
they enforce the law will depend
in part
on the

.
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demands of the most
powerfully organised
interests.
With the exception
of the brief period
that the
bracero program was
administered by the Farm
Security
Administration, it tended
to be executed with
a
pro-grower bias so long
as the countervailing
power
of reform interests
was weak.
As they grew stronger
Program administrators
grew more responsive to
their
demands
One of the merits of
the pluralist approach
is that it alerts
us to politically
relevant factors
which political scientists
have traditionally tended
t0 n '"' lect ’
In this dissertation, it
has turned our
attention to such factors
as mechanization, public
opinion toward farmers, and
rural poverty.

Many
such variables figured,
directly or indirectly, in
the passage, reform and
repeal of bracero legislation.
By exploring such less
obvious roots of the

political process, the pluralist
approach may prove
useful for anticipating legal
changes
long before a

bill is actually introduced.

For some time, reform

interests have apparently been
losing certain extragovernmental advantages which they
gained during the
late 1950’s and early l 60’s.
9
Underlying and stimulating these changes is a national
swing toward
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conservatism.

Public opinion

earlier New Frontier
course.
more sceptical of
reformers.
ment has move! beyond

.

g

apparently Qff

People have grown
The civil rights
move-

its pea,, and both
private and
governmental commitment
to bettering the
lot of

Mexican-Americans an d Blacks
has diminished.
Both
public opinion and
government officials have
grown
more critical of the
ooor
T
After enjoying
substantial
Prestige, consumer groups
have found themselves
under
increasing attack.
If these developments
continue,
pressure groups from the
old farm labor reform
coalition may find their
self-confidence
.

.

hard to

maintain.

In an increasingly
conservative society,

they may find it more
difficult to enter into
coalitions with other groups.
The above developments
would suggest that relnaugu ration of a bracero
program may be a greater

possibility than the almost
total lack of congressional
concern with the issue would
suggest.

It should be
remembered that as late as
i960, Public Law 78 seemed
firmly entrenched. Had
scholars of that era paid
less
exclusive attention to the
then recent and vast expansion of the program and
more to the beneath-theurface shift of group advantages
from growers to
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reformers, termination
would have been less
surprising.

Despite its general
usefulness for explaining
the polities of
Mexican labor, the
pluralist model
faxls t0 6XPlain S °
me of
findings of this dissertation.
Even worse, it is
sometimes misleading.
Perhaps the greatest
weakness of the model
is its
ex agge ration of
the extpnt
u
extent to which
political power
is shared.
We have seen that
after more than half
a
century of controversy
over bracero programs
and wetbacks, the single
domestic group with the
most
threatened interests has
still to be heard from.
It
interesting to note that
in the many volumes
of congressional
hearings on Mexican labor,
apparently
not a single bracero ever
testified.
•

,
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epilogue
FUTURE AREAS OF INQUIRY
It has now been
over thirty years since
the

bracero program was
instituted. Almost a
decade has
passed since it was
terminated in December.

1964.
Yet
the passage of time
has done little to fill
the serious
gaps in the literature.
This dissertation is
a modest
step in that direction.

Very few political
scientists have paid any
attention to the bracero
program.
Yet its decline
coincided with the growing
emphasis on group analysis
American political science
and with a more

m

pro-

nounced American concern
with Latin America. Other
trends which might have
been expected to turn attention to the politics of the
bracero program, but so
far have not. include the
growth of Chicano studies
programs and the increasing
importance of policy

analysis in political science.

Including the present

writer, only two other
political scientists have
studied the bracero program.

Certain periods relevant to the
Mexican labor
program have been under-studied by
all disciplines,
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including political science.

The second contribution

Of this dissertation
lies in its attention
to these
eras. Studies of the
bracero program typically
ignore its roots in re-l
P
9 4 2 Mexican labor
patterns
in the United States.
little attention has
been paid
to the program's last
four years (1961-64)
or to
reasons for its termination.
Apparently no study
has been made of the post-1964
political struggle

over Mexican labor.

The bulk of this
dissertation

deals With these three
neglected periods.

Only two other researchers
have made any attempt
to explain bracero politics
in theoretical terms.
The
third contribution of this
dissertation lies in its

application of the pluralist model
to selected aspects
Of the Mexican labor system.
When this student sought to
narrow his dissertation to some specific aspect of
the bracero program
which needed study, there was
little explicit guidance
in the literature short of
reading it. Few
scholars

had bothered to identify gaps or
problem areas beyond
their immediate research problem.
Consequently, the

remainder of this section is devoted to
pinpointing
some of the many weaknesses
remaining in the literature.

First

»

there is a need to explain more of the

•
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accumulated facts in
explicit theoretical
terms.
For
example, study of the
Mexican labor program
would
dily lend itself to
a systems approach 1
Alternative organization of
the factual material
in terms
.

of

Lnputs

feedback, rewards, and
deprivation
might prove useful.
'

Secondly, a number of
historical periods before and after the brace™
4
oracero era ~continue
to need study.
Apparently no other proiect
h^a de voted any
p
J CI nas
attention
to developments since
the beginning of the
Nixon
presidency. Scholarly
concern with the World War
I
bracero program is apparently
limited to a single
published study. Although
the widespread
repatriation
of Mexican workers
during the Great Depression
was an
important influence on Mexico's
position during
.

the

mo's,

that movement has received
very little

scholarly attention.
Thirdly, a number of in-depth
studies are
needed of limited, but important,
aspects of bracero
politics which have received
little or no attention.
Court rulings concerning the
Mexican labor system
have been almost completely
ignored.
As strikes by
a

S

Alfred l? Kno P f? 197i )T

^ F ° lltical S ^ tPm

York,
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American farm workers
grew more common during
the
did they affect and
how were they affected
by the bracero program?
Did these relationships
change
as reform forces grew
stronger? How was Labor
Secretary Mitchell able to
initiate liberal, reforms
xnixiate
from
within a pro-grower
administration? Did he have
some independent power
base of his own which
encouraged
his bold action? Material
for a master’s thesis
could
perhaps be found in a
background study of congressmen
Which would identify those
who owned farms, those
who
owned businesses heavily
dependent on agriculture,
and
those who had grown up on
farms.
Correlations between
these traits and votes on
the bracero program
(and

related legislation) would
then be calculated.
It would be useful to
study the immigration
service for the purpose of
identifying those officers
who insisted on rigorous
enforcement of the immigration
laws and those advocating
lax enforcement.
What

strategies did each follow and how
successful were
they? Did each side enter
into coalitions with nonimmigration officials and with
interest groups?
It might prove useful to ask
congressmen who

switched against the bracero
program why they did so.
Since it has apparently not been
done, farm workers
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should be asked how
they feel about
wetback labor
and whether they
would oppose re-institution
of a
bracero program.
Cesar Chavez*navez s farm workers
union
should be evaluated
in terms n
f its
i+= w
of
broad implications
for the politics
of Mexican labor.

f™

m

The bracero
program also needs to be
studied
in terms of Mexico's
political system. What
role

did her interest
groups pl ay?

Were there spUts

within the government
similar to those within
the
American government?
What has been the post-1964
political aftermath in
Mexico?
Most studies of the
bracero program have made
little effort to relate
it to other supplies
of Mexican labor. How did it
influence and how was it
ln-luenced by wetbacks,
border-crossers
,

H-2 workers,

Mexican immigrants, and
commuters? It might also
be
useful to relate the bracero
program to other foreign
labor supplies in the United
States,

including the
Canadians, British West Indians.
Basques, and the
Cubans in Florida.

No serious effort has
been made to compare and

contrast bracero politics with
the earlier successful
effort to rid American industry
of foreign labor.
Arguments, interest group
alignments, and strategies
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might be compared and
contrasted.
The bracero literature
generally treats the
program as too unique.
No serious efforts
have been
made to see if political
patterns surrounding the
Mexican labor system are
similar to those

which
have grown up around
foreign labor programs
of other
countries such as West
Germany and England.
Does
labor typically flow from
less developed to more
developed countries? Do
these movements intensify
nationalism in the supplier
nation by highlighting
its under-developed
status? Do political
pressure
groups invariably arise
in the host country to
oppose
perceived threats from the
foreign workers?

—

L
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